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Fix multiple vulnerabilities in unbound.
[FreeBSD/FreeBSD.git] / contrib / unbound / validator / val_utils.c
1 /*
2  * validator/val_utils.c - validator utility functions.
3  *
4  * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
5  *
6  * This software is open source.
7  * 
8  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10  * are met:
11  * 
12  * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
13  * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14  * 
15  * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
16  * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
17  * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
18  * 
19  * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may
20  * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
21  * specific prior written permission.
22  * 
23  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
24  * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
25  * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
26  * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
27  * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
28  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
29  * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
30  * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
31  * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
32  * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
33  * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
34  */
35
36 /**
37  * \file
38  *
39  * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
40  */
41 #include "config.h"
42 #include "validator/val_utils.h"
43 #include "validator/validator.h"
44 #include "validator/val_kentry.h"
45 #include "validator/val_sigcrypt.h"
46 #include "validator/val_anchor.h"
47 #include "validator/val_nsec.h"
48 #include "validator/val_neg.h"
49 #include "services/cache/rrset.h"
50 #include "services/cache/dns.h"
51 #include "util/data/msgreply.h"
52 #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h"
53 #include "util/data/dname.h"
54 #include "util/net_help.h"
55 #include "util/module.h"
56 #include "util/regional.h"
57 #include "util/config_file.h"
58 #include "sldns/wire2str.h"
59 #include "sldns/parseutil.h"
60
61 enum val_classification 
62 val_classify_response(uint16_t query_flags, struct query_info* origqinf,
63         struct query_info* qinf, struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip)
64 {
65         int rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(rep->flags);
66         size_t i;
67
68         /* Normal Name Error's are easy to detect -- but don't mistake a CNAME
69          * chain ending in NXDOMAIN. */
70         if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN && rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
71                 return VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR;
72
73         /* check for referral: nonRD query and it looks like a nodata */
74         if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->an_numrrsets == 0 &&
75                 rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
76                 /* SOA record in auth indicates it is NODATA instead.
77                  * All validation requiring NODATA messages have SOA in 
78                  * authority section. */
79                 /* uses fact that answer section is empty */
80                 int saw_ns = 0;
81                 for(i=0; i<rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
82                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)
83                                 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
84                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)
85                                 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL;
86                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS)
87                                 saw_ns = 1;
88                 }
89                 return saw_ns?VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
90         }
91         /* root referral where NS set is in the answer section */
92         if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->ns_numrrsets == 0 &&
93                 rep->an_numrrsets == 1 && rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
94                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS &&
95                 query_dname_compare(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.dname, 
96                         origqinf->qname) != 0)
97                 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL;
98
99         /* dump bad messages */
100         if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN)
101                 return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN;
102         /* next check if the skip into the answer section shows no answer */
103         if(skip>0 && rep->an_numrrsets <= skip)
104                 return VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER;
105
106         /* Next is NODATA */
107         if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
108                 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
109         
110         /* We distinguish between CNAME response and other positive/negative
111          * responses because CNAME answers require extra processing. */
112
113         /* We distinguish between ANY and CNAME or POSITIVE because 
114          * ANY responses are validated differently. */
115         if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && qinf->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY)
116                 return VAL_CLASS_ANY;
117         
118         /* Note that DNAMEs will be ignored here, unless qtype=DNAME. Unless
119          * qtype=CNAME, this will yield a CNAME response. */
120         for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
121                 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
122                         ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == qinf->qtype)
123                         return VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE;
124                 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)
125                         return VAL_CLASS_CNAME;
126         }
127         log_dns_msg("validator: error. failed to classify response message: ",
128                 qinf, rep);
129         return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN;
130 }
131
132 /** Get signer name from RRSIG */
133 static void
134 rrsig_get_signer(uint8_t* data, size_t len, uint8_t** sname, size_t* slen)
135 {
136         /* RRSIG rdata is not allowed to be compressed, it is stored
137          * uncompressed in memory as well, so return a ptr to the name */
138         if(len < 21) {
139                 /* too short RRSig:
140                  * short, byte, byte, long, long, long, short, "." is
141                  * 2    1       1       4       4  4    2       1 = 19
142                  *                      and a skip of 18 bytes to the name.
