2 * validator/val_nsec3.c - validator NSEC3 denial of existence functions.
4 * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
6 * This software is open source.
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12 * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
13 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
16 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
17 * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
19 * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may
20 * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
21 * specific prior written permission.
23 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
24 * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
25 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
26 * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
27 * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
28 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
29 * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
30 * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
31 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
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33 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
39 * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
40 * The functions help with NSEC3 checking, the different NSEC3 proofs
41 * for denial of existence, and proofs for presence of types.
45 #include "validator/val_nsec3.h"
46 #include "validator/val_secalgo.h"
47 #include "validator/validator.h"
48 #include "validator/val_kentry.h"
49 #include "services/cache/rrset.h"
50 #include "util/regional.h"
51 #include "util/rbtree.h"
52 #include "util/module.h"
53 #include "util/net_help.h"
54 #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h"
55 #include "util/data/dname.h"
56 #include "util/data/msgreply.h"
57 /* we include nsec.h for the bitmap_has_type function */
58 #include "validator/val_nsec.h"
59 #include "sldns/sbuffer.h"
62 * This function we get from ldns-compat or from base system
63 * it returns the number of data bytes stored at the target, or <0 on error.
65 int sldns_b32_ntop_extended_hex(uint8_t const *src, size_t srclength,
66 char *target, size_t targsize);
68 * This function we get from ldns-compat or from base system
69 * it returns the number of data bytes stored at the target, or <0 on error.
71 int sldns_b32_pton_extended_hex(char const *src, size_t hashed_owner_str_len,
72 uint8_t *target, size_t targsize);
75 * Closest encloser (ce) proof results
76 * Contains the ce and the next-closer (nc) proof.
79 /** the closest encloser name */
83 /** NSEC3 record that proved ce. rrset */
84 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ce_rrset;
85 /** NSEC3 record that proved ce. rr number */
87 /** NSEC3 record that proved nc. rrset */
88 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nc_rrset;
89 /** NSEC3 record that proved nc. rr*/
94 * Filter conditions for NSEC3 proof
95 * Used to iterate over the applicable NSEC3 RRs.
98 /** Zone name, only NSEC3 records for this zone are considered */
100 /** length of the zonename */
102 /** the list of NSEC3s to filter; array */
103 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list;
104 /** number of rrsets in list */
106 /** class of records for the NSEC3, only this class applies */
110 /** return number of rrs in an rrset */
112 rrset_get_count(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
114 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
120 /** return if nsec3 RR has unknown flags */
122 nsec3_unknown_flags(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r)
124 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
126 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
127 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+2)
128 return 0; /* malformed */
129 return (int)(d->rr_data[r][2+1] & NSEC3_UNKNOWN_FLAGS);
133 nsec3_has_optout(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r)
135 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
137 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
138 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+2)
139 return 0; /* malformed */
140 return (int)(d->rr_data[r][2+1] & NSEC3_OPTOUT);
143 /** return nsec3 RR algorithm */
145 nsec3_get_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r)
147 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
149 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
150 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+1)
151 return 0; /* malformed */
152 return (int)(d->rr_data[r][2+0]);
155 /** return if nsec3 RR has known algorithm */
157 nsec3_known_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r)
159 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
161 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
162 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+1)
163 return 0; /* malformed */
164 switch(d->rr_data[r][2+0]) {
165 case NSEC3_HASH_SHA1:
171 /** return nsec3 RR iteration count */
173 nsec3_get_iter(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r)
176 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
178 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
179 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+4)
180 return 0; /* malformed */
181 memmove(&i, d->rr_data[r]+2+2, sizeof(i));
186 /** return nsec3 RR salt */
188 nsec3_get_salt(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r,
189 uint8_t** salt, size_t* saltlen)
191 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
193 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
194 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+5) {
197 return 0; /* malformed */
199 *saltlen = (size_t)d->rr_data[r][2+4];
200 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+5+(size_t)*saltlen) {
203 return 0; /* malformed */
205 *salt = d->rr_data[r]+2+5;
209 int nsec3_get_params(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r,
210 int* algo, size_t* iter, uint8_t** salt, size_t* saltlen)
212 if(!nsec3_known_algo(rrset, r) || nsec3_unknown_flags(rrset, r))
214 if(!nsec3_get_salt(rrset, r, salt, saltlen))
216 *algo = nsec3_get_algo(rrset, r);
217 *iter = nsec3_get_iter(rrset, r);
222 nsec3_get_nextowner(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r,
223 uint8_t** next, size_t* nextlen)
226 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
228 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
229 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+5) {
232 return 0; /* malformed */
234 saltlen = (size_t)d->rr_data[r][2+4];
235 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+5+saltlen+1) {
238 return 0; /* malformed */
240 *nextlen = (size_t)d->rr_data[r][2+5+saltlen];
241 if(d->rr_len[r] < 2+5+saltlen+1+*nextlen) {
244 return 0; /* malformed */
246 *next = d->rr_data[r]+2+5+saltlen+1;
250 size_t nsec3_hash_to_b32(uint8_t* hash, size_t hashlen, uint8_t* zone,
251 size_t zonelen, uint8_t* buf, size_t max)
253 /* write b32 of name, leave one for length */
255 if(max < hashlen*2+1) /* quick approx of b32, as if hexb16 */
257 ret = sldns_b32_ntop_extended_hex(hash, hashlen, (char*)buf+1, max-1);
260 buf[0] = (uint8_t)ret; /* length of b32 label */
262 if(max - ret < zonelen)
264 memmove(buf+ret, zone, zonelen);
265 return zonelen+(size_t)ret;
268 size_t nsec3_get_nextowner_b32(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r,
269 uint8_t* buf, size_t max)
272 size_t nmlen, zonelen;
273 if(!nsec3_get_nextowner(rrset, r, &nm, &nmlen))
275 /* append zone name; the owner name must be <b32>.zone */
276 zone = rrset->rk.dname;
277 zonelen = rrset->rk.dname_len;
278 dname_remove_label(&zone, &zonelen);
279 return nsec3_hash_to_b32(nm, nmlen, zone, zonelen, buf, max);
283 nsec3_has_type(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int r, uint16_t type)
286 size_t bitlen, skiplen;
287 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
289 log_assert(d && r < (int)d->count);
292 if(d->rr_len[r] < skiplen+1)
293 return 0; /* malformed, too short */
294 skiplen += 1+(size_t)d->rr_data[r][skiplen];
295 /* skip next hashed owner */
296 if(d->rr_len[r] < skiplen+1)
297 return 0; /* malformed, too short */
298 skiplen += 1+(size_t)d->rr_data[r][skiplen];
299 if(d->rr_len[r] < skiplen)
300 return 0; /* malformed, too short */
301 bitlen = d->rr_len[r] - skiplen;
302 bitmap = d->rr_data[r]+skiplen;
303 return nsecbitmap_has_type_rdata(bitmap, bitlen, type);
307 * Iterate through NSEC3 list, per RR
308 * This routine gives the next RR in the list (or sets rrset null).
