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[FreeBSD/FreeBSD.git] / contrib / unbound / validator / val_utils.c
1 /*
2  * validator/val_utils.c - validator utility functions.
3  *
4  * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
5  *
6  * This software is open source.
7  * 
8  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10  * are met:
11  * 
12  * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
13  * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14  * 
15  * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
16  * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
17  * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
18  * 
19  * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may
20  * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
21  * specific prior written permission.
22  * 
23  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
24  * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
25  * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
26  * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
27  * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
28  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
29  * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
30  * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
31  * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
32  * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
33  * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
34  */
35
36 /**
37  * \file
38  *
39  * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
40  */
41 #include "config.h"
42 #include "validator/val_utils.h"
43 #include "validator/validator.h"
44 #include "validator/val_kentry.h"
45 #include "validator/val_sigcrypt.h"
46 #include "validator/val_anchor.h"
47 #include "validator/val_nsec.h"
48 #include "validator/val_neg.h"
49 #include "services/cache/rrset.h"
50 #include "services/cache/dns.h"
51 #include "util/data/msgreply.h"
52 #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h"
53 #include "util/data/dname.h"
54 #include "util/net_help.h"
55 #include "util/module.h"
56 #include "util/regional.h"
57 #include "sldns/wire2str.h"
58 #include "sldns/parseutil.h"
59
60 enum val_classification 
61 val_classify_response(uint16_t query_flags, struct query_info* origqinf,
62         struct query_info* qinf, struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip)
63 {
64         int rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(rep->flags);
65         size_t i;
66
67         /* Normal Name Error's are easy to detect -- but don't mistake a CNAME
68          * chain ending in NXDOMAIN. */
69         if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN && rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
70                 return VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR;
71
72         /* check for referral: nonRD query and it looks like a nodata */
73         if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->an_numrrsets == 0 &&
74                 rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
75                 /* SOA record in auth indicates it is NODATA instead.
76                  * All validation requiring NODATA messages have SOA in 
77                  * authority section. */
78                 /* uses fact that answer section is empty */
79                 int saw_ns = 0;
80                 for(i=0; i<rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
81                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)
82                                 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
83                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)
84                                 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL;
85                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS)
86                                 saw_ns = 1;
87                 }
88                 return saw_ns?VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
89         }
90         /* root referral where NS set is in the answer section */
91         if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->ns_numrrsets == 0 &&
92                 rep->an_numrrsets == 1 && rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
93                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS &&
94                 query_dname_compare(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.dname, 
95                         origqinf->qname) != 0)
96                 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL;
97
98         /* dump bad messages */
99         if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN)
100                 return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN;
101         /* next check if the skip into the answer section shows no answer */
102         if(skip>0 && rep->an_numrrsets <= skip)
103                 return VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER;
104
105         /* Next is NODATA */
106         if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
107                 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
108         
109         /* We distinguish between CNAME response and other positive/negative
110          * responses because CNAME answers require extra processing. */
111
112         /* We distinguish between ANY and CNAME or POSITIVE because 
113          * ANY responses are validated differently. */
114         if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && qinf->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY)
115                 return VAL_CLASS_ANY;
116         
117         /* Note that DNAMEs will be ignored here, unless qtype=DNAME. Unless
118          * qtype=CNAME, this will yield a CNAME response. */
119         for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
120                 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
121                         ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == qinf->qtype)
122                         return VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE;
123                 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)
124                         return VAL_CLASS_CNAME;
125         }
126         log_dns_msg("validator: error. failed to classify response message: ",
127                 qinf, rep);
128         return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN;
129 }
130
131 /** Get signer name from RRSIG */
132 static void
133 rrsig_get_signer(uint8_t* data, size_t len, uint8_t** sname, size_t* slen)
134 {
135         /* RRSIG rdata is not allowed to be compressed, it is stored
136          * uncompressed in memory as well, so return a ptr to the name */
137         if(len < 21) {
138                 /* too short RRSig:
139                  * short, byte, byte, long, long, long, short, "." is
140                  * 2    1       1       4       4  4    2       1 = 19
141                  *                      and a skip of 18 bytes to the name.