143                  * +2 for the rdatalen is 21 bytes len for root label */
144                 *sname = NULL;
145                 *slen = 0;
146                 return;
147         }
148         data += 20; /* skip the fixed size bits */
149         len -= 20;
150         *slen = dname_valid(data, len);
151         if(!*slen) {
152                 /* bad dname in this rrsig. */
153                 *sname = NULL;
154                 return;
155         }
156         *sname = data;
157 }
158
159 void 
160 val_find_rrset_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** sname,
161         size_t* slen)
162 {
163         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
164                 rrset->entry.data;
165         /* return signer for first signature, or NULL */
166         if(d->rrsig_count == 0) {
167                 *sname = NULL;
168                 *slen = 0;
169                 return;
170         }
171         /* get rrsig signer name out of the signature */
172         rrsig_get_signer(d->rr_data[d->count], d->rr_len[d->count], 
173                 sname, slen);
174 }
175
176 /**
177  * Find best signer name in this set of rrsigs.
178  * @param rrset: which rrsigs to look through.
179  * @param qinf: the query name that needs validation.
180  * @param signer_name: the best signer_name. Updated if a better one is found.
181  * @param signer_len: length of signer name.
182  * @param matchcount: count of current best name (starts at 0 for no match).
183  *      Updated if match is improved.
184  */
185 static void
186 val_find_best_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, 
187         struct query_info* qinf, uint8_t** signer_name, size_t* signer_len, 
188         int* matchcount)
189 {
190         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
191                 rrset->entry.data;
192         uint8_t* sign;
193         size_t i;
194         int m;
195         for(i=d->count; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) {
196                 sign = d->rr_data[i]+2+18;
197                 /* look at signatures that are valid (long enough),
198                  * and have a signer name that is a superdomain of qname,
199                  * and then check the number of labels in the shared topdomain
200                  * improve the match if possible */
201                 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+19 && /* rdata, sig + root label*/
202                         dname_subdomain_c(qinf->qname, sign)) {
203                         (void)dname_lab_cmp(qinf->qname, 
204                                 dname_count_labels(qinf->qname), 
205                                 sign, dname_count_labels(sign), &m);
206                         if(m > *matchcount) {
207                                 *matchcount = m;
208                                 *signer_name = sign;
209                                 (void)dname_count_size_labels(*signer_name,
210                                         signer_len);
211                         }
212                 }
213         }
214 }
215
216 void 
217 val_find_signer(enum val_classification subtype, struct query_info* qinf, 
218         struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip, uint8_t** signer_name, 
219         size_t* signer_len)
220 {
221         size_t i;
222         
223         if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) {
224                 /* check for the answer rrset */
225                 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
226                         if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname, 
227                                 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) {
228                                 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 
229                                         signer_name, signer_len);
230                                 return;
231                         }
232                 }
233                 *signer_name = NULL;
234                 *signer_len = 0;
235         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) {
236                 /* check for the first signed cname/dname rrset */
237                 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
238                         val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 
239                                 signer_name, signer_len);
240                         if(*signer_name)
241                                 return;
242                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME)
243                                 break; /* only check CNAME after a DNAME */
244                 }
245                 *signer_name = NULL;
246                 *signer_len = 0;
247         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR 
248                 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA) {
249                 /*Check to see if the AUTH section NSEC record(s) have rrsigs*/
250                 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<
251                         rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
252                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC
253                                 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
254                                 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
255                                 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 
256                                         signer_name, signer_len);
257                                 return;
258                         }
259                 }
260         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER) {
261                 /* find closest superdomain signer name in authority section
262                  * NSEC and NSEC3s */
263                 int matchcount = 0;
264                 *signer_name = NULL;
265                 *signer_len = 0;
266                 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->
267                         ns_numrrsets; i++) { 
268                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC
269                                 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 
270                                 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
271                                 val_find_best_signer(rep->rrsets[i], qinf,
272                                         signer_name, signer_len, &matchcount);
273                         }
274                 }
275         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY) {
276                 /* check for one of the answer rrset that has signatures,
277                  * or potentially a DNAME is in use with a different qname */
278                 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
279                         if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname, 
280                                 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) {
281                                 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 
282                                         signer_name, signer_len);
283                                 if(*signer_name)
284                                         return;
285                         }
286                 }
287                 /* no answer RRSIGs with qname, try a DNAME */
288                 if(skip < rep->an_numrrsets &&
289                         ntohs(rep->rrsets[skip]->rk.type) ==
290                         LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
291                         val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip], 
292                                 signer_name, signer_len);
293                         if(*signer_name)
294                                 return;
295                 }
296                 *signer_name = NULL;
297                 *signer_len = 0;
298         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) {
299                 /* find keys for the item at skip */
300                 if(skip < rep->rrset_count) {
301                         val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip], 
302                                 signer_name, signer_len);
