2 * validator/val_utils.c - validator utility functions.
4 * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
6 * This software is open source.
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12 * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
13 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
16 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
17 * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
19 * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may
20 * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
21 * specific prior written permission.
23 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
24 * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
25 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
26 * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
27 * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
28 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
29 * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
30 * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
31 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
32 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
33 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
39 * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
42 #include "validator/val_utils.h"
43 #include "validator/validator.h"
44 #include "validator/val_kentry.h"
45 #include "validator/val_sigcrypt.h"
46 #include "validator/val_anchor.h"
47 #include "validator/val_nsec.h"
48 #include "validator/val_neg.h"
49 #include "services/cache/rrset.h"
50 #include "services/cache/dns.h"
51 #include "util/data/msgreply.h"
52 #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h"
53 #include "util/data/dname.h"
54 #include "util/net_help.h"
55 #include "util/module.h"
56 #include "util/regional.h"
57 #include "sldns/wire2str.h"
58 #include "sldns/parseutil.h"
60 enum val_classification
61 val_classify_response(uint16_t query_flags, struct query_info* origqinf,
62 struct query_info* qinf, struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip)
64 int rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(rep->flags);
67 /* Normal Name Error's are easy to detect -- but don't mistake a CNAME
68 * chain ending in NXDOMAIN. */
69 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN && rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
70 return VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR;
72 /* check for referral: nonRD query and it looks like a nodata */
73 if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->an_numrrsets == 0 &&
74 rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
75 /* SOA record in auth indicates it is NODATA instead.
76 * All validation requiring NODATA messages have SOA in
77 * authority section. */
78 /* uses fact that answer section is empty */
80 for(i=0; i<rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
81 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)
82 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
83 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)
84 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL;
85 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS)
88 return saw_ns?VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
90 /* root referral where NS set is in the answer section */
91 if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->ns_numrrsets == 0 &&
92 rep->an_numrrsets == 1 && rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
93 ntohs(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS &&
94 query_dname_compare(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.dname,
95 origqinf->qname) != 0)
96 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL;
98 /* dump bad messages */
99 if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN)
100 return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN;
101 /* next check if the skip into the answer section shows no answer */
102 if(skip>0 && rep->an_numrrsets <= skip)
103 return VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER;
106 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
107 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
109 /* We distinguish between CNAME response and other positive/negative
110 * responses because CNAME answers require extra processing. */
112 /* We distinguish between ANY and CNAME or POSITIVE because
113 * ANY responses are validated differently. */
114 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && qinf->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY)
115 return VAL_CLASS_ANY;
117 /* Note that DNAMEs will be ignored here, unless qtype=DNAME. Unless
118 * qtype=CNAME, this will yield a CNAME response. */
119 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
120 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
121 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == qinf->qtype)
122 return VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE;
123 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)
124 return VAL_CLASS_CNAME;
126 log_dns_msg("validator: error. failed to classify response message: ",
128 return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN;
131 /** Get signer name from RRSIG */
133 rrsig_get_signer(uint8_t* data, size_t len, uint8_t** sname, size_t* slen)
135 /* RRSIG rdata is not allowed to be compressed, it is stored
136 * uncompressed in memory as well, so return a ptr to the name */
139 * short, byte, byte, long, long, long, short, "." is
140 * 2 1 1 4 4 4 2 1 = 19
141 * and a skip of 18 bytes to the name.
142 * +2 for the rdatalen is 21 bytes len for root label */
147 data += 20; /* skip the fixed size bits */
149 *slen = dname_valid(data, len);
151 /* bad dname in this rrsig. */
159 val_find_rrset_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** sname,
162 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
164 /* return signer for first signature, or NULL */
165 if(d->rrsig_count == 0) {
170 /* get rrsig signer name out of the signature */
171 rrsig_get_signer(d->rr_data[d->count], d->rr_len[d->count],
176 * Find best signer name in this set of rrsigs.
177 * @param rrset: which rrsigs to look through.
178 * @param qinf: the query name that needs validation.
179 * @param signer_name: the best signer_name. Updated if a better one is found.