142                  * +2 for the rdatalen is 21 bytes len for root label */
143                 *sname = NULL;
144                 *slen = 0;
145                 return;
146         }
147         data += 20; /* skip the fixed size bits */
148         len -= 20;
149         *slen = dname_valid(data, len);
150         if(!*slen) {
151                 /* bad dname in this rrsig. */
152                 *sname = NULL;
153                 return;
154         }
155         *sname = data;
156 }
157
158 void 
159 val_find_rrset_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** sname,
160         size_t* slen)
161 {
162         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
163                 rrset->entry.data;
164         /* return signer for first signature, or NULL */
165         if(d->rrsig_count == 0) {
166                 *sname = NULL;
167                 *slen = 0;
168                 return;
169         }
170         /* get rrsig signer name out of the signature */
171         rrsig_get_signer(d->rr_data[d->count], d->rr_len[d->count], 
172                 sname, slen);
173 }
174
175 /**
176  * Find best signer name in this set of rrsigs.
177  * @param rrset: which rrsigs to look through.
178  * @param qinf: the query name that needs validation.
179  * @param signer_name: the best signer_name. Updated if a better one is found.
180  * @param signer_len: length of signer name.
181  * @param matchcount: count of current best name (starts at 0 for no match).
182  *      Updated if match is improved.
183  */
184 static void
185 val_find_best_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, 
186         struct query_info* qinf, uint8_t** signer_name, size_t* signer_len, 
187         int* matchcount)
188 {
189         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
190                 rrset->entry.data;
191         uint8_t* sign;
192         size_t i;
193         int m;
194         for(i=d->count; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) {
195                 sign = d->rr_data[i]+2+18;
196                 /* look at signatures that are valid (long enough),
197                  * and have a signer name that is a superdomain of qname,
198                  * and then check the number of labels in the shared topdomain
199                  * improve the match if possible */
200                 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+19 && /* rdata, sig + root label*/
201                         dname_subdomain_c(qinf->qname, sign)) {
202                         (void)dname_lab_cmp(qinf->qname, 
203                                 dname_count_labels(qinf->qname), 
204                                 sign, dname_count_labels(sign), &m);
205                         if(m > *matchcount) {
206                                 *matchcount = m;
207                                 *signer_name = sign;
208                                 (void)dname_count_size_labels(*signer_name,
209                                         signer_len);
210                         }
211                 }
212         }
213 }
214
215 void 
216 val_find_signer(enum val_classification subtype, struct query_info* qinf, 
217         struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip, uint8_t** signer_name, 
218         size_t* signer_len)
219 {
220         size_t i;
221         
222         if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE || subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY) {
223                 /* check for the answer rrset */
224                 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
225                         if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname, 
226                                 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) {
227                                 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 
228                                         signer_name, signer_len);
229                                 return;
230                         }
231                 }
232                 *signer_name = NULL;
233                 *signer_len = 0;
234         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) {
235                 /* check for the first signed cname/dname rrset */
236                 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
237                         val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 
238                                 signer_name, signer_len);
239                         if(*signer_name)
240                                 return;
241                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME)
242                                 break; /* only check CNAME after a DNAME */
243                 }
244                 *signer_name = NULL;
245                 *signer_len = 0;
246         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR 
247                 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA) {
248                 /*Check to see if the AUTH section NSEC record(s) have rrsigs*/
249                 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<
250                         rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
251                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC
252                                 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
253                                 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
254                                 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 
255                                         signer_name, signer_len);
256                                 return;
257                         }
258                 }
259         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER) {
260                 /* find closest superdomain signer name in authority section
261                  * NSEC and NSEC3s */
262                 int matchcount = 0;
263                 *signer_name = NULL;
264                 *signer_len = 0;
265                 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->
266                         ns_numrrsets; i++) { 
267                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC
268                                 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 
269                                 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
270                                 val_find_best_signer(rep->rrsets[i], qinf,
271                                         signer_name, signer_len, &matchcount);
272                         }
273                 }
274         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) {
275                 /* find keys for the item at skip */
276                 if(skip < rep->rrset_count) {
277                         val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip], 
278                                 signer_name, signer_len);
279                         return;
280                 }
281                 *signer_name = NULL;
282                 *signer_len = 0;
283         } else {
284                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "find_signer: could not find signer name"
285                         " for unknown type response");
286                 *signer_name = NULL;
287                 *signer_len = 0;
288         }
289 }
290
291 /** return number of rrs in an rrset */
292 static size_t
293 rrset_get_count(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
294 {
295         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
296                 rrset->entry.data;
