2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
136 #include <openssl/x509.h>
137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
138 #include <openssl/dh.h>
140 #include <openssl/bn.h>
141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
142 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
144 #include <openssl/md5.h>
146 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
151 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
170 int new_state,state,skip=0;
172 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
176 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
178 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
179 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
181 /* init things to blank */
183 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
197 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
199 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
203 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
204 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
207 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
209 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
214 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
216 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
218 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
223 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
231 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
238 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
251 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
252 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
254 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
255 * client that doesn't support secure
258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
259 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
265 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
266 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
267 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
268 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
272 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
276 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
277 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
278 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
282 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
285 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
289 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
290 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
291 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
294 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
295 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
301 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
302 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
303 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
304 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
308 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
311 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
315 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
318 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
322 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
323 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
324 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
325 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
326 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
328 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
329 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
331 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
332 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
346 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
351 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
353 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
355 /* clear this, it may get reset by
356 * send_server_key_exchange */
357 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
360 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
361 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
363 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
364 * message only if the cipher suite is either
365 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
366 * server certificate contains the server's
367 * public key for key exchange.
370 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
372 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
373 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
374 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
380 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
381 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
386 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
391 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
392 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
393 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
394 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
395 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
396 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
397 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
398 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
399 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
400 * and in RFC 2246): */
401 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
402 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
403 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
404 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
405 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
406 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
408 /* no cert request */
410 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
411 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
415 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
416 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
417 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
418 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
422 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
428 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
429 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
430 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
431 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
432 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
437 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
439 /* This code originally checked to see if
440 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
441 * and then flushed. This caused problems
442 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
443 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
444 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
445 * still exist. So instead we just flush
449 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
450 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
455 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
457 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
460 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
461 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
462 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
463 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
467 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
469 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
471 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
472 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
475 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
479 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
480 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
481 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
486 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
487 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
488 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
489 * message is not sent.
491 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
496 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
499 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
500 * a client cert, it can be verified
502 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
503 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
504 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
505 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
506 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
507 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
511 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
512 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
514 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
515 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
516 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
517 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
519 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
523 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
524 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
525 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
526 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
527 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
528 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
532 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
533 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
536 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
541 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
542 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
543 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
544 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
545 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
549 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
550 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
551 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
552 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
553 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
559 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
562 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
563 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
564 { ret= -1; goto end; }
566 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
567 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
569 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
570 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
573 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
574 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
582 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
583 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
584 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
585 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
586 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
587 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
588 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
589 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
591 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
593 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
598 /* clean a few things up */
599 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
601 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
604 /* remove buffering on output */
605 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
609 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
611 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
612 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
616 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
618 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
620 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
622 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
636 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
640 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
645 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
649 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
656 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
660 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
664 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
668 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
670 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
671 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
676 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
677 /* number of bytes to write */
682 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
683 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
686 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
691 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
692 * so permit appropriate message length */
693 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
699 if (!ok) return((int)n);
700 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
701 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
703 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
705 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
710 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
711 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
713 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
715 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
716 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
720 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
722 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
723 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
726 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
732 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
734 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
735 unsigned int cookie_len;
738 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
743 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
745 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
746 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
747 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
748 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
751 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
753 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
756 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
757 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
758 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
759 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
760 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
763 if (!ok) return((int)n);
765 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
767 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
768 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
769 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
772 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
773 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
776 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
778 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
779 s->version = s->client_version;
781 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
785 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
786 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
787 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
789 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
791 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
793 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
794 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
796 if (cookie_length == 0)
800 /* load the client random */
801 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
804 /* get the session-id */
808 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
809 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
810 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
811 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
812 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
813 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
814 * an earlier library version)
816 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
818 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
823 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
825 { /* previous session */
832 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
839 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
845 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
846 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
847 * does not cause an overflow.