303                         return;
304                 }
305                 *signer_name = NULL;
306                 *signer_len = 0;
307         } else {
308                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "find_signer: could not find signer name"
309                         " for unknown type response");
310                 *signer_name = NULL;
311                 *signer_len = 0;
312         }
313 }
314
315 /** return number of rrs in an rrset */
316 static size_t
317 rrset_get_count(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
318 {
319         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
320                 rrset->entry.data;
321         if(!d) return 0;
322         return d->count;
323 }
324
325 /** return TTL of rrset */
326 static uint32_t
327 rrset_get_ttl(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
328 {
329         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
330                 rrset->entry.data;
331         if(!d) return 0;
332         return d->ttl;
333 }
334
335 enum sec_status 
336 val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
337         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* keys,
338         uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section,
339         struct module_qstate* qstate)
340 {
341         enum sec_status sec;
342         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
343                 entry.data;
344         if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
345                 /* re-verify all other statuses, because keyset may change*/
346                 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset cached", 
347                         rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type), 
348                         ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
349                 return d->security;
350         }
351         /* check in the cache if verification has already been done */
352         rrset_check_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now);
353         if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
354                 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset from cache", 
355                         rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type), 
356                         ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
357                 return d->security;
358         }
359         log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset", rrset->rk.dname,
360                 ntohs(rrset->rk.type), ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
361         sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, keys, sigalg, reason,
362                 section, qstate);
363         verbose(VERB_ALGO, "verify result: %s", sec_status_to_string(sec));
364         regional_free_all(env->scratch);
365
366         /* update rrset security status 
367          * only improves security status 
368          * and bogus is set only once, even if we rechecked the status */
369         if(sec > d->security) {
370                 d->security = sec;
371                 if(sec == sec_status_secure)
372                         d->trust = rrset_trust_validated;
373                 else if(sec == sec_status_bogus) {
374                         size_t i;
375                         /* update ttl for rrset to fixed value. */
376                         d->ttl = ve->bogus_ttl;
377                         for(i=0; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++)
378                                 d->rr_ttl[i] = ve->bogus_ttl;
379                         /* leave RR specific TTL: not used for determine
380                          * if RRset timed out and clients see proper value. */
381                         lock_basic_lock(&ve->bogus_lock);
382                         ve->num_rrset_bogus++;
383                         lock_basic_unlock(&ve->bogus_lock);
384                 }
385                 /* if status updated - store in cache for reuse */
386                 rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now);
387         }
388
389         return sec;
390 }
391
392 enum sec_status 
393 val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
394         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct key_entry_key* kkey,
395         char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate)
396 {
397         /* temporary dnskey rrset-key */
398         struct ub_packed_rrset_key dnskey;
399         struct key_entry_data* kd = (struct key_entry_data*)kkey->entry.data;
400         enum sec_status sec;
401         dnskey.rk.type = htons(kd->rrset_type);
402         dnskey.rk.rrset_class = htons(kkey->key_class);
403         dnskey.rk.flags = 0;
404         dnskey.rk.dname = kkey->name;
405         dnskey.rk.dname_len = kkey->namelen;
406         dnskey.entry.key = &dnskey;
407         dnskey.entry.data = kd->rrset_data;
408         sec = val_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, &dnskey, kd->algo, reason,
409                 section, qstate);
410         return sec;
411 }
412
413 /** verify that a DS RR hashes to a key and that key signs the set */
414 static enum sec_status
415 verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 
416         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
417         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, size_t ds_idx, char** reason,
418         struct module_qstate* qstate)
419 {
420         enum sec_status sec = sec_status_bogus;
421         size_t i, num, numchecked = 0, numhashok = 0;
422         num = rrset_get_count(dnskey_rrset);
423         for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
424                 /* Skip DNSKEYs that don't match the basic criteria. */
425                 if(ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx) 
426                    != dnskey_get_algo(dnskey_rrset, i)
427                    || dnskey_calc_keytag(dnskey_rrset, i)
428                    != ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx)) {
429                         continue;
430                 }
431                 numchecked++;
432                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "attempt DS match algo %d keytag %d",
433                         ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx),
434                         ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx));
435
436                 /* Convert the candidate DNSKEY into a hash using the 
437                  * same DS hash algorithm. */
438                 if(!ds_digest_match_dnskey(env, dnskey_rrset, i, ds_rrset, 
439                         ds_idx)) {
440                         verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match attempt failed");
441                         continue;
442                 }
443                 numhashok++;
444                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match digest ok, trying signature");
445
446                 /* Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY 
447                  * verifies *with this key*  */
448                 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 
449                         dnskey_rrset, i, reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate);
450                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
451                         return sec;
452                 }
453                 /* If it didn't validate with the DNSKEY, try the next one! */
454         }
455         if(numchecked == 0)
456                 algo_needs_reason(env, ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx),
457                         reason, "no keys have a DS");
458         else if(numhashok == 0)
459                 *reason = "DS hash mismatches key";
460         else if(!*reason)
461                 *reason = "keyset not secured by DNSKEY that matches DS";
462         return sec_status_bogus;
463 }
464
465 int val_favorite_ds_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset)
466 {
467         size_t i, num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset);
468         int d, digest_algo = 0; /* DS digest algo 0 is not used. */