297         if(!d) return 0;
298         return d->count;
299 }
300
301 /** return TTL of rrset */
302 static uint32_t
303 rrset_get_ttl(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
304 {
305         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
306                 rrset->entry.data;
307         if(!d) return 0;
308         return d->ttl;
309 }
310
311 enum sec_status 
312 val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
313         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* keys,
314         uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
315 {
316         enum sec_status sec;
317         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
318                 entry.data;
319         if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
320                 /* re-verify all other statuses, because keyset may change*/
321                 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset cached", 
322                         rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type), 
323                         ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
324                 return d->security;
325         }
326         /* check in the cache if verification has already been done */
327         rrset_check_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now);
328         if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
329                 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset from cache", 
330                         rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type), 
331                         ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
332                 return d->security;
333         }
334         log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset", rrset->rk.dname,
335                 ntohs(rrset->rk.type), ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
336         sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, keys, sigalg, reason);
337         verbose(VERB_ALGO, "verify result: %s", sec_status_to_string(sec));
338         regional_free_all(env->scratch);
339
340         /* update rrset security status 
341          * only improves security status 
342          * and bogus is set only once, even if we rechecked the status */
343         if(sec > d->security) {
344                 d->security = sec;
345                 if(sec == sec_status_secure)
346                         d->trust = rrset_trust_validated;
347                 else if(sec == sec_status_bogus) {
348                         size_t i;
349                         /* update ttl for rrset to fixed value. */
350                         d->ttl = ve->bogus_ttl;
351                         for(i=0; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++)
352                                 d->rr_ttl[i] = ve->bogus_ttl;
353                         /* leave RR specific TTL: not used for determine
354                          * if RRset timed out and clients see proper value. */
355                         lock_basic_lock(&ve->bogus_lock);
356                         ve->num_rrset_bogus++;
357                         lock_basic_unlock(&ve->bogus_lock);
358                 }
359                 /* if status updated - store in cache for reuse */
360                 rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now);
361         }
362
363         return sec;
364 }
365
366 enum sec_status 
367 val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
368         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct key_entry_key* kkey,
369         char** reason)
370 {
371         /* temporary dnskey rrset-key */
372         struct ub_packed_rrset_key dnskey;
373         struct key_entry_data* kd = (struct key_entry_data*)kkey->entry.data;
374         enum sec_status sec;
375         dnskey.rk.type = htons(kd->rrset_type);
376         dnskey.rk.rrset_class = htons(kkey->key_class);
377         dnskey.rk.flags = 0;
378         dnskey.rk.dname = kkey->name;
379         dnskey.rk.dname_len = kkey->namelen;
380         dnskey.entry.key = &dnskey;
381         dnskey.entry.data = kd->rrset_data;
382         sec = val_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, &dnskey, kd->algo, reason);
383         return sec;
384 }
385
386 /** verify that a DS RR hashes to a key and that key signs the set */
387 static enum sec_status
388 verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 
389         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
390         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, size_t ds_idx, char** reason)
391 {
392         enum sec_status sec = sec_status_bogus;
393         size_t i, num, numchecked = 0, numhashok = 0;
394         num = rrset_get_count(dnskey_rrset);
395         for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
396                 /* Skip DNSKEYs that don't match the basic criteria. */
397                 if(ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx) 
398                    != dnskey_get_algo(dnskey_rrset, i)
399                    || dnskey_calc_keytag(dnskey_rrset, i)
400                    != ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx)) {
401                         continue;
402                 }
403                 numchecked++;
404                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "attempt DS match algo %d keytag %d",
405                         ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx),
406                         ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx));
407
408                 /* Convert the candidate DNSKEY into a hash using the 
409                  * same DS hash algorithm. */
410                 if(!ds_digest_match_dnskey(env, dnskey_rrset, i, ds_rrset, 
411                         ds_idx)) {
412                         verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match attempt failed");
413                         continue;
414                 }
415                 numhashok++;
416                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match digest ok, trying signature");
417
418                 /* Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY 
419                  * verifies *with this key*  */
420                 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 
421                         dnskey_rrset, i, reason);
422                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
423                         return sec;
424                 }
425                 /* If it didn't validate with the DNSKEY, try the next one! */
426         }
427         if(numchecked == 0)
428                 algo_needs_reason(env, ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx),
429                         reason, "no keys have a DS");
430         else if(numhashok == 0)
431                 *reason = "DS hash mismatches key";
432         else if(!*reason)
433                 *reason = "keyset not secured by DNSKEY that matches DS";
434         return sec_status_bogus;
435 }
436
437 int val_favorite_ds_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset)
438 {
439         size_t i, num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset);
440         int d, digest_algo = 0; /* DS digest algo 0 is not used. */
441         /* find favorite algo, for now, highest number supported */
442         for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
443                 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
444                         !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i)) {