180 * @param signer_len: length of signer name.
181 * @param matchcount: count of current best name (starts at 0 for no match).
182 * Updated if match is improved.
185 val_find_best_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset,
186 struct query_info* qinf, uint8_t** signer_name, size_t* signer_len,
189 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
194 for(i=d->count; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) {
195 sign = d->rr_data[i]+2+18;
196 /* look at signatures that are valid (long enough),
197 * and have a signer name that is a superdomain of qname,
198 * and then check the number of labels in the shared topdomain
199 * improve the match if possible */
200 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+19 && /* rdata, sig + root label*/
201 dname_subdomain_c(qinf->qname, sign)) {
202 (void)dname_lab_cmp(qinf->qname,
203 dname_count_labels(qinf->qname),
204 sign, dname_count_labels(sign), &m);
205 if(m > *matchcount) {
208 (void)dname_count_size_labels(*signer_name,
216 val_find_signer(enum val_classification subtype, struct query_info* qinf,
217 struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip, uint8_t** signer_name,
222 if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE || subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY) {
223 /* check for the answer rrset */
224 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
225 if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname,
226 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) {
227 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i],
228 signer_name, signer_len);
234 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) {
235 /* check for the first signed cname/dname rrset */
236 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
237 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i],
238 signer_name, signer_len);
241 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME)
242 break; /* only check CNAME after a DNAME */
246 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR
247 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA) {
248 /*Check to see if the AUTH section NSEC record(s) have rrsigs*/
249 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<
250 rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
251 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC
252 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
253 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
254 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i],
255 signer_name, signer_len);
259 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER) {
260 /* find closest superdomain signer name in authority section
265 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->
267 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC
268 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
269 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
270 val_find_best_signer(rep->rrsets[i], qinf,
271 signer_name, signer_len, &matchcount);
274 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) {
275 /* find keys for the item at skip */
276 if(skip < rep->rrset_count) {
277 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip],
278 signer_name, signer_len);
284 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "find_signer: could not find signer name"
285 " for unknown type response");
291 /** return number of rrs in an rrset */
293 rrset_get_count(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
295 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
301 /** return TTL of rrset */
303 rrset_get_ttl(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
305 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
312 val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
313 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* keys,
314 uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
317 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
319 if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
320 /* re-verify all other statuses, because keyset may change*/
321 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset cached",
322 rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type),
323 ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
326 /* check in the cache if verification has already been done */
327 rrset_check_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now);
328 if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
329 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset from cache",
330 rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type),
331 ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
334 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset", rrset->rk.dname,
335 ntohs(rrset->rk.type), ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
336 sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, keys, sigalg, reason);
337 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "verify result: %s", sec_status_to_string(sec));
338 regional_free_all(env->scratch);
340 /* update rrset security status
341 * only improves security status
342 * and bogus is set only once, even if we rechecked the status */
343 if(sec > d->security) {
345 if(sec == sec_status_secure)
346 d->trust = rrset_trust_validated;
347 else if(sec == sec_status_bogus) {
349 /* update ttl for rrset to fixed value. */
350 d->ttl = ve->bogus_ttl;
351 for(i=0; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++)
352 d->rr_ttl[i] = ve->bogus_ttl;
353 /* leave RR specific TTL: not used for determine
354 * if RRset timed out and clients see proper value. */
355 lock_basic_lock(&ve->bogus_lock);
356 ve->num_rrset_bogus++;
357 lock_basic_unlock(&ve->bogus_lock);
359 /* if status updated - store in cache for reuse */
360 rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now);
367 val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
368 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct key_entry_key* kkey,
371 /* temporary dnskey rrset-key */
372 struct ub_packed_rrset_key dnskey;
373 struct key_entry_data* kd = (struct key_entry_data*)kkey->entry.data;
375 dnskey.rk.type = htons(kd->rrset_type);
376 dnskey.rk.rrset_class = htons(kkey->key_class);
378 dnskey.rk.dname = kkey->name;
379 dnskey.rk.dname_len = kkey->namelen;
380 dnskey.entry.key = &dnskey;
381 dnskey.entry.data = kd->rrset_data;
382 sec = val_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, &dnskey, kd->algo, reason);
386 /** verify that a DS RR hashes to a key and that key signs the set */
387 static enum sec_status
388 verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
389 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
390 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, size_t ds_idx, char** reason)
392 enum sec_status sec = sec_status_bogus;
393 size_t i, num, numchecked = 0, numhashok = 0;
394 num = rrset_get_count(dnskey_rrset);
395 for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
396 /* Skip DNSKEYs that don't match the basic criteria. */
