1 /* crypto/rand/md_rand.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
112 #define OPENSSL_FIPSEVP
126 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
127 #include <openssl/rand.h>
128 #include "rand_lcl.h"
130 #include <openssl/err.h>
136 /* #define PREDICT 1 */
138 #define STATE_SIZE 1023
139 static int state_num=0,state_index=0;
140 static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
141 static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
142 static long md_count[2]={0,0};
143 static double entropy=0;
144 static int initialized=0;
146 static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
147 * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
148 * (to prevent double locking) */
149 /* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
150 static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
154 int rand_predictable=0;
157 const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
159 static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
160 static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
161 static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
162 static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo);
163 static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
164 static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
165 static int ssleay_rand_status(void);
167 RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
169 ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes,
172 ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes,
176 RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void)
178 return(&rand_ssleay_meth);
181 static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void)
183 OPENSSL_cleanse(state,sizeof(state));
186 OPENSSL_cleanse(md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
193 static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
197 unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
205 * (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
207 * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for
208 * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash
209 * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function
210 * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state'
211 * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as
212 * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count'
213 * (which is incremented after each use).
214 * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the
215 * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the
219 /* check if we already have the lock */
220 if (crypto_lock_rand)
223 CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
224 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
225 do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
226 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
231 if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
234 /* use our own copies of the counters so that even
235 * if a concurrent thread seeds with exactly the
236 * same data and uses the same subarray there's _some_
238 md_c[0] = md_count[0];
239 md_c[1] = md_count[1];
241 memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
243 /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
245 if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE)
247 state_index%=STATE_SIZE;
248 state_num=STATE_SIZE;
250 else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE)
252 if (state_index > state_num)
253 state_num=state_index;
255 /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
257 /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE]
258 * are what we will use now, but other threads may use them
261 md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
263 if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
266 for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
269 j=(j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j;
272 MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
273 k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE;
276 MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k);
277 MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
280 MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
282 /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
284 /* We know that line may cause programs such as
285 purify and valgrind to complain about use of
286 uninitialized data. The problem is not, it's
287 with the caller. Removing that line will make
288 sure you get really bad randomness and thereby
289 other problems such as very insecure keys. */
291 MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
292 MD_Final(&m,local_md);
295 buf=(const char *)buf + j;
299 /* Parallel threads may interfere with this,
300 * but always each byte of the new state is
301 * the XOR of some previous value of its
302 * and local_md (itermediate values may be lost).
303 * Alway using locking could hurt performance more
304 * than necessary given that conflicts occur only
305 * when the total seeding is longer than the random
307 state[st_idx++]^=local_md[k];
308 if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
312 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
314 if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
315 /* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
316 * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
317 * the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as
318 * much entropy as fits into md. */
319 for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++)
321 md[k] ^= local_md[k];
323 if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
325 if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
327 #if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
328 assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
332 static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
334 ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
337 static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
339 static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
340 int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx;
344 unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
346 #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
347 pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
349 int do_stir_pool = 0;
352 if (rand_predictable)
354 static unsigned char val=0;
356 for (i=0; i<num; i++)
366 /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
367 num_ceil = (1 + (num-1)/(MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
370 * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
372 * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
374 * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
375 * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
376 * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
377 * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
378 * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
379 * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
381 * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
382 * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
383 * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
387 /* NB: in FIPS mode we are already under a lock */
390 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
392 /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
393 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
394 CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
395 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
396 crypto_lock_rand = 1;
407 ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
410 /* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing
411 * the PRNG output may help attackers to determine the new
412 * state; thus we have to decrease the entropy estimate.
413 * Once we've had enough initial seeding we don't bother to
414 * adjust the entropy count, though, because we're not ambitious
415 * to provide *information-theoretic* randomness.
417 * NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
418 * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected
419 * in a separate input pool and be transferred to the
420 * output pool only when the entropy limit has been reached.
429 /* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret,
430 * so we better make sure that the required entropy gets
431 * 'evenly distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool.
432 * The input function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md',
433 * which makes it more suitable for this purpose.
436 int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
439 #if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
440 # error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED."
442 #define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */
443 /* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
444 * ssleay_rand_add expects to have something to hash. */
445 ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
446 n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
454 md_c[0] = md_count[0];
455 md_c[1] = md_count[1];
456 memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
458 state_index+=num_ceil;
459 if (state_index > state_num)
460 state_index %= state_num;
462 /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num]
463 * are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */
467 /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
468 crypto_lock_rand = 0;
472 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
476 /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
477 j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num;
480 #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
481 if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
483 MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid);
487 MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
488 MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
490 #ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */
491 /* The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small
492 * source of entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised
493 * it may cause programs such as purify or valgrind to
494 * complain. So for those builds it is not used: the removal
495 * of such a small source of entropy has negligible impact on
501 k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num;
504 MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k);
505 MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
508 MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
509 MD_Final(&m,local_md);
511 for (i=0; i<MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2; i++)
513 state[st_idx++]^=local_md[i]; /* may compete with other threads */
514 if (st_idx >= st_num)
517 *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2];
522 MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
523 MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
527 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
528 MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
533 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
535 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
542 RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
543 ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
544 "http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html");
549 static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
551 return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
554 /* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not
556 static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
558 return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
561 static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
567 CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
568 /* check if we already have the lock
569 * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
570 if (crypto_lock_rand)
572 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
573 do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
574 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
581 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
583 /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
584 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
585 CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
586 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
587 crypto_lock_rand = 1;
596 ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
600 /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
601 crypto_lock_rand = 0;
603 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);