445                         continue;
446                 }
447                 d = ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i);
448                 if(d > digest_algo)
449                         digest_algo = d;
450         }
451         return digest_algo;
452 }
453
454 enum sec_status 
455 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
456         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
457         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
458 {
459         /* as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be
460          * equivalent to no DS rrset. */
461         int has_useful_ds = 0, digest_algo, alg;
462         struct algo_needs needs;
463         size_t i, num;
464         enum sec_status sec;
465
466         if(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ds_rrset->rk.dname_len ||
467                 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname)
468                 != 0) {
469                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset "
470                         "by name");
471                 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name";
472                 return sec_status_bogus;
473         }
474
475         digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ds_rrset);
476         if(sigalg)
477                 algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ds_rrset, digest_algo, sigalg);
478         num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset);
479         for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
480                 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS. 
481                  * And check it is the strongest digest */
482                 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
483                         !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
484                         ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i) != digest_algo) {
485                         continue;
486                 }
487
488                 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and 
489                  * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a 
490                  * "null" KeyEntry). */
491                 has_useful_ds = 1;
492
493                 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 
494                         ds_rrset, i, reason);
495                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
496                         if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
497                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i))) {
498                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY.");
499                                 return sec_status_secure;
500                         }
501                 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
502                         algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
503                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
504                 }
505         }
506
507         /* None of the DS's worked out. */
508
509         /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */
510         if(!has_useful_ds) {
511                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable DS records were found -- "
512                         "treating as insecure.");
513                 return sec_status_insecure;
514         }
515         /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */
516         verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable DS to a DNSKEY.");
517         if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) {
518                 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of "
519                         "DNSKEY signature");
520         }
521         return sec_status_bogus;
522 }
523
524 struct key_entry_key* 
525 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env, 
526         struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
527         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason)
528 {
529         uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
530         enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(env, ve, 
531                 dnskey_rrset, ds_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason);
532
533         if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
534                 return key_entry_create_rrset(region, 
535                         ds_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname_len,
536                         ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset,
537                         downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now);
538         } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
539                 return key_entry_create_null(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname,
540                         ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, 
541                         ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
542                         rrset_get_ttl(ds_rrset), *env->now);
543         }
544         return key_entry_create_bad(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname,
545                 ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
546                 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now);
547 }
548
549 enum sec_status 
550 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
551         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
552         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds,
553         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
554 {
555         /* as long as this is false, we can consider this anchor to be
556          * equivalent to no anchor. */
557         int has_useful_ta = 0, digest_algo = 0, alg;
558         struct algo_needs needs;
559         size_t i, num;
560         enum sec_status sec;
561
562         if(ta_ds && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_ds->rk.dname_len ||
563                 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_ds->rk.dname)
564                 != 0)) {
565                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset "
566                         "by name");
567                 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name";
568                 return sec_status_bogus;
569         }
570         if(ta_dnskey && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_dnskey->rk.dname_len
571              || query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_dnskey->rk.dname)
572                 != 0)) {
573                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset "
574                         "by name");
575                 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset by name";
576                 return sec_status_bogus;
577         }
578
579         if(ta_ds)
580                 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ta_ds);
581         if(sigalg) {
582                 if(ta_ds)
583                         algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ta_ds, digest_algo, sigalg);
584                 else    memset(&needs, 0, sizeof(needs));
585                 if(ta_dnskey)
586                         algo_needs_init_dnskey_add(&needs, ta_dnskey, sigalg);
587         }
588         if(ta_ds) {
589             num = rrset_get_count(ta_ds);
590             for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
591                 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS. 