397 if(ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx)
398 != dnskey_get_algo(dnskey_rrset, i)
399 || dnskey_calc_keytag(dnskey_rrset, i)
400 != ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx)) {
404 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "attempt DS match algo %d keytag %d",
405 ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx),
406 ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx));
408 /* Convert the candidate DNSKEY into a hash using the
409 * same DS hash algorithm. */
410 if(!ds_digest_match_dnskey(env, dnskey_rrset, i, ds_rrset,
412 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match attempt failed");
416 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match digest ok, trying signature");
418 /* Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY
419 * verifies *with this key* */
420 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
421 dnskey_rrset, i, reason);
422 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
425 /* If it didn't validate with the DNSKEY, try the next one! */
428 algo_needs_reason(env, ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx),
429 reason, "no keys have a DS");
430 else if(numhashok == 0)
431 *reason = "DS hash mismatches key";
433 *reason = "keyset not secured by DNSKEY that matches DS";
434 return sec_status_bogus;
437 int val_favorite_ds_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset)
439 size_t i, num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset);
440 int d, digest_algo = 0; /* DS digest algo 0 is not used. */
441 /* find favorite algo, for now, highest number supported */
442 for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
443 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
444 !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i)) {
447 d = ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i);
455 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
456 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
457 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
459 /* as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be
460 * equivalent to no DS rrset. */
461 int has_useful_ds = 0, digest_algo, alg;
462 struct algo_needs needs;
466 if(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ds_rrset->rk.dname_len ||
467 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname)
469 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset "
471 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name";
472 return sec_status_bogus;
475 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ds_rrset);
477 algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ds_rrset, digest_algo, sigalg);
478 num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset);
479 for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
480 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS.
481 * And check it is the strongest digest */
482 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
483 !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
484 ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i) != digest_algo) {
488 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and
489 * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a
490 * "null" KeyEntry). */
493 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
494 ds_rrset, i, reason);
495 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
496 if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
497 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i))) {
498 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY.");
499 return sec_status_secure;
501 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
502 algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
503 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
507 /* None of the DS's worked out. */
509 /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */
511 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable DS records were found -- "
512 "treating as insecure.");
513 return sec_status_insecure;
515 /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */
516 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable DS to a DNSKEY.");
517 if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) {
518 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of "
521 return sec_status_bogus;
524 struct key_entry_key*
525 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env,
526 struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
527 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason)
529 uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
530 enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(env, ve,
531 dnskey_rrset, ds_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason);
533 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
534 return key_entry_create_rrset(region,
535 ds_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname_len,
536 ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset,
537 downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now);
538 } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
539 return key_entry_create_null(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname,
540 ds_rrset->rk.dname_len,
541 ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
542 rrset_get_ttl(ds_rrset), *env->now);
544 return key_entry_create_bad(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname,
545 ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
546 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now);
550 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
551 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
552 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds,
553 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
555 /* as long as this is false, we can consider this anchor to be
556 * equivalent to no anchor. */
557 int has_useful_ta = 0, digest_algo = 0, alg;
558 struct algo_needs needs;
562 if(ta_ds && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_ds->rk.dname_len ||
563 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_ds->rk.dname)
565 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset "
567 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name";
568 return sec_status_bogus;
570 if(ta_dnskey && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_dnskey->rk.dname_len
571 || query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_dnskey->rk.dname)
573 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset "
575 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset by name";
576 return sec_status_bogus;
580 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ta_ds);
583 algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ta_ds, digest_algo, sigalg);
584 else memset(&needs, 0, sizeof(needs));
586 algo_needs_init_dnskey_add(&needs, ta_dnskey, sigalg);
589 num = rrset_get_count(ta_ds);
590 for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
591 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS.