469         /* find favorite algo, for now, highest number supported */
470         for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
471                 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
472                         !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i)) {
473                         continue;
474                 }
475                 d = ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i);
476                 if(d > digest_algo)
477                         digest_algo = d;
478         }
479         return digest_algo;
480 }
481
482 enum sec_status 
483 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
484         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
485         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason,
486         struct module_qstate* qstate)
487 {
488         /* as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be
489          * equivalent to no DS rrset. */
490         int has_useful_ds = 0, digest_algo, alg;
491         struct algo_needs needs;
492         size_t i, num;
493         enum sec_status sec;
494
495         if(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ds_rrset->rk.dname_len ||
496                 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname)
497                 != 0) {
498                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset "
499                         "by name");
500                 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name";
501                 return sec_status_bogus;
502         }
503
504         if(sigalg) {
505                 /* harden against algo downgrade is enabled */
506                 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ds_rrset);
507                 algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ds_rrset, digest_algo, sigalg);
508         } else {
509                 /* accept any key algo, any digest algo */
510                 digest_algo = -1;
511         }
512         num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset);
513         for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
514                 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS. 
515                  * And check it is the strongest digest */
516                 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
517                         !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
518                         (sigalg && (ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i) != digest_algo))) {
519                         continue;
520                 }
521
522                 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and 
523                  * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a 
524                  * "null" KeyEntry). */
525                 has_useful_ds = 1;
526
527                 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 
528                         ds_rrset, i, reason, qstate);
529                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
530                         if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
531                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i))) {
532                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY.");
533                                 return sec_status_secure;
534                         }
535                 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
536                         algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
537                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
538                 }
539         }
540
541         /* None of the DS's worked out. */
542
543         /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */
544         if(!has_useful_ds) {
545                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable DS records were found -- "
546                         "treating as insecure.");
547                 return sec_status_insecure;
548         }
549         /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */
550         verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable DS to a DNSKEY.");
551         if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) {
552                 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of "
553                         "DNSKEY signature");
554         }
555         return sec_status_bogus;
556 }
557
558 struct key_entry_key* 
559 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env, 
560         struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
561         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason,
562         struct module_qstate* qstate)
563 {
564         uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
565         enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(env, ve, 
566                 dnskey_rrset, ds_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason, qstate);
567
568         if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
569                 return key_entry_create_rrset(region, 
570                         ds_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname_len,
571                         ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset,
572                         downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now);
573         } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
574                 return key_entry_create_null(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname,
575                         ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, 
576                         ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
577                         rrset_get_ttl(ds_rrset), *env->now);
578         }
579         return key_entry_create_bad(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname,
580                 ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
581                 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now);
582 }
583
584 enum sec_status 
585 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
586         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
587         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds,
588         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason,
589         struct module_qstate* qstate)
590 {
591         /* as long as this is false, we can consider this anchor to be
592          * equivalent to no anchor. */
593         int has_useful_ta = 0, digest_algo = 0, alg;
594         struct algo_needs needs;
595         size_t i, num;
596         enum sec_status sec;
597
598         if(ta_ds && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_ds->rk.dname_len ||
599                 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_ds->rk.dname)
600                 != 0)) {
601                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset "
602                         "by name");
603                 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name";
604                 return sec_status_bogus;
605         }
606         if(ta_dnskey && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_dnskey->rk.dname_len
607              || query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_dnskey->rk.dname)
608                 != 0)) {
609                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset "
610                         "by name");
611                 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset by name";
612                 return sec_status_bogus;
613         }
614
615         if(ta_ds)
616                 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ta_ds);
617         if(sigalg) {
618                 if(ta_ds)
619                         algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ta_ds, digest_algo, sigalg);
620                 else    memset(&needs, 0, sizeof(needs));
621                 if(ta_dnskey)
622                         algo_needs_init_dnskey_add(&needs, ta_dnskey, sigalg);
623         }
624         if(ta_ds) {
625             num = rrset_get_count(ta_ds);
626             for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
627                 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS. 