849 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
852 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
857 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
858 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
861 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
863 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
865 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
868 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
870 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
873 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
875 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
876 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
878 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
880 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
891 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
893 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
894 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
900 /* not enough data */
901 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
905 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
912 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
913 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
916 id=s->session->cipher->id;
919 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
921 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
923 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
925 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
926 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
934 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
935 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
938 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
940 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
941 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
942 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
943 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
944 * enabled, though. */
945 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
946 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
948 s->session->cipher = c;
955 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
956 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
957 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
967 /* not enough data */
968 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
975 if (p[j] == 0) break;
982 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
989 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
991 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
993 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
998 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1003 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1004 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1005 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1006 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1008 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
1009 { /* See if we have a match */
1010 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1012 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1013 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1015 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1028 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1034 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
1035 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
1036 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
1037 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
1038 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1042 /* wrong number of bytes,
1043 * there could be more to follow */
1044 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1051 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1056 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1057 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1059 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1061 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1062 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1063 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1064 if (ciphers == NULL)
1066 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1071 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1072 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1076 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1080 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1084 /* Session-id reuse */
1085 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1086 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1087 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1088 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1090 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1092 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1093 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1095 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1096 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1098 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1102 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1103 else if (ec != NULL)
1104 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1106 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1110 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1113 /* we now have the following setup.
1115 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1116 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1117 * compression - basically ignored right now
1118 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1119 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1120 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1121 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1125 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1126 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1128 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1140 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1143 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1147 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1150 unsigned char *p,*d;
1152 unsigned long l,Time;
1154 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1156 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1157 p=s->s3->server_random;
1158 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1160 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1162 /* Do the message type and length last */
1165 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1166 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1169 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1170 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1172 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1173 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1174 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1175 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1176 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1177 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1178 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1180 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1181 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1182 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1183 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1184 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1187 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1189 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1191 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1192 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1201 /* put the cipher */
1202 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1205 /* put the compression method */
1206 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1209 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1212 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1215 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1224 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1227 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1228 /* number of bytes to write */
1233 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1234 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1237 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1241 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1243 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1246 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1251 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1252 /* number of bytes to write */
1257 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1258 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1261 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1267 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1274 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1275 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1278 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1281 unsigned char *p,*d;
1291 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1292 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1294 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1299 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1302 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1305 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1307 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1308 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1309 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1312 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1321 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1327 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1332 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1335 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1336 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1337 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1338 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1341 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1346 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1352 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1359 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1360 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1361 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1363 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1372 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1373 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1374 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1375 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1388 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1390 const EC_GROUP *group;
1392 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1393 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1395 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1396 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1397 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1401 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1406 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1412 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1418 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1424 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1425 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1426 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1427 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1429 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1436 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1437 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1438 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1444 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1445 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1451 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1452 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1453 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1456 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1463 /* Encode the public key.
1464 * First check the size of encoding and
1465 * allocate memory accordingly.
1467 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1468 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1469 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1472 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1473 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1474 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1475 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1482 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1483 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1484 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1485 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1487 if (encodedlen == 0)
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1493 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1495 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1496 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1497 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1498 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1503 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1504 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1512 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1514 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1518 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1520 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1524 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1526 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1529 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1532 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1540 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1545 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1548 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1556 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1558 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1559 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1560 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1561 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1562 * the actual encoded point itself
1564 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1572 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1573 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1575 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1576 encodedPoint = NULL;
1584 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1585 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1587 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1591 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1593 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1594 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1595 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1596 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1597 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1598 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1599 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1600 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1601 (unsigned int *)&i);
1605 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1606 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1616 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1617 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1620 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1621 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1622 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1623 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1624 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1625 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1635 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1636 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1638 /* let's do ECDSA */
1639 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1640 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1641 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1642 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1643 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1644 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1655 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1656 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1662 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1665 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1671 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1672 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1673 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1675 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1678 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1679 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1681 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1685 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1687 unsigned char *p,*d;
1689 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1693 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1697 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1699 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1701 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1710 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1714 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1716 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1717 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1718 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1723 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1724 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1727 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1734 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1735 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1741 /* else no CA names */
1742 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1745 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1746 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1749 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1754 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1755 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1760 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1763 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1770 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1773 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1774 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1779 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1787 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1795 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1797 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1798 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1799 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1800 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1801 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1804 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1805 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1806 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1807 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1811 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1812 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1814 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1819 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1820 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1822 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1823 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1824 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1825 * be sent already */
1828 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1836 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1837 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1838 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1839 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1841 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1848 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
1849 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
1850 s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1855 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1867 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1871 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1873 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1874 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1877 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1879 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1880 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1881 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1882 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1883 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1885 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1886 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1887 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1889 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1890 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1892 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1893 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1894 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1895 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1896 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1897 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1898 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1904 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1905 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1906 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1908 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1909 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1910 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1911 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1915 s->session->master_key_length=
1916 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1917 s->session->master_key,
1919 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1924 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1929 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1941 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1943 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1949 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1951 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1956 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1959 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1966 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1975 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1980 s->session->master_key_length=
1981 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1982 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1983 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1990 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1991 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1992 krb5_data authenticator;
1994 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1995 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1996 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1997 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1998 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1999 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2001 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2002 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2004 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2006 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2009 enc_ticket.length = i;
2011 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
2013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2014 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2018 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2019 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2022 authenticator.length = i;
2024 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2027 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2031 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2032 p+=authenticator.length;
2036 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2039 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2042 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2045 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2049 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2050 enc_pms.length + 6))
2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2053 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2057 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2061 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2062 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2064 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2065 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2071 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2072 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2074 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2075 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2078 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2079 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2081 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2082 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2088 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2095 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2096 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2098 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2102 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2104 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2107 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2110 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2111 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2114 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2117 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2120 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2123 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2126 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2130 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2133 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2136 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2138 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2139 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2140 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2141 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2142 * the protocol version.