592 * And check it is the strongest digest */
593 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) ||
594 !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) ||
595 ds_get_digest_algo(ta_ds, i) != digest_algo)
598 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and
599 * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a
600 * "null" KeyEntry). */
603 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
605 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
606 if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
607 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i))) {
608 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY.");
609 return sec_status_secure;
611 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
612 algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
613 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i));
618 /* None of the DS's worked out: check the DNSKEYs. */
620 num = rrset_get_count(ta_dnskey);
621 for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
622 /* Check to see if we can understand this DNSKEY */
623 if(!dnskey_algo_is_supported(ta_dnskey, i))
626 /* we saw a useful TA */
629 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
630 ta_dnskey, i, reason);
631 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
632 if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
633 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i))) {
634 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "anchor matched DNSKEY.");
635 return sec_status_secure;
637 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
638 algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
639 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i));
644 /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */
646 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable trust anchors were found -- "
647 "treating as insecure.");
648 return sec_status_insecure;
650 /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */
651 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable anchor to a DNSKEY.");
652 if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) {
653 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of "
656 return sec_status_bogus;
659 struct key_entry_key*
660 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env,
661 struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
662 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds_rrset,
663 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey_rrset, int downprot,
666 uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
667 enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(env, ve,
668 dnskey_rrset, ta_ds_rrset, ta_dnskey_rrset,
669 downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason);
671 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
672 return key_entry_create_rrset(region,
673 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len,
674 ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset,
675 downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now);
676 } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
677 return key_entry_create_null(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname,
678 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len,
679 ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
680 rrset_get_ttl(dnskey_rrset), *env->now);
682 return key_entry_create_bad(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname,
683 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
684 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now);
688 val_dsset_isusable(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset)
691 for(i=0; i<rrset_get_count(ds_rrset); i++) {
692 if(ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) &&
693 ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i))
696 if(verbosity < VERB_ALGO)
698 if(rrset_get_count(ds_rrset) == 0)
699 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS is not usable");
701 /* report usability for the first DS RR */
702 sldns_lookup_table *lt;
703 char herr[64], aerr[64];
704 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_hashes,
705 (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i));
706 if(lt) snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%s", lt->name);
707 else snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%d",
708 (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i));
709 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_algorithms,
710 (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
711 if(lt) snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%s", lt->name);
712 else snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%d",
713 (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
714 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS unsupported, hash %s %s, "
715 "key algorithm %s %s", herr,
716 (ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)?
717 "(supported)":"(unsupported)"), aerr,
718 (ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)?
719 "(supported)":"(unsupported)"));
724 /** get label count for a signature */
726 rrsig_get_labcount(struct packed_rrset_data* d, size_t sig)
728 if(d->rr_len[sig] < 2+4)
729 return 0; /* bad sig length */
730 return d->rr_data[sig][2+3];
734 val_rrset_wildcard(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** wc)
736 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
742 if(d->rrsig_count == 0) {
745 labcount = rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + 0);
746 /* check rest of signatures identical */
747 for(i=1; i<d->rrsig_count; i++) {
748 if(labcount != rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + i)) {
752 /* OK the rrsigs check out */
753 /* if the RRSIG label count is shorter than the number of actual
754 * labels, then this rrset was synthesized from a wildcard.