313 * struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset;
314 * for(rrset=filter_first(filter, &rrsetnum, &rrnum); rrset;
315 * rrset=filter_next(filter, &rrsetnum, &rrnum))
319 * o unknown flag NSEC3s
320 * o unknown algorithm NSEC3s.
321 * @param filter: nsec3 filter structure.
322 * @param rrsetnum: in/out rrset number to look at.
323 * @param rrnum: in/out rr number in rrset to look at.
324 * @returns ptr to the next rrset (or NULL at end).
326 static struct ub_packed_rrset_key*
327 filter_next(struct nsec3_filter* filter, size_t* rrsetnum, int* rrnum)
333 if(!filter->zone) /* empty list */
335 for(i=*rrsetnum; i<filter->num; i++) {
336 /* see if RRset qualifies */
337 if(ntohs(filter->list[i]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3 ||
338 ntohs(filter->list[i]->rk.rrset_class) !=
341 /* check RRset zone */
342 nm = filter->list[i]->rk.dname;
343 nmlen = filter->list[i]->rk.dname_len;
344 dname_remove_label(&nm, &nmlen);
345 if(query_dname_compare(nm, filter->zone) != 0)
348 r = (*rrnum) + 1; /* continue at next RR */
349 else r = 0; /* new RRset start at first RR */
350 for(; r < (int)rrset_get_count(filter->list[i]); r++) {
351 /* skip unknown flags, algo */
352 if(nsec3_unknown_flags(filter->list[i], r) ||
353 !nsec3_known_algo(filter->list[i], r))
355 /* this one is a good target */
358 return filter->list[i];
365 * Start iterating over NSEC3 records.
366 * @param filter: the filter structure, must have been filter_init-ed.
367 * @param rrsetnum: can be undefined on call, initialised.
368 * @param rrnum: can be undefined on call, initialised.
369 * @return first rrset of an NSEC3, together with rrnum this points to
370 * the first RR to examine. Is NULL on empty list.
372 static struct ub_packed_rrset_key*
373 filter_first(struct nsec3_filter* filter, size_t* rrsetnum, int* rrnum)
377 return filter_next(filter, rrsetnum, rrnum);
380 /** see if at least one RR is known (flags, algo) */
382 nsec3_rrset_has_known(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s)
385 for(r=0; r < (int)rrset_get_count(s); r++) {
386 if(!nsec3_unknown_flags(s, r) && nsec3_known_algo(s, r))
393 * Initialize the filter structure.
394 * Finds the zone by looking at available NSEC3 records and best match.
395 * (skips the unknown flag and unknown algo NSEC3s).
397 * @param filter: nsec3 filter structure.
398 * @param list: list of rrsets, an array of them.
399 * @param num: number of rrsets in list.
401 * query name to match a zone for.
402 * query type (if DS a higher zone must be chosen)
403 * qclass, to filter NSEC3s with.
406 filter_init(struct nsec3_filter* filter, struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list,
407 size_t num, struct query_info* qinfo)
413 filter->zone_len = 0;
416 filter->fclass = qinfo->qclass;
417 for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
418 /* ignore other stuff in the list */
419 if(ntohs(list[i]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3 ||
420 ntohs(list[i]->rk.rrset_class) != qinfo->qclass)
422 /* skip unknown flags, algo */
423 if(!nsec3_rrset_has_known(list[i]))
426 /* since NSEC3s are base32.zonename, we can find the zone
427 * name by stripping off the first label of the record */
428 nm = list[i]->rk.dname;
429 nmlen = list[i]->rk.dname_len;
430 dname_remove_label(&nm, &nmlen);
431 /* if we find a domain that can prove about the qname,
432 * and if this domain is closer to the qname */
433 if(dname_subdomain_c(qinfo->qname, nm) && (!filter->zone ||
434 dname_subdomain_c(nm, filter->zone))) {
435 /* for a type DS do not accept a zone equal to qname*/
436 if(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS &&
437 query_dname_compare(qinfo->qname, nm) == 0 &&
438 !dname_is_root(qinfo->qname))
441 filter->zone_len = nmlen;
447 * Find max iteration count using config settings and key size
448 * @param ve: validator environment with iteration count config settings.