628                  * And check it is the strongest digest */
629                 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) ||
630                         !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) ||
631                         ds_get_digest_algo(ta_ds, i) != digest_algo)
632                         continue;
633
634                 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and 
635                  * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a 
636                  * "null" KeyEntry). */
637                 has_useful_ta = 1;
638
639                 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 
640                         ta_ds, i, reason, qstate);
641                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
642                         if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
643                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i))) {
644                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY.");
645                                 return sec_status_secure;
646                         }
647                 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
648                         algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
649                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i));
650                 }
651             }
652         }
653
654         /* None of the DS's worked out: check the DNSKEYs. */
655         if(ta_dnskey) {
656             num = rrset_get_count(ta_dnskey);
657             for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
658                 /* Check to see if we can understand this DNSKEY */
659                 if(!dnskey_algo_is_supported(ta_dnskey, i))
660                         continue;
661
662                 /* we saw a useful TA */
663                 has_useful_ta = 1;
664
665                 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
666                         ta_dnskey, i, reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate);
667                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
668                         if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
669                                 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i))) {
670                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "anchor matched DNSKEY.");
671                                 return sec_status_secure;
672                         }
673                 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
674                         algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
675                                 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i));
676                 }
677             }
678         }
679
680         /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */
681         if(!has_useful_ta) {
682                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable trust anchors were found -- "
683                         "treating as insecure.");
684                 return sec_status_insecure;
685         }
686         /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */
687         verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable anchor to a DNSKEY.");
688         if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) {
689                 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of "
690                         "DNSKEY signature");
691         }
692         return sec_status_bogus;
693 }
694
695 struct key_entry_key* 
696 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env,
697         struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
698         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds_rrset,
699         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey_rrset, int downprot,
700         char** reason, struct module_qstate* qstate)
701 {
702         uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
703         enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(env, ve, 
704                 dnskey_rrset, ta_ds_rrset, ta_dnskey_rrset,
705                 downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason, qstate);
706
707         if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
708                 return key_entry_create_rrset(region, 
709                         dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len,
710                         ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset,
711                         downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now);
712         } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
713                 return key_entry_create_null(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname,
714                         dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, 
715                         ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
716                         rrset_get_ttl(dnskey_rrset), *env->now);
717         }
718         return key_entry_create_bad(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname,
719                 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
720                 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now);
721 }
722
723 int 
724 val_dsset_isusable(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset)
725 {
726         size_t i;
727         for(i=0; i<rrset_get_count(ds_rrset); i++) {
728                 if(ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) &&
729                         ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i))
730                         return 1;
731         }
732         if(verbosity < VERB_ALGO)
733                 return 0;
734         if(rrset_get_count(ds_rrset) == 0)
735                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS is not usable");
736         else {
737                 /* report usability for the first DS RR */
738                 sldns_lookup_table *lt;
739                 char herr[64], aerr[64];
740                 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_hashes,
741                         (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i));
742                 if(lt) snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%s", lt->name);
743                 else snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%d",
744                         (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i));
745                 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_algorithms,
746                         (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
747                 if(lt) snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%s", lt->name);
748                 else snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%d",
749                         (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
750                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS unsupported, hash %s %s, "
751                         "key algorithm %s %s", herr,
752                         (ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)?
753                         "(supported)":"(unsupported)"), aerr, 
754                         (ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)?