755 * Note that the RRSIG label count doesn't count the root label. */
756 wn = rrset->rk.dname;
757 wl = rrset->rk.dname_len;
758 /* skip a leading wildcard label in the dname (RFC4035 2.2) */
759 if(dname_is_wild(wn)) {
763 labdiff = (dname_count_labels(wn) - 1) - (int)labcount;
766 dname_remove_labels(wc, &wl, labdiff);
773 val_chase_cname(struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* rep,
774 size_t* cname_skip) {
776 /* skip any DNAMEs, go to the CNAME for next part */
777 for(i = *cname_skip; i < rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
778 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME &&
779 query_dname_compare(qchase->qname, rep->rrsets[i]->
781 qchase->qname = NULL;
782 get_cname_target(rep->rrsets[i], &qchase->qname,
785 return 0; /* bad CNAME rdata */
790 return 0; /* CNAME classified but no matching CNAME ?! */
793 /** see if rrset has signer name as one of the rrsig signers */
795 rrset_has_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t* name, size_t len)
797 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
800 for(i = d->count; i< d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) {
801 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+18+len) {
802 /* at least rdatalen + signature + signame (+1 sig)*/
803 if(!dname_valid(d->rr_data[i]+2+18, d->rr_len[i]-2-18))
805 if(query_dname_compare(name, d->rr_data[i]+2+18) == 0)
815 val_fill_reply(struct reply_info* chase, struct reply_info* orig,
816 size_t skip, uint8_t* name, size_t len, uint8_t* signer)
820 chase->rrset_count = 0;
821 chase->an_numrrsets = 0;
822 chase->ns_numrrsets = 0;
823 chase->ar_numrrsets = 0;
825 for(i=skip; i<orig->an_numrrsets; i++) {
827 if(query_dname_compare(name,
828 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
829 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] =
831 } else if(seen_dname && ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
832 LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) {
833 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
835 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
836 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
837 if(ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
838 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
843 /* AUTHORITY section */
844 for(i = (skip > orig->an_numrrsets)?skip:orig->an_numrrsets;
845 i<orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets;
848 if(query_dname_compare(name,
849 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
850 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+
851 chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
852 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
853 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+
854 chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
857 /* ADDITIONAL section */
858 for(i= (skip>orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets)?
859 skip:orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets;
860 i<orig->rrset_count; i++) {
862 if(query_dname_compare(name,
863 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
864 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets
865 +orig->ns_numrrsets+chase->ar_numrrsets++]
867 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
868 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets+
869 chase->ar_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
872 chase->rrset_count = chase->an_numrrsets + chase->ns_numrrsets +
876 void val_reply_remove_auth(struct reply_info* rep, size_t index)
878 log_assert(index < rep->rrset_count);
879 log_assert(index >= rep->an_numrrsets);
880 log_assert(index < rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets);
881 memmove(rep->rrsets+index, rep->rrsets+index+1,
882 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)*
883 (rep->rrset_count - index - 1));
889 val_check_nonsecure(struct val_env* ve, struct reply_info* rep)
893 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
894 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data)
895 ->security != sec_status_secure) {
896 /* because we want to return the authentic original
897 * message when presented with CD-flagged queries,
898 * we need to preserve AUTHORITY section data.
899 * However, this rrset is not signed or signed
900 * with the wrong keys. Validation has tried to
901 * verify this rrset with the keysets of import.
902 * But this rrset did not verify.
903 * Therefore the message is bogus.
906 /* check if authority consists of only an NS record
907 * which is bad, and there is an answer section with
908 * data. In that case, delete NS and additional to
909 * be lenient and make a minimal response */
910 if(rep->an_numrrsets != 0 && rep->ns_numrrsets == 1 &&
911 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type)
912 == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) {
913 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "truncate to minimal");
914 rep->ns_numrrsets = 0;
915 rep->ar_numrrsets = 0;
916 rep->rrset_count = rep->an_numrrsets;
920 log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "message is bogus, "
922 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname,
923 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type),
924 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class));
925 rep->security = sec_status_bogus;
930 if(!ve->clean_additional)
932 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
933 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data)
934 ->security != sec_status_secure) {
935 /* This does not cause message invalidation. It was
936 * simply unsigned data in the additional. The
937 * RRSIG must have been truncated off the message.
939 * However, we do not want to return possible bogus
940 * data to clients that rely on this service for
941 * their authentication.