449 * @param bits: key size
450 * @return max iteration count
453 get_max_iter(struct val_env* ve, size_t bits)
456 log_assert(ve->nsec3_keyiter_count > 0);
457 /* round up to nearest config keysize, linear search, keep it small */
458 for(i=0; i<ve->nsec3_keyiter_count; i++) {
459 if(bits <= ve->nsec3_keysize[i])
460 return ve->nsec3_maxiter[i];
462 /* else, use value for biggest key */
463 return ve->nsec3_maxiter[ve->nsec3_keyiter_count-1];
467 * Determine if any of the NSEC3 rrs iteration count is too high, from key.
468 * @param ve: validator environment with iteration count config settings.
469 * @param filter: what NSEC3s to loop over.
470 * @param kkey: key entry used for verification; used for iteration counts.
471 * @return 1 if some nsec3s are above the max iteration count.
474 nsec3_iteration_count_high(struct val_env* ve, struct nsec3_filter* filter,
475 struct key_entry_key* kkey)
479 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset;
480 /* first determine the max number of iterations */
481 size_t bits = key_entry_keysize(kkey);
482 size_t max_iter = get_max_iter(ve, bits);
483 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3: keysize %d bits, max iterations %d",
484 (int)bits, (int)max_iter);
486 for(rrset=filter_first(filter, &rrsetnum, &rrnum); rrset;
487 rrset=filter_next(filter, &rrsetnum, &rrnum)) {
488 if(nsec3_get_iter(rrset, rrnum) > max_iter)
494 /* nsec3_cache_compare for rbtree */
496 nsec3_hash_cmp(const void* c1, const void* c2)
498 struct nsec3_cached_hash* h1 = (struct nsec3_cached_hash*)c1;
499 struct nsec3_cached_hash* h2 = (struct nsec3_cached_hash*)c2;
502 int c = query_dname_compare(h1->dname, h2->dname);
505 /* compare parameters */
506 /* if both malformed, its equal, robustness */
507 if(nsec3_get_algo(h1->nsec3, h1->rr) !=
508 nsec3_get_algo(h2->nsec3, h2->rr)) {
509 if(nsec3_get_algo(h1->nsec3, h1->rr) <
510 nsec3_get_algo(h2->nsec3, h2->rr))
514 if(nsec3_get_iter(h1->nsec3, h1->rr) !=
515 nsec3_get_iter(h2->nsec3, h2->rr)) {
516 if(nsec3_get_iter(h1->nsec3, h1->rr) <
517 nsec3_get_iter(h2->nsec3, h2->rr))
521 (void)nsec3_get_salt(h1->nsec3, h1->rr, &s1, &s1len);
522 (void)nsec3_get_salt(h2->nsec3, h2->rr, &s2, &s2len);
523 if(s1len == 0 && s2len == 0)
532 return memcmp(s1, s2, s1len);
536 nsec3_get_hashed(sldns_buffer* buf, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, int algo,
537 size_t iter, uint8_t* salt, size_t saltlen, uint8_t* res, size_t max)
540 /* prepare buffer for first iteration */
541 sldns_buffer_clear(buf);
542 sldns_buffer_write(buf, nm, nmlen);
543 query_dname_tolower(sldns_buffer_begin(buf));
544 sldns_buffer_write(buf, salt, saltlen);
545 sldns_buffer_flip(buf);
546 hash_len = nsec3_hash_algo_size_supported(algo);
548 log_err("nsec3 hash of unknown algo %d", algo);
553 if(!secalgo_nsec3_hash(algo, (unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf),
554 sldns_buffer_limit(buf), (unsigned char*)res))
556 for(i=0; i<iter; i++) {
557 sldns_buffer_clear(buf);
558 sldns_buffer_write(buf, res, hash_len);
559 sldns_buffer_write(buf, salt, saltlen);
560 sldns_buffer_flip(buf);
561 if(!secalgo_nsec3_hash(algo,
562 (unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf),
563 sldns_buffer_limit(buf), (unsigned char*)res))
569 /** perform hash of name */
571 nsec3_calc_hash(struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf,
572 struct nsec3_cached_hash* c)
574 int algo = nsec3_get_algo(c->nsec3, c->rr);
575 size_t iter = nsec3_get_iter(c->nsec3, c->rr);
578 if(!nsec3_get_salt(c->nsec3, c->rr, &salt, &saltlen))
580 /* prepare buffer for first iteration */
581 sldns_buffer_clear(buf);
582 sldns_buffer_write(buf, c->dname, c->dname_len);
583 query_dname_tolower(sldns_buffer_begin(buf));
584 sldns_buffer_write(buf, salt, saltlen);
585 sldns_buffer_flip(buf);
586 c->hash_len = nsec3_hash_algo_size_supported(algo);
587 if(c->hash_len == 0) {
588 log_err("nsec3 hash of unknown algo %d", algo);
591 c->hash = (uint8_t*)regional_alloc(region, c->hash_len);
594 (void)secalgo_nsec3_hash(algo, (unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf),
595 sldns_buffer_limit(buf), (unsigned char*)c->hash);
596 for(i=0; i<iter; i++) {
597 sldns_buffer_clear(buf);
598 sldns_buffer_write(buf, c->hash, c->hash_len);
599 sldns_buffer_write(buf, salt, saltlen);
600 sldns_buffer_flip(buf);
601 (void)secalgo_nsec3_hash(algo,
602 (unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf),
603 sldns_buffer_limit(buf), (unsigned char*)c->hash);
608 /** perform b32 encoding of hash */
610 nsec3_calc_b32(struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf,
611 struct nsec3_cached_hash* c)
614 sldns_buffer_clear(buf);
615 r = sldns_b32_ntop_extended_hex(c->hash, c->hash_len,
616 (char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf), sldns_buffer_limit(buf));
618 log_err("b32_ntop_extended_hex: error in encoding: %d", r);
621 c->b32_len = (size_t)r;