755                         "(supported)":"(unsupported)"));
756         }
757         return 0;
758 }
759
760 /** get label count for a signature */
761 static uint8_t
762 rrsig_get_labcount(struct packed_rrset_data* d, size_t sig)
763 {
764         if(d->rr_len[sig] < 2+4)
765                 return 0; /* bad sig length */
766         return d->rr_data[sig][2+3];
767 }
768
769 int 
770 val_rrset_wildcard(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** wc,
771         size_t* wc_len)
772 {
773         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
774                 entry.data;
775         uint8_t labcount;
776         int labdiff;
777         uint8_t* wn;
778         size_t i, wl;
779         if(d->rrsig_count == 0) {
780                 return 1;
781         }
782         labcount = rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + 0);
783         /* check rest of signatures identical */
784         for(i=1; i<d->rrsig_count; i++) {
785                 if(labcount != rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + i)) {
786                         return 0;
787                 }
788         }
789         /* OK the rrsigs check out */
790         /* if the RRSIG label count is shorter than the number of actual 
791          * labels, then this rrset was synthesized from a wildcard.
792          * Note that the RRSIG label count doesn't count the root label. */
793         wn = rrset->rk.dname;
794         wl = rrset->rk.dname_len;
795         /* skip a leading wildcard label in the dname (RFC4035 2.2) */
796         if(dname_is_wild(wn)) {
797                 wn += 2;
798                 wl -= 2;
799         }
800         labdiff = (dname_count_labels(wn) - 1) - (int)labcount;
801         if(labdiff > 0) {
802                 *wc = wn;
803                 dname_remove_labels(wc, &wl, labdiff);
804                 *wc_len = wl;
805                 return 1;
806         }
807         return 1;
808 }
809
810 int
811 val_chase_cname(struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* rep,
812         size_t* cname_skip) {
813         size_t i;
814         /* skip any DNAMEs, go to the CNAME for next part */
815         for(i = *cname_skip; i < rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
816                 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME &&
817                         query_dname_compare(qchase->qname, rep->rrsets[i]->
818                                 rk.dname) == 0) {
819                         qchase->qname = NULL;
820                         get_cname_target(rep->rrsets[i], &qchase->qname,
821                                 &qchase->qname_len);
822                         if(!qchase->qname)
823                                 return 0; /* bad CNAME rdata */
824                         (*cname_skip) = i+1;
825                         return 1;
826                 }
827         }
828         return 0; /* CNAME classified but no matching CNAME ?! */
829 }
830
831 /** see if rrset has signer name as one of the rrsig signers */
832 static int
833 rrset_has_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t* name, size_t len)
834 {
835         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
836                 entry.data;
837         size_t i;
838         for(i = d->count; i< d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) {
839                 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+18+len) {
840                         /* at least rdatalen + signature + signame (+1 sig)*/
841                         if(!dname_valid(d->rr_data[i]+2+18, d->rr_len[i]-2-18))
842                                 continue;
843                         if(query_dname_compare(name, d->rr_data[i]+2+18) == 0)
844                         {
845                                 return 1;
846                         }
847                 }
848         }
849         return 0;
850 }
851
852 void 
853 val_fill_reply(struct reply_info* chase, struct reply_info* orig, 
854         size_t skip, uint8_t* name, size_t len, uint8_t* signer)
855 {
856         size_t i;
857         int seen_dname = 0;
858         chase->rrset_count = 0;
859         chase->an_numrrsets = 0;
860         chase->ns_numrrsets = 0;
861         chase->ar_numrrsets = 0;
862         /* ANSWER section */
863         for(i=skip; i<orig->an_numrrsets; i++) {
864                 if(!signer) {
865                         if(query_dname_compare(name, 
866                                 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
867                                 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = 
868                                         orig->rrsets[i];
869                 } else if(seen_dname && ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 
870                         LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) {
871                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
872                         seen_dname = 0;
873                 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
874                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
875                         if(ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 
876                                 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
877                                         seen_dname = 1;
878                         }
879                 }
880         }       
881         /* AUTHORITY section */
882         for(i = (skip > orig->an_numrrsets)?skip:orig->an_numrrsets;
883                 i<orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets; 
884                 i++) {
885                 if(!signer) {
886                         if(query_dname_compare(name, 
887                                 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
888                                 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+
889                                     chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
890                 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
891                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+
892                                 chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
893                 }
894         }
895         /* ADDITIONAL section */
896         for(i= (skip>orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets)?