943 /* remove this unneeded additional rrset */
944 memmove(rep->rrsets+i, rep->rrsets+i+1,
945 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)*
946 (rep->rrset_count - i - 1));
954 /** check no anchor and unlock */
956 check_no_anchor(struct val_anchors* anchors, uint8_t* nm, size_t l, uint16_t c)
958 struct trust_anchor* ta;
959 if((ta=anchors_lookup(anchors, nm, l, c))) {
960 lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock);
966 val_mark_indeterminate(struct reply_info* rep, struct val_anchors* anchors,
967 struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env)
970 struct packed_rrset_data* d;
971 for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
972 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
973 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked &&
974 check_no_anchor(anchors, rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname,
975 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname_len,
976 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class)))
978 /* mark as indeterminate */
979 d->security = sec_status_indeterminate;
980 rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now);
986 val_mark_insecure(struct reply_info* rep, uint8_t* kname,
987 struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env)
990 struct packed_rrset_data* d;
991 for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
992 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
993 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked &&
994 dname_subdomain_c(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, kname)) {
995 /* mark as insecure */
996 d->security = sec_status_insecure;
997 rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now);
1003 val_next_unchecked(struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip)
1006 struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1007 for(i=skip+1; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
1008 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1009 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked) {
1013 return rep->rrset_count;
1017 val_classification_to_string(enum val_classification subtype)
1020 case VAL_CLASS_UNTYPED: return "untyped";
1021 case VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN: return "unknown";
1022 case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE: return "positive";
1023 case VAL_CLASS_CNAME: return "cname";
1024 case VAL_CLASS_NODATA: return "nodata";
1025 case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR: return "nameerror";
1026 case VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER: return "cnamenoanswer";
1027 case VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL: return "referral";
1028 case VAL_CLASS_ANY: return "qtype_any";
1030 return "bad_val_classification";
1034 /** log a sock_list entry */
1036 sock_list_logentry(enum verbosity_value v, const char* s, struct sock_list* p)
1039 log_addr(v, s, &p->addr, p->len);
1040 else verbose(v, "%s cache", s);
1043 void val_blacklist(struct sock_list** blacklist, struct regional* region,
1044 struct sock_list* origin, int cross)
1046 /* debug printout */
1047 if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) {
1048 struct sock_list* p;
1049 for(p=*blacklist; p; p=p->next)
1050 sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist", p);
1052 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add: cache");
1053 for(p=origin; p; p=p->next)
1054 sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add", p);
1056 /* blacklist the IPs or the cache */
1058 /* only add if nothing there. anything else also stops cache*/
1060 sock_list_insert(blacklist, NULL, 0, region);
1062 sock_list_prepend(blacklist, origin);
1063 else sock_list_merge(blacklist, region, origin);
1066 int val_has_signed_nsecs(struct reply_info* rep, char** reason)
1068 size_t i, num_nsec = 0, num_nsec3 = 0;
1069 struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1070 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
1071 if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC))
1073 else if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3))
1076 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1077 if(d && d->rrsig_count != 0) {
1081 if(num_nsec == 0 && num_nsec3 == 0)
1082 *reason = "no DNSSEC records";
1083 else if(num_nsec != 0)
1084 *reason = "no signatures over NSECs";
1085 else *reason = "no signatures over NSEC3s";
1090 val_find_DS(struct module_env* env, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, uint16_t c,
1091 struct regional* region, uint8_t* topname)
1093 struct dns_msg* msg;
1094 struct query_info qinfo;
1095 struct ub_packed_rrset_key *rrset = rrset_cache_lookup(
1096 env->rrset_cache, nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, 0,
1099 /* DS rrset exists. Return it to the validator immediately*/
1100 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* copy = packed_rrset_copy_region(
1101 rrset, region, *env->now);
1102 lock_rw_unlock(&rrset->entry.lock);
1105 msg = dns_msg_create(nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, region, 1);
1108 msg->rep->rrsets[0] = copy;
1109 msg->rep->rrset_count++;
1110 msg->rep->an_numrrsets++;
1113 /* lookup in rrset and negative cache for NSEC/NSEC3 */
1115 qinfo.qname_len = nmlen;
1116 qinfo.qtype = LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS;
1118 /* do not add SOA to reply message, it is going to be used internal */
1119 msg = val_neg_getmsg(env->neg_cache, &qinfo, region, env->rrset_cache,
1120 env->scratch_buffer, *env->now, 0, topname);