622 c->b32 = regional_alloc_init(region, sldns_buffer_begin(buf),
630 nsec3_hash_name(rbtree_type* table, struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf,
631 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec3, int rr, uint8_t* dname,
632 size_t dname_len, struct nsec3_cached_hash** hash)
634 struct nsec3_cached_hash* c;
635 struct nsec3_cached_hash looki;
640 looki.node.key = &looki;
644 looki.dname_len = dname_len;
645 /* lookup first in cache */
646 c = (struct nsec3_cached_hash*)rbtree_search(table, &looki);
651 /* create a new entry */
652 c = (struct nsec3_cached_hash*)regional_alloc(region, sizeof(*c));
658 c->dname_len = dname_len;
659 r = nsec3_calc_hash(region, buf, c);
662 r = nsec3_calc_b32(region, buf, c);
670 rbtree_insert(table, &c->node);
671 log_assert(n); /* cannot be duplicate, just did lookup */
677 * compare a label lowercased
680 label_compare_lower(uint8_t* lab1, uint8_t* lab2, size_t lablen)
683 for(i=0; i<lablen; i++) {
684 if(tolower((unsigned char)*lab1) != tolower((unsigned char)*lab2)) {
685 if(tolower((unsigned char)*lab1) < tolower((unsigned char)*lab2))
696 * Compare a hashed name with the owner name of an NSEC3 RRset.
697 * @param flt: filter with zone name.
698 * @param hash: the hashed name.
699 * @param s: rrset with owner name.
700 * @return true if matches exactly, false if not.
703 nsec3_hash_matches_owner(struct nsec3_filter* flt,
704 struct nsec3_cached_hash* hash, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s)
706 uint8_t* nm = s->rk.dname;
707 /* compare, does hash of name based on params in this NSEC3
708 * match the owner name of this NSEC3?
709 * name must be: <hashlength>base32 . zone name
710 * so; first label must not be root label (not zero length),
711 * and match the b32 encoded hash length,
712 * and the label content match the b32 encoded hash
713 * and the rest must be the zone name.
715 if(hash->b32_len != 0 && (size_t)nm[0] == hash->b32_len &&
716 label_compare_lower(nm+1, hash->b32, hash->b32_len) == 0 &&
717 query_dname_compare(nm+(size_t)nm[0]+1, flt->zone) == 0) {
724 * Find matching NSEC3
725 * Find the NSEC3Record that matches a hash of a name.
726 * @param env: module environment with temporary region and buffer.
727 * @param flt: the NSEC3 RR filter, contains zone name and RRs.
728 * @param ct: cached hashes table.
729 * @param nm: name to look for.
730 * @param nmlen: length of name.
731 * @param rrset: nsec3 that matches is returned here.
732 * @param rr: rr number in nsec3 rrset that matches.
733 * @return true if a matching NSEC3 is found, false if not.
736 find_matching_nsec3(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt,
737 rbtree_type* ct, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen,
738 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** rrset, int* rr)
742 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
743 struct nsec3_cached_hash* hash = NULL;
746 /* this loop skips other-zone and unknown NSEC3s, also non-NSEC3 RRs */
747 for(s=filter_first(flt, &i_rs, &i_rr); s;
748 s=filter_next(flt, &i_rs, &i_rr)) {
749 /* get name hashed for this NSEC3 RR */
750 r = nsec3_hash_name(ct, env->scratch, env->scratch_buffer,
751 s, i_rr, nm, nmlen, &hash);
753 log_err("nsec3: malloc failure");
754 break; /* alloc failure */
756 continue; /* malformed NSEC3 */
757 else if(nsec3_hash_matches_owner(flt, hash, s)) {
758 *rrset = s; /* rrset with this name */
759 *rr = i_rr; /* matches hash with these parameters */
769 nsec3_covers(uint8_t* zone, struct nsec3_cached_hash* hash,
770 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int rr, sldns_buffer* buf)
772 uint8_t* next, *owner;
775 if(!nsec3_get_nextowner(rrset, rr, &next, &nextlen))
776 return 0; /* malformed RR proves nothing */
778 /* check the owner name is a hashed value . apex
779 * base32 encoded values must have equal length.
780 * hash_value and next hash value must have equal length. */
781 if(nextlen != hash->hash_len || hash->hash_len==0||hash->b32_len==0||
782 (size_t)*rrset->rk.dname != hash->b32_len ||
783 query_dname_compare(rrset->rk.dname+1+
784 (size_t)*rrset->rk.dname, zone) != 0)
785 return 0; /* bad lengths or owner name */
787 /* This is the "normal case: owner < next and owner < hash < next */
788 if(label_compare_lower(rrset->rk.dname+1, hash->b32,
789 hash->b32_len) < 0 &&
790 memcmp(hash->hash, next, nextlen) < 0)
793 /* convert owner name from text to binary */
794 sldns_buffer_clear(buf);
795 owner = sldns_buffer_begin(buf);
796 len = sldns_b32_pton_extended_hex((char*)rrset->rk.dname+1,
797 hash->b32_len, owner, sldns_buffer_limit(buf));
799 return 0; /* bad owner name in some way */
800 if((size_t)len != hash->hash_len || (size_t)len != nextlen)
801 return 0; /* wrong length */
803 /* this is the end of zone case: next <= owner &&
804 * (hash > owner || hash < next)
805 * this also covers the only-apex case of next==owner.