897                 skip:orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets; 
898                 i<orig->rrset_count; i++) {
899                 if(!signer) {
900                         if(query_dname_compare(name, 
901                                 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
902                             chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets
903                                 +orig->ns_numrrsets+chase->ar_numrrsets++] 
904                                 = orig->rrsets[i];
905                 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
906                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets+
907                                 chase->ar_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
908                 }
909         }
910         chase->rrset_count = chase->an_numrrsets + chase->ns_numrrsets + 
911                 chase->ar_numrrsets;
912 }
913
914 void val_reply_remove_auth(struct reply_info* rep, size_t index)
915 {
916         log_assert(index < rep->rrset_count);
917         log_assert(index >= rep->an_numrrsets);
918         log_assert(index < rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets);
919         memmove(rep->rrsets+index, rep->rrsets+index+1,
920                 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)*
921                 (rep->rrset_count - index - 1));
922         rep->ns_numrrsets--;
923         rep->rrset_count--;
924 }
925
926 void
927 val_check_nonsecure(struct module_env* env, struct reply_info* rep) 
928 {
929         size_t i;
930         /* authority */
931         for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
932                 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data)
933                         ->security != sec_status_secure) {
934                         /* because we want to return the authentic original
935                          * message when presented with CD-flagged queries,
936                          * we need to preserve AUTHORITY section data.
937                          * However, this rrset is not signed or signed
938                          * with the wrong keys. Validation has tried to
939                          * verify this rrset with the keysets of import.
940                          * But this rrset did not verify.
941                          * Therefore the message is bogus.
942                          */
943
944                         /* check if authority has an NS record
945                          * which is bad, and there is an answer section with
946                          * data.  In that case, delete NS and additional to 
947                          * be lenient and make a minimal response */
948                         if(rep->an_numrrsets != 0 &&
949                                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) 
950                                 == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) {
951                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "truncate to minimal");
952                                 rep->ar_numrrsets = 0;
953                                 rep->rrset_count = rep->an_numrrsets +
954                                         rep->ns_numrrsets;
955                                 /* remove this unneeded authority rrset */
956                                 memmove(rep->rrsets+i, rep->rrsets+i+1, 
957                                         sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)*
958                                         (rep->rrset_count - i - 1));
959                                 rep->ns_numrrsets--;
960                                 rep->rrset_count--;
961                                 i--;
962                                 return;
963                         }
964
965                         log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "message is bogus, "
966                                 "non secure rrset",
967                                 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, 
968                                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type),
969                                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class));
970                         rep->security = sec_status_bogus;
971                         return;
972                 }
973         }
974         /* additional */
975         if(!env->cfg->val_clean_additional)
976                 return;
977         for(i=rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
978                 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data)
979                         ->security != sec_status_secure) {
980                         /* This does not cause message invalidation. It was
981                          * simply unsigned data in the additional. The
982                          * RRSIG must have been truncated off the message.
983                          *
984                          * However, we do not want to return possible bogus
985                          * data to clients that rely on this service for
986                          * their authentication.
987                          */
988                         /* remove this unneeded additional rrset */
989                         memmove(rep->rrsets+i, rep->rrsets+i+1, 
990                                 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)*
991                                 (rep->rrset_count - i - 1));
992                         rep->ar_numrrsets--;
993                         rep->rrset_count--;
994                         i--;
995                 }
996         }
997 }
998
999 /** check no anchor and unlock */
1000 static int
1001 check_no_anchor(struct val_anchors* anchors, uint8_t* nm, size_t l, uint16_t c)
1002 {
1003         struct trust_anchor* ta;
1004         if((ta=anchors_lookup(anchors, nm, l, c))) {
1005                 lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock);
1006         }
1007         return !ta;
1008 }
1009
1010 void 
1011 val_mark_indeterminate(struct reply_info* rep, struct val_anchors* anchors, 
1012         struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env)
1013 {
1014         size_t i;
1015         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1016         for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
1017                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1018                 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked &&
1019                    check_no_anchor(anchors, rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname,
1020                         rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname_len, 
1021                         ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class))) 
1022                 {       
1023                         /* mark as indeterminate */