2143 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2144 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2146 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2149 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2154 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2156 s->session->master_key_length=
2157 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2158 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2160 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2162 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2163 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2165 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2166 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2171 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2172 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2173 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2174 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2178 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2181 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2186 const EC_GROUP *group;
2187 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2189 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2190 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2193 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2197 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2200 /* use the certificate */
2201 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2205 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2206 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2208 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2211 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2212 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2214 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2215 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2222 /* Let's get client's public key */
2223 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2226 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2232 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2236 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2240 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2242 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2244 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2245 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2246 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2247 * never executed. When that support is
2248 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2249 * received in the certificate is
2250 * authorized for key agreement.
2251 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2252 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2255 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2257 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2261 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2262 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2268 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2272 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2273 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2275 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2278 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2282 /* Get encoded point length */
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2291 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2292 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2298 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2299 * currently, so set it to the start
2301 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2304 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2305 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2306 if (field_size <= 0)
2308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2312 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2320 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2321 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2322 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2323 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2324 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2326 /* Compute the master secret */
2327 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2328 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2330 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2336 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2338 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2344 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2345 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2349 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2350 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2351 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2352 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2353 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2358 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2360 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2367 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2368 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2369 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2374 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2376 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2378 peer=s->session->peer;
2379 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2380 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2388 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2390 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2393 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2404 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2408 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2411 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2415 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2418 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2422 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2423 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2429 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2433 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2434 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2437 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2442 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2444 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2445 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2449 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2455 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2463 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2465 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2466 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2467 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2471 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2479 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2481 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2482 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2483 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2487 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2489 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2497 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2506 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2509 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2513 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2515 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2517 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2518 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2520 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2522 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2529 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2531 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2533 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2534 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2537 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2540 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2541 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2544 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2547 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2551 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2553 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2557 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2559 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2568 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2572 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2575 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2577 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2583 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2591 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2595 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2604 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2606 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2607 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2609 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2613 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2614 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2615 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2618 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2624 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2627 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2633 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2634 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2635 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2636 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2638 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2639 * when we arrive here. */
2640 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2642 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2643 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2649 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2650 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2651 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2652 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2653 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2661 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2664 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2665 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2669 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2674 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2676 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2678 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2679 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2680 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2681 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2687 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2688 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2693 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2694 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2699 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2700 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2702 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2703 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2705 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2707 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2709 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2711 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2713 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2715 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2717 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2719 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2721 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2723 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2725 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2727 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2729 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2731 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2733 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2735 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2737 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2739 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2741 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2743 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2745 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2747 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2749 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2751 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2753 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2761 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2763 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2765 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2770 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2771 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2772 unsigned char key_name[16];
2774 /* get session encoding length */
2775 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2776 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2781 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2782 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2783 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2784 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2785 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2786 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2788 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2789 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2790 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2792 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2796 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2798 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2800 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2801 /* Skip message length for now */
2803 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2804 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2805 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2806 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2809 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2811 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
2820 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
2821 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2822 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2823 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2824 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2825 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2827 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2828 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2830 /* Output key name */
2832 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2835 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2836 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2837 /* Encrypt session data */
2838 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2840 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2842 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2844 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2845 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2846 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2849 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2851 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2852 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
2853 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
2855 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
2857 /* number of bytes to write */
2859 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2864 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2865 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2868 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2870 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
2873 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2874 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2875 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2878 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2881 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2884 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
2885 /* message length */
2886 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
2888 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
2889 /* length of OCSP response */
2890 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2891 /* actual response */
2892 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2893 /* number of bytes to write */
2894 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
2895 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2899 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2900 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));