807 if(memcmp(next, owner, nextlen) <= 0 &&
808 ( memcmp(hash->hash, owner, nextlen) > 0 ||
809 memcmp(hash->hash, next, nextlen) < 0)) {
817 * Given a name, find a covering NSEC3 from among a list of NSEC3s.
819 * @param env: module environment with temporary region and buffer.
820 * @param flt: the NSEC3 RR filter, contains zone name and RRs.
821 * @param ct: cached hashes table.
822 * @param nm: name to check if covered.
823 * @param nmlen: length of name.
824 * @param rrset: covering NSEC3 rrset is returned here.
825 * @param rr: rr of cover is returned here.
826 * @return true if a covering NSEC3 is found, false if not.
829 find_covering_nsec3(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt,
830 rbtree_type* ct, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen,
831 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** rrset, int* rr)
835 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
836 struct nsec3_cached_hash* hash = NULL;
839 /* this loop skips other-zone and unknown NSEC3s, also non-NSEC3 RRs */
840 for(s=filter_first(flt, &i_rs, &i_rr); s;
841 s=filter_next(flt, &i_rs, &i_rr)) {
842 /* get name hashed for this NSEC3 RR */
843 r = nsec3_hash_name(ct, env->scratch, env->scratch_buffer,
844 s, i_rr, nm, nmlen, &hash);
846 log_err("nsec3: malloc failure");
847 break; /* alloc failure */
849 continue; /* malformed NSEC3 */
850 else if(nsec3_covers(flt->zone, hash, s, i_rr,
851 env->scratch_buffer)) {
852 *rrset = s; /* rrset with this name */
853 *rr = i_rr; /* covers hash with these parameters */
863 * findClosestEncloser
864 * Given a name and a list of NSEC3s, find the candidate closest encloser.
865 * This will be the first ancestor of 'name' (including itself) to have a
867 * @param env: module environment with temporary region and buffer.
868 * @param flt: the NSEC3 RR filter, contains zone name and RRs.
869 * @param ct: cached hashes table.
870 * @param qinfo: query that is verified for.
871 * @param ce: closest encloser information is returned in here.
872 * @return true if a closest encloser candidate is found, false if not.
875 nsec3_find_closest_encloser(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt,
876 rbtree_type* ct, struct query_info* qinfo, struct ce_response* ce)
878 uint8_t* nm = qinfo->qname;
879 size_t nmlen = qinfo->qname_len;
881 /* This scans from longest name to shortest, so the first match
882 * we find is the only viable candidate. */
884 /* (David:) FIXME: modify so that the NSEC3 matching the zone apex need
885 * not be present. (Mark Andrews idea).
886 * (Wouter:) But make sure you check for DNAME bit in zone apex,
887 * if the NSEC3 you find is the only NSEC3 in the zone, then this
888 * may be the case. */
890 while(dname_subdomain_c(nm, flt->zone)) {
891 if(find_matching_nsec3(env, flt, ct, nm, nmlen,
892 &ce->ce_rrset, &ce->ce_rr)) {
897 dname_remove_label(&nm, &nmlen);
903 * Given a qname and its proven closest encloser, calculate the "next
904 * closest" name. Basically, this is the name that is one label longer than
905 * the closest encloser that is still a subdomain of qname.
907 * @param qname: query name.
908 * @param qnamelen: length of qname.
909 * @param ce: closest encloser
910 * @param nm: result name.
911 * @param nmlen: length of nm.
914 next_closer(uint8_t* qname, size_t qnamelen, uint8_t* ce,
915 uint8_t** nm, size_t* nmlen)
917 int strip = dname_count_labels(qname) - dname_count_labels(ce) -1;
921 dname_remove_labels(nm, nmlen, strip);
925 * proveClosestEncloser
926 * Given a List of nsec3 RRs, find and prove the closest encloser to qname.
927 * @param env: module environment with temporary region and buffer.
928 * @param flt: the NSEC3 RR filter, contains zone name and RRs.
929 * @param ct: cached hashes table.
930 * @param qinfo: query that is verified for.
931 * @param prove_does_not_exist: If true, then if the closest encloser
932 * turns out to be qname, then null is returned.
933 * If set true, and the return value is true, then you can be
934 * certain that the ce.nc_rrset and ce.nc_rr are set properly.
935 * @param ce: closest encloser information is returned in here.
936 * @return bogus if no closest encloser could be proven.
937 * secure if a closest encloser could be proven, ce is set.
938 * insecure if the closest-encloser candidate turns out to prove
939 * that an insecure delegation exists above the qname.