1024                         d->security = sec_status_indeterminate;
1025                         rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now);
1026                 }
1027         }
1028 }
1029
1030 void 
1031 val_mark_insecure(struct reply_info* rep, uint8_t* kname,
1032         struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env)
1033 {
1034         size_t i;
1035         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1036         for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
1037                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1038                 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked &&
1039                    dname_subdomain_c(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, kname)) {
1040                         /* mark as insecure */
1041                         d->security = sec_status_insecure;
1042                         rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now);
1043                 }
1044         }
1045 }
1046
1047 size_t 
1048 val_next_unchecked(struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip)
1049 {
1050         size_t i;
1051         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1052         for(i=skip+1; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
1053                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1054                 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked) {
1055                         return i;
1056                 }
1057         }
1058         return rep->rrset_count;
1059 }
1060
1061 const char*
1062 val_classification_to_string(enum val_classification subtype)
1063 {
1064         switch(subtype) {
1065                 case VAL_CLASS_UNTYPED:         return "untyped";
1066                 case VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN:         return "unknown";
1067                 case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE:        return "positive";
1068                 case VAL_CLASS_CNAME:           return "cname";
1069                 case VAL_CLASS_NODATA:          return "nodata";
1070                 case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR:       return "nameerror";
1071                 case VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER:   return "cnamenoanswer";
1072                 case VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:        return "referral";
1073                 case VAL_CLASS_ANY:             return "qtype_any";
1074                 default:
1075                         return "bad_val_classification";
1076         }
1077 }
1078
1079 /** log a sock_list entry */
1080 static void
1081 sock_list_logentry(enum verbosity_value v, const char* s, struct sock_list* p)
1082 {
1083         if(p->len)
1084                 log_addr(v, s, &p->addr, p->len);
1085         else    verbose(v, "%s cache", s);
1086 }
1087
1088 void val_blacklist(struct sock_list** blacklist, struct regional* region,
1089         struct sock_list* origin, int cross)
1090 {
1091         /* debug printout */
1092         if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) {
1093                 struct sock_list* p;
1094                 for(p=*blacklist; p; p=p->next)
1095                         sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist", p);
1096                 if(!origin)
1097                         verbose(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add: cache");
1098                 for(p=origin; p; p=p->next)
1099                         sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add", p);
1100         }
1101         /* blacklist the IPs or the cache */
1102         if(!origin) {
1103                 /* only add if nothing there. anything else also stops cache*/
1104                 if(!*blacklist)
1105                         sock_list_insert(blacklist, NULL, 0, region);
1106         } else if(!cross)
1107                 sock_list_prepend(blacklist, origin);
1108         else    sock_list_merge(blacklist, region, origin);
1109 }
1110
1111 int val_has_signed_nsecs(struct reply_info* rep, char** reason)
1112 {
1113         size_t i, num_nsec = 0, num_nsec3 = 0;
1114         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1115         for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
1116                 if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC))
1117                         num_nsec++;
1118                 else if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3))
1119                         num_nsec3++;
1120                 else continue;
1121                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1122                 if(d && d->rrsig_count != 0) {
1123                         return 1;
1124                 }
1125         }
1126         if(num_nsec == 0 && num_nsec3 == 0)
1127                 *reason = "no DNSSEC records";
1128         else if(num_nsec != 0)
1129                 *reason = "no signatures over NSECs";
1130         else    *reason = "no signatures over NSEC3s";
1131         return 0;
1132 }
1133
1134 struct dns_msg* 
1135 val_find_DS(struct module_env* env, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, uint16_t c, 
1136         struct regional* region, uint8_t* topname)
1137 {
1138         struct dns_msg* msg;
1139         struct query_info qinfo;
1140         struct ub_packed_rrset_key *rrset = rrset_cache_lookup(
1141                 env->rrset_cache, nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, 0, 
1142                 *env->now, 0);
1143         if(rrset) {
1144                 /* DS rrset exists. Return it to the validator immediately*/
1145                 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* copy = packed_rrset_copy_region(
1146                         rrset, region, *env->now);
1147                 lock_rw_unlock(&rrset->entry.lock);
1148                 if(!copy)
1149                         return NULL;
1150                 msg = dns_msg_create(nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, region, 1);
1151                 if(!msg)
1152                         return NULL;
1153                 msg->rep->rrsets[0] = copy;
1154                 msg->rep->rrset_count++;
1155                 msg->rep->an_numrrsets++;
1156                 return msg;
1157         }
1158         /* lookup in rrset and negative cache for NSEC/NSEC3 */
1159         qinfo.qname = nm;
1160         qinfo.qname_len = nmlen;
1161         qinfo.qtype = LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS;
1162         qinfo.qclass = c;
1163         qinfo.local_alias = NULL;
1164         /* do not add SOA to reply message, it is going to be used internal */
1165         msg = val_neg_getmsg(env->neg_cache, &qinfo, region, env->rrset_cache,
1166                 env->scratch_buffer, *env->now, 0, topname, env->cfg);
1167         return msg;
1168 }