592                  * And check it is the strongest digest */
593                 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) ||
594                         !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) ||
595                         ds_get_digest_algo(ta_ds, i) != digest_algo)
596                         continue;
597
598                 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and 
599                  * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a 
600                  * "null" KeyEntry). */
601                 has_useful_ta = 1;
602
603                 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 
604                         ta_ds, i, reason);
605                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
606                         if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
607                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i))) {
608                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY.");
609                                 return sec_status_secure;
610                         }
611                 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
612                         algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
613                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i));
614                 }
615             }
616         }
617
618         /* None of the DS's worked out: check the DNSKEYs. */
619         if(ta_dnskey) {
620             num = rrset_get_count(ta_dnskey);
621             for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
622                 /* Check to see if we can understand this DNSKEY */
623                 if(!dnskey_algo_is_supported(ta_dnskey, i))
624                         continue;
625
626                 /* we saw a useful TA */
627                 has_useful_ta = 1;
628
629                 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
630                         ta_dnskey, i, reason);
631                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
632                         if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
633                                 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i))) {
634                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "anchor matched DNSKEY.");
635                                 return sec_status_secure;
636                         }
637                 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
638                         algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
639                                 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i));
640                 }
641             }
642         }
643
644         /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */
645         if(!has_useful_ta) {
646                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable trust anchors were found -- "
647                         "treating as insecure.");
648                 return sec_status_insecure;
649         }
650         /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */
651         verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable anchor to a DNSKEY.");
652         if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) {
653                 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of "
654                         "DNSKEY signature");
655         }
656         return sec_status_bogus;
657 }
658
659 struct key_entry_key* 
660 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env,
661         struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
662         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds_rrset,
663         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey_rrset, int downprot,
664         char** reason)
665 {
666         uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
667         enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(env, ve, 
668                 dnskey_rrset, ta_ds_rrset, ta_dnskey_rrset,
669                 downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason);
670
671         if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
672                 return key_entry_create_rrset(region, 
673                         dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len,
674                         ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset,
675                         downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now);
676         } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
677                 return key_entry_create_null(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname,
678                         dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, 
679                         ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
680                         rrset_get_ttl(dnskey_rrset), *env->now);
681         }
682         return key_entry_create_bad(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname,
683                 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
684                 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now);
685 }
686
687 int 
688 val_dsset_isusable(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset)
689 {
690         size_t i;
691         for(i=0; i<rrset_get_count(ds_rrset); i++) {
692                 if(ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) &&
693                         ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i))
694                         return 1;
695         }
696         if(verbosity < VERB_ALGO)
697                 return 0;
698         if(rrset_get_count(ds_rrset) == 0)
699                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS is not usable");
700         else {
701                 /* report usability for the first DS RR */
702                 sldns_lookup_table *lt;
703                 char herr[64], aerr[64];
704                 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_hashes,
705                         (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i));
706                 if(lt) snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%s", lt->name);
707                 else snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%d",
708                         (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i));
709                 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_algorithms,
710                         (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
711                 if(lt) snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%s", lt->name);
712                 else snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%d",
713                         (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
714                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS unsupported, hash %s %s, "
715                         "key algorithm %s %s", herr,
716                         (ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)?
717                         "(supported)":"(unsupported)"), aerr, 
718                         (ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)?