941 static enum sec_status
942 nsec3_prove_closest_encloser(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt,
943 rbtree_type* ct, struct query_info* qinfo, int prove_does_not_exist,
944 struct ce_response* ce)
948 /* robust: clean out ce, in case it gets abused later */
949 memset(ce, 0, sizeof(*ce));
951 if(!nsec3_find_closest_encloser(env, flt, ct, qinfo, ce)) {
952 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 proveClosestEncloser: could "
953 "not find a candidate for the closest encloser.");
954 return sec_status_bogus;
956 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "ce candidate", ce->ce, 0, 0);
958 if(query_dname_compare(ce->ce, qinfo->qname) == 0) {
959 if(prove_does_not_exist) {
960 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 proveClosestEncloser: "
961 "proved that qname existed, bad");
962 return sec_status_bogus;
964 /* otherwise, we need to nothing else to prove that qname
965 * is its own closest encloser. */
966 return sec_status_secure;
969 /* If the closest encloser is actually a delegation, then the
970 * response should have been a referral. If it is a DNAME, then
971 * it should have been a DNAME response. */
972 if(nsec3_has_type(ce->ce_rrset, ce->ce_rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) &&
973 !nsec3_has_type(ce->ce_rrset, ce->ce_rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) {
974 if(!nsec3_has_type(ce->ce_rrset, ce->ce_rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)) {
975 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 proveClosestEncloser: "
976 "closest encloser is insecure delegation");
977 return sec_status_insecure;
979 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 proveClosestEncloser: closest "
980 "encloser was a delegation, bad");
981 return sec_status_bogus;
983 if(nsec3_has_type(ce->ce_rrset, ce->ce_rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME)) {
984 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 proveClosestEncloser: closest "
985 "encloser was a DNAME, bad");
986 return sec_status_bogus;
989 /* Otherwise, we need to show that the next closer name is covered. */
990 next_closer(qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, ce->ce, &nc, &nc_len);
991 if(!find_covering_nsec3(env, flt, ct, nc, nc_len,
992 &ce->nc_rrset, &ce->nc_rr)) {
993 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3: Could not find proof that the "
994 "candidate encloser was the closest encloser");
995 return sec_status_bogus;
997 return sec_status_secure;
1000 /** allocate a wildcard for the closest encloser */
1002 nsec3_ce_wildcard(struct regional* region, uint8_t* ce, size_t celen,
1006 if(celen > LDNS_MAX_DOMAINLEN - 2)
1007 return 0; /* too long */
1008 nm = (uint8_t*)regional_alloc(region, celen+2);
1010 log_err("nsec3 wildcard: out of memory");
1011 return 0; /* alloc failure */
1014 nm[1] = (uint8_t)'*'; /* wildcard label */
1015 memmove(nm+2, ce, celen);
1020 /** Do the name error proof */
1021 static enum sec_status
1022 nsec3_do_prove_nameerror(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt,
1023 rbtree_type* ct, struct query_info* qinfo)
1025 struct ce_response ce;
1028 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* wc_rrset;
1030 enum sec_status sec;
1032 /* First locate and prove the closest encloser to qname. We will
1033 * use the variant that fails if the closest encloser turns out
1035 sec = nsec3_prove_closest_encloser(env, flt, ct, qinfo, 1, &ce);
1036 if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
1037 if(sec == sec_status_bogus)
1038 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nameerror proof: failed "
1039 "to prove a closest encloser");
1040 else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nameerror proof: closest "
1041 "nsec3 is an insecure delegation");
1044 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nameerror: proven ce=", ce.ce,0,0);
1046 /* At this point, we know that qname does not exist. Now we need
1047 * to prove that the wildcard does not exist. */
1049 wc = nsec3_ce_wildcard(env->scratch, ce.ce, ce.ce_len, &wclen);
1050 if(!wc || !find_covering_nsec3(env, flt, ct, wc, wclen,
1051 &wc_rrset, &wc_rr)) {
1052 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nameerror proof: could not prove "
1053 "that the applicable wildcard did not exist.");
1054 return sec_status_bogus;
1057 if(ce.nc_rrset && nsec3_has_optout(ce.nc_rrset, ce.nc_rr)) {
1058 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nameerror proof: nc has optout");
1059 return sec_status_insecure;
1061 return sec_status_secure;
1065 nsec3_prove_nameerror(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
1066 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num,
1067 struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey)
1070 struct nsec3_filter flt;
1072 if(!list || num == 0 || !kkey || !key_entry_isgood(kkey))
1073 return sec_status_bogus; /* no valid NSEC3s, bogus */
1074 rbtree_init(&ct, &nsec3_hash_cmp); /* init names-to-hash cache */
1075 filter_init(&flt, list, num, qinfo); /* init RR iterator */
1077 return sec_status_bogus; /* no RRs */
1078 if(nsec3_iteration_count_high(ve, &flt, kkey))
1079 return sec_status_insecure; /* iteration count too high */
1080 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "start nsec3 nameerror proof, zone",
1082 return nsec3_do_prove_nameerror(env, &flt, &ct, qinfo);
1086 * No code to handle qtype=NSEC3 specially.
1087 * This existed in early drafts, but was later (-05) removed.
1090 /** Do the nodata proof */
1091 static enum sec_status
1092 nsec3_do_prove_nodata(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt,
1093 rbtree_type* ct, struct query_info* qinfo)
1095 struct ce_response ce;
1098 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset;
1100 enum sec_status sec;
1102 if(find_matching_nsec3(env, flt, ct, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len,
1105 if(nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, qinfo->qtype)) {
1106 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: Matching NSEC3 "
1107 "proved that type existed, bogus");
1108 return sec_status_bogus;
1109 } else if(nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)) {
1110 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: Matching NSEC3 "
1111 "proved that a CNAME existed, bogus");
1112 return sec_status_bogus;
1116 * If type DS: filter_init zone find already found a parent
1117 * zone, so this nsec3 is from a parent zone.
1118 * o can be not a delegation (unusual query for normal name,
1119 * no DS anyway, but we can verify that).
1120 * o can be a delegation (which is the usual DS check).
1121 * o may not have the SOA bit set (only the top of the
1122 * zone, which must have been above the name, has that).
1123 * Except for the root; which is checked by itself.
1125 * If not type DS: matching nsec3 must not be a delegation.
1127 if(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS && qinfo->qname_len != 1
1128 && nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA) &&
1129 !dname_is_root(qinfo->qname)) {
1130 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: apex NSEC3 "
1131 "abused for no DS proof, bogus");
1132 return sec_status_bogus;
1133 } else if(qinfo->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS &&
1134 nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) &&
1135 !nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) {
1136 if(!nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)) {
1137 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: matching "
1138 "NSEC3 is insecure delegation");
1139 return sec_status_insecure;
1141 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: matching "
1142 "NSEC3 is a delegation, bogus");
1143 return sec_status_bogus;
1145 return sec_status_secure;
1148 /* For cases 3 - 5, we need the proven closest encloser, and it
1149 * can't match qname. Although, at this point, we know that it
1150 * won't since we just checked that. */
1151 sec = nsec3_prove_closest_encloser(env, flt, ct, qinfo, 1, &ce);
1152 if(sec == sec_status_bogus) {
1153 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: did not match qname, "
1154 "nor found a proven closest encloser.");
1155 return sec_status_bogus;
1156 } else if(sec==sec_status_insecure && qinfo->qtype!=LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS){
1157 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: closest nsec3 is insecure "
1159 return sec_status_insecure;
1162 /* Case 3: removed */
1166 wc = nsec3_ce_wildcard(env->scratch, ce.ce, ce.ce_len, &wclen);
1167 if(wc && find_matching_nsec3(env, flt, ct, wc, wclen, &rrset, &rr)) {
1168 /* found wildcard */
1169 if(nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, qinfo->qtype)) {
1170 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nodata proof: matching "
1171 "wildcard had qtype, bogus");
1172 return sec_status_bogus;
1173 } else if(nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)) {
1174 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nodata proof: matching "
1175 "wildcard had a CNAME, bogus");
1176 return sec_status_bogus;
1178 if(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS && qinfo->qname_len != 1
1179 && nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) {
1180 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nodata proof: matching "
1181 "wildcard for no DS proof has a SOA, bogus");
1182 return sec_status_bogus;
1183 } else if(qinfo->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS &&
1184 nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) &&
1185 !nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) {
1186 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nodata proof: matching "
1187 "wildcard is a delegation, bogus");
1188 return sec_status_bogus;
1190 /* everything is peachy keen, except for optout spans */
1191 if(ce.nc_rrset && nsec3_has_optout(ce.nc_rrset, ce.nc_rr)) {
1192 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nodata proof: matching "
1193 "wildcard is in optout range, insecure");
1194 return sec_status_insecure;
1196 return sec_status_secure;
1200 /* Due to forwarders, cnames, and other collating effects, we
1201 * can see the ordinary unsigned data from a zone beneath an
1202 * insecure delegation under an optout here */
1204 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nodata proof: no next closer nsec3");
1205 return sec_status_bogus;
1208 /* We need to make sure that the covering NSEC3 is opt-out. */
1209 log_assert(ce.nc_rrset);
1210 if(!nsec3_has_optout(ce.nc_rrset, ce.nc_rr)) {
1211 if(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)
1212 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: covering NSEC3 was not "
1213 "opt-out in an opt-out DS NOERROR/NODATA case.");
1214 else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveNodata: could not find matching "
1215 "NSEC3, nor matching wildcard, nor optout NSEC3 "
1216 "-- no more options, bogus.");
1217 return sec_status_bogus;
1219 /* RFC5155 section 9.2: if nc has optout then no AD flag set */
1220 return sec_status_insecure;
1224 nsec3_prove_nodata(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
1225 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num,
1226 struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey)
1229 struct nsec3_filter flt;
1231 if(!list || num == 0 || !kkey || !key_entry_isgood(kkey))
1232 return sec_status_bogus; /* no valid NSEC3s, bogus */
1233 rbtree_init(&ct, &nsec3_hash_cmp); /* init names-to-hash cache */
1234 filter_init(&flt, list, num, qinfo); /* init RR iterator */
1236 return sec_status_bogus; /* no RRs */
1237 if(nsec3_iteration_count_high(ve, &flt, kkey))
1238 return sec_status_insecure; /* iteration count too high */
1239 return nsec3_do_prove_nodata(env, &flt, &ct, qinfo);
1243 nsec3_prove_wildcard(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
1244 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num,
1245 struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, uint8_t* wc)
1248 struct nsec3_filter flt;
1249 struct ce_response ce;
1253 (void)dname_count_size_labels(wc, &wclen);
1255 if(!list || num == 0 || !kkey || !key_entry_isgood(kkey))
1256 return sec_status_bogus; /* no valid NSEC3s, bogus */
1257 rbtree_init(&ct, &nsec3_hash_cmp); /* init names-to-hash cache */
1258 filter_init(&flt, list, num, qinfo); /* init RR iterator */
1260 return sec_status_bogus; /* no RRs */
1261 if(nsec3_iteration_count_high(ve, &flt, kkey))
1262 return sec_status_insecure; /* iteration count too high */
1264 /* We know what the (purported) closest encloser is by just
1265 * looking at the supposed generating wildcard.
1266 * The *. has already been removed from the wc name.
1268 memset(&ce, 0, sizeof(ce));
1272 /* Now we still need to prove that the original data did not exist.