719                         "(supported)":"(unsupported)"));
720         }
721         return 0;
722 }
723
724 /** get label count for a signature */
725 static uint8_t
726 rrsig_get_labcount(struct packed_rrset_data* d, size_t sig)
727 {
728         if(d->rr_len[sig] < 2+4)
729                 return 0; /* bad sig length */
730         return d->rr_data[sig][2+3];
731 }
732
733 int 
734 val_rrset_wildcard(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** wc)
735 {
736         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
737                 entry.data;
738         uint8_t labcount;
739         int labdiff;
740         uint8_t* wn;
741         size_t i, wl;
742         if(d->rrsig_count == 0) {
743                 return 1;
744         }
745         labcount = rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + 0);
746         /* check rest of signatures identical */
747         for(i=1; i<d->rrsig_count; i++) {
748                 if(labcount != rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + i)) {
749                         return 0;
750                 }
751         }
752         /* OK the rrsigs check out */
753         /* if the RRSIG label count is shorter than the number of actual 
754          * labels, then this rrset was synthesized from a wildcard.
755          * Note that the RRSIG label count doesn't count the root label. */
756         wn = rrset->rk.dname;
757         wl = rrset->rk.dname_len;
758         /* skip a leading wildcard label in the dname (RFC4035 2.2) */
759         if(dname_is_wild(wn)) {
760                 wn += 2;
761                 wl -= 2;
762         }
763         labdiff = (dname_count_labels(wn) - 1) - (int)labcount;
764         if(labdiff > 0) {
765                 *wc = wn;
766                 dname_remove_labels(wc, &wl, labdiff);
767                 return 1;
768         }
769         return 1;
770 }
771
772 int
773 val_chase_cname(struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* rep,
774         size_t* cname_skip) {
775         size_t i;
776         /* skip any DNAMEs, go to the CNAME for next part */
777         for(i = *cname_skip; i < rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
778                 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME &&
779                         query_dname_compare(qchase->qname, rep->rrsets[i]->
780                                 rk.dname) == 0) {
781                         qchase->qname = NULL;
782                         get_cname_target(rep->rrsets[i], &qchase->qname,
783                                 &qchase->qname_len);
784                         if(!qchase->qname)
785                                 return 0; /* bad CNAME rdata */
786                         (*cname_skip) = i+1;
787                         return 1;
788                 }
789         }
790         return 0; /* CNAME classified but no matching CNAME ?! */
791 }
792
793 /** see if rrset has signer name as one of the rrsig signers */
794 static int
795 rrset_has_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t* name, size_t len)
796 {
797         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
798                 entry.data;
799         size_t i;
800         for(i = d->count; i< d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) {
801                 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+18+len) {
802                         /* at least rdatalen + signature + signame (+1 sig)*/
803                         if(!dname_valid(d->rr_data[i]+2+18, d->rr_len[i]-2-18))
804                                 continue;
805                         if(query_dname_compare(name, d->rr_data[i]+2+18) == 0)
806                         {
807                                 return 1;
808                         }
809                 }
810         }
811         return 0;
812 }
813
814 void 
815 val_fill_reply(struct reply_info* chase, struct reply_info* orig, 
816         size_t skip, uint8_t* name, size_t len, uint8_t* signer)
817 {
818         size_t i;
819         int seen_dname = 0;
820         chase->rrset_count = 0;
821         chase->an_numrrsets = 0;
822         chase->ns_numrrsets = 0;
823         chase->ar_numrrsets = 0;
824         /* ANSWER section */
825         for(i=skip; i<orig->an_numrrsets; i++) {
826                 if(!signer) {
827                         if(query_dname_compare(name, 
828                                 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
829                                 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = 
830                                         orig->rrsets[i];
831                 } else if(seen_dname && ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 
832                         LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) {
833                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
834                         seen_dname = 0;
835                 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
836                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
837                         if(ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 
838                                 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
839                                         seen_dname = 1;
840                         }
841                 }
842         }       
843         /* AUTHORITY section */
844         for(i = (skip > orig->an_numrrsets)?skip:orig->an_numrrsets;
845                 i<orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets; 
846                 i++) {
847                 if(!signer) {
848                         if(query_dname_compare(name, 
849                                 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
850                                 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+
851                                     chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
852                 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
853                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+
854                                 chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
855                 }
856         }
857         /* ADDITIONAL section */
858         for(i= (skip>orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets)?
859                 skip:orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets; 
860                 i<orig->rrset_count; i++) {
861                 if(!signer) {
862                         if(query_dname_compare(name, 
863                                 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
864                             chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets
865                                 +orig->ns_numrrsets+chase->ar_numrrsets++] 
866                                 = orig->rrsets[i];
867                 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
868                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets+
869                                 chase->ar_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
870                 }
871         }
872         chase->rrset_count = chase->an_numrrsets + chase->ns_numrrsets + 
873                 chase->ar_numrrsets;
874 }
875
876 void val_reply_remove_auth(struct reply_info* rep, size_t index)
877 {
878         log_assert(index < rep->rrset_count);
879         log_assert(index >= rep->an_numrrsets);
880         log_assert(index < rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets);
881         memmove(rep->rrsets+index, rep->rrsets+index+1,
882                 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)*
883                 (rep->rrset_count - index - 1));
884         rep->ns_numrrsets--;
885         rep->rrset_count--;
886 }
887
888 void
889 val_check_nonsecure(struct val_env* ve, struct reply_info* rep) 
890 {
891         size_t i;
892         /* authority */
893         for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
894                 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data)
895                         ->security != sec_status_secure) {
896                         /* because we want to return the authentic original
897                          * message when presented with CD-flagged queries,
898                          * we need to preserve AUTHORITY section data.
899                          * However, this rrset is not signed or signed
900                          * with the wrong keys. Validation has tried to
901                          * verify this rrset with the keysets of import.
902                          * But this rrset did not verify.
903                          * Therefore the message is bogus.
904                          */
905
906                         /* check if authority consists of only an NS record
907                          * which is bad, and there is an answer section with
908                          * data.  In that case, delete NS and additional to 
909                          * be lenient and make a minimal response */
910                         if(rep->an_numrrsets != 0 && rep->ns_numrrsets == 1 &&
911                                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) 
912                                 == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) {
913                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "truncate to minimal");
914                                 rep->ns_numrrsets = 0;
915                                 rep->ar_numrrsets = 0;
916                                 rep->rrset_count = rep->an_numrrsets;
917                                 return;
918                         }
919
920                         log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "message is bogus, "
921                                 "non secure rrset",
922                                 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, 
923                                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type),
924                                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class));
925                         rep->security = sec_status_bogus;
926                         return;
927                 }
928         }
929         /* additional */
930         if(!ve->clean_additional)
931                 return;
932         for(i=rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
933                 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data)
934                         ->security != sec_status_secure) {
935                         /* This does not cause message invalidation. It was
936                          * simply unsigned data in the additional. The
937                          * RRSIG must have been truncated off the message.
938                          *
939                          * However, we do not want to return possible bogus
940                          * data to clients that rely on this service for
941                          * their authentication.
942                          */
943                         /* remove this unneeded additional rrset */
944                         memmove(rep->rrsets+i, rep->rrsets+i+1, 
945                                 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)*
946                                 (rep->rrset_count - i - 1));
947                         rep->ar_numrrsets--;
948                         rep->rrset_count--;
949                         i--;
950                 }
951         }
952 }
953
954 /** check no anchor and unlock */
955 static int
956 check_no_anchor(struct val_anchors* anchors, uint8_t* nm, size_t l, uint16_t c)
957 {
958         struct trust_anchor* ta;
959         if((ta=anchors_lookup(anchors, nm, l, c))) {
960                 lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock);
961         }
962         return !ta;
963 }
964
965 void 
966 val_mark_indeterminate(struct reply_info* rep, struct val_anchors* anchors, 
967         struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env)
968 {
969         size_t i;
970         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
971         for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
972                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
973                 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked &&
974                    check_no_anchor(anchors, rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname,
975                         rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname_len, 
976                         ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class))) 
977                 {       
978                         /* mark as indeterminate */
979                         d->security = sec_status_indeterminate;
980                         rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now);
981                 }
982         }
983 }
984
985 void 
986 val_mark_insecure(struct reply_info* rep, uint8_t* kname,
987         struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env)
988 {
989         size_t i;
990         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
991         for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
992                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
993                 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked &&
994                    dname_subdomain_c(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, kname)) {
995                         /* mark as insecure */
996                         d->security = sec_status_insecure;
997                         rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now);
998                 }
999         }
1000 }
1001
1002 size_t 
1003 val_next_unchecked(struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip)
1004 {
1005         size_t i;
1006         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1007         for(i=skip+1; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
1008                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1009                 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked) {
1010                         return i;
1011                 }
1012         }
1013         return rep->rrset_count;
1014 }
1015
1016 const char*
1017 val_classification_to_string(enum val_classification subtype)
1018 {
1019         switch(subtype) {
1020                 case VAL_CLASS_UNTYPED:         return "untyped";
1021                 case VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN:         return "unknown";
1022                 case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE:        return "positive";
1023                 case VAL_CLASS_CNAME:           return "cname";
1024                 case VAL_CLASS_NODATA:          return "nodata";
1025                 case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR:       return "nameerror";
1026                 case VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER:   return "cnamenoanswer";
1027                 case VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:        return "referral";
1028                 case VAL_CLASS_ANY:             return "qtype_any";
1029                 default:
1030                         return "bad_val_classification";
1031         }
1032 }
1033
1034 /** log a sock_list entry */
1035 static void
1036 sock_list_logentry(enum verbosity_value v, const char* s, struct sock_list* p)
1037 {
1038         if(p->len)
1039                 log_addr(v, s, &p->addr, p->len);
1040         else    verbose(v, "%s cache", s);
1041 }
1042
1043 void val_blacklist(struct sock_list** blacklist, struct regional* region,
1044         struct sock_list* origin, int cross)
1045 {
1046         /* debug printout */
1047         if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) {
1048                 struct sock_list* p;
1049                 for(p=*blacklist; p; p=p->next)
1050                         sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist", p);
1051                 if(!origin)
1052                         verbose(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add: cache");
1053                 for(p=origin; p; p=p->next)
1054                         sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add", p);
1055         }
1056         /* blacklist the IPs or the cache */
1057         if(!origin) {
1058                 /* only add if nothing there. anything else also stops cache*/
1059                 if(!*blacklist)
1060                         sock_list_insert(blacklist, NULL, 0, region);
1061         } else if(!cross)
1062                 sock_list_prepend(blacklist, origin);
1063         else    sock_list_merge(blacklist, region, origin);
1064 }
1065
1066 int val_has_signed_nsecs(struct reply_info* rep, char** reason)
1067 {
1068         size_t i, num_nsec = 0, num_nsec3 = 0;
1069         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1070         for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
1071                 if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC))
1072                         num_nsec++;
1073                 else if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3))
1074                         num_nsec3++;
1075                 else continue;
1076                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1077                 if(d && d->rrsig_count != 0) {
1078                         return 1;
1079                 }
1080         }
1081         if(num_nsec == 0 && num_nsec3 == 0)
1082                 *reason = "no DNSSEC records";
1083         else if(num_nsec != 0)
1084                 *reason = "no signatures over NSECs";
1085         else    *reason = "no signatures over NSEC3s";
1086         return 0;
1087 }
1088
1089 struct dns_msg* 
1090 val_find_DS(struct module_env* env, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, uint16_t c, 
1091         struct regional* region, uint8_t* topname)
1092 {
1093         struct dns_msg* msg;
1094         struct query_info qinfo;
1095         struct ub_packed_rrset_key *rrset = rrset_cache_lookup(
1096                 env->rrset_cache, nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, 0, 
1097                 *env->now, 0);
1098         if(rrset) {
1099                 /* DS rrset exists. Return it to the validator immediately*/
1100                 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* copy = packed_rrset_copy_region(
1101                         rrset, region, *env->now);
1102                 lock_rw_unlock(&rrset->entry.lock);
1103                 if(!copy)
1104                         return NULL;
1105                 msg = dns_msg_create(nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, region, 1);
1106                 if(!msg)
1107                         return NULL;
1108                 msg->rep->rrsets[0] = copy;
1109                 msg->rep->rrset_count++;
1110                 msg->rep->an_numrrsets++;
1111                 return msg;
1112         }
1113         /* lookup in rrset and negative cache for NSEC/NSEC3 */
1114         qinfo.qname = nm;
1115         qinfo.qname_len = nmlen;
1116         qinfo.qtype = LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS;
1117         qinfo.qclass = c;
1118         /* do not add SOA to reply message, it is going to be used internal */
1119         msg = val_neg_getmsg(env->neg_cache, &qinfo, region, env->rrset_cache