1273 * Otherwise, we need to show that the next closer name is covered. */
1274 next_closer(qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, ce.ce, &nc, &nc_len);
1275 if(!find_covering_nsec3(env, &flt, &ct, nc, nc_len,
1276 &ce.nc_rrset, &ce.nc_rr)) {
1277 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveWildcard: did not find a covering "
1278 "NSEC3 that covered the next closer name.");
1279 return sec_status_bogus;
1281 if(ce.nc_rrset && nsec3_has_optout(ce.nc_rrset, ce.nc_rr)) {
1282 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "proveWildcard: NSEC3 optout");
1283 return sec_status_insecure;
1285 return sec_status_secure;
1288 /** test if list is all secure */
1290 list_is_secure(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
1291 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num,
1292 struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason, struct module_qstate* qstate)
1294 struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1296 for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
1297 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)list[i]->entry.data;
1298 if(list[i]->rk.type != htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3))
1300 if(d->security == sec_status_secure)
1302 rrset_check_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, list[i], *env->now);
1303 if(d->security == sec_status_secure)
1305 d->security = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, list[i], kkey,
1306 reason, LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate);
1307 if(d->security != sec_status_secure) {
1308 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC3 did not verify");
1311 rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, list[i], *env->now);
1317 nsec3_prove_nods(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
1318 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num,
1319 struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason,
1320 struct module_qstate* qstate)
1323 struct nsec3_filter flt;
1324 struct ce_response ce;
1325 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset;
1327 log_assert(qinfo->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS);
1329 if(!list || num == 0 || !kkey || !key_entry_isgood(kkey)) {
1330 *reason = "no valid NSEC3s";
1331 return sec_status_bogus; /* no valid NSEC3s, bogus */
1333 if(!list_is_secure(env, ve, list, num, kkey, reason, qstate))
1334 return sec_status_bogus; /* not all NSEC3 records secure */
1335 rbtree_init(&ct, &nsec3_hash_cmp); /* init names-to-hash cache */
1336 filter_init(&flt, list, num, qinfo); /* init RR iterator */
1338 *reason = "no NSEC3 records";
1339 return sec_status_bogus; /* no RRs */
1341 if(nsec3_iteration_count_high(ve, &flt, kkey))
1342 return sec_status_insecure; /* iteration count too high */
1344 /* Look for a matching NSEC3 to qname -- this is the normal
1346 if(find_matching_nsec3(env, &flt, &ct, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len,
1348 /* If the matching NSEC3 has the SOA bit set, it is from
1349 * the wrong zone (the child instead of the parent). If
1350 * it has the DS bit set, then we were lied to. */
1351 if(nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA) &&
1352 qinfo->qname_len != 1) {
1353 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 provenods: NSEC3 is from"
1354 " child zone, bogus");
1355 *reason = "NSEC3 from child zone";
1356 return sec_status_bogus;
1357 } else if(nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)) {
1358 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 provenods: NSEC3 has qtype"
1360 *reason = "NSEC3 has DS in bitmap";
1361 return sec_status_bogus;
1363 /* If the NSEC3 RR doesn't have the NS bit set, then
1364 * this wasn't a delegation point. */
1365 if(!nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS))
1366 return sec_status_indeterminate;
1367 /* Otherwise, this proves no DS. */
1368 return sec_status_secure;
1371 /* Otherwise, we are probably in the opt-out case. */
1372 if(nsec3_prove_closest_encloser(env, &flt, &ct, qinfo, 1, &ce)
1373 != sec_status_secure) {
1374 /* an insecure delegation *above* the qname does not prove
1375 * anything about this qname exactly, and bogus is bogus */
1376 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 provenods: did not match qname, "
1377 "nor found a proven closest encloser.");
1378 *reason = "no NSEC3 closest encloser";
1379 return sec_status_bogus;
1382 /* robust extra check */
1384 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nods proof: no next closer nsec3");
1385 *reason = "no NSEC3 next closer";
1386 return sec_status_bogus;
1389 /* we had the closest encloser proof, then we need to check that the
1390 * covering NSEC3 was opt-out -- the proveClosestEncloser step already
1391 * checked to see if the closest encloser was a delegation or DNAME.
1393 log_assert(ce.nc_rrset);
1394 if(!nsec3_has_optout(ce.nc_rrset, ce.nc_rr)) {
1395 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 provenods: covering NSEC3 was not "
1396 "opt-out in an opt-out DS NOERROR/NODATA case.");
1397 *reason = "covering NSEC3 was not opt-out in an opt-out "
1398 "DS NOERROR/NODATA case";
1399 return sec_status_bogus;
1401 /* RFC5155 section 9.2: if nc has optout then no AD flag set */
1402 return sec_status_insecure;
1406 nsec3_prove_nxornodata(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
1407 struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num,
1408 struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, int* nodata)
1410 enum sec_status sec, secnx;
1412 struct nsec3_filter flt;
1415 if(!list || num == 0 || !kkey || !key_entry_isgood(kkey))
1416 return sec_status_bogus; /* no valid NSEC3s, bogus */
1417 rbtree_init(&ct, &nsec3_hash_cmp); /* init names-to-hash cache */
1418 filter_init(&flt, list, num, qinfo); /* init RR iterator */
1420 return sec_status_bogus; /* no RRs */
1421 if(nsec3_iteration_count_high(ve, &flt, kkey))
1422 return sec_status_insecure; /* iteration count too high */
1424 /* try nxdomain and nodata after another, while keeping the
1425 * hash cache intact */
1427 secnx = nsec3_do_prove_nameerror(env, &flt, &ct, qinfo);
1428 if(secnx==sec_status_secure)
1429 return sec_status_secure;
1430 sec = nsec3_do_prove_nodata(env, &flt, &ct, qinfo);
1431 if(sec==sec_status_secure) {
1433 } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
1435 } else if(secnx == sec_status_insecure) {
1436 sec = sec_status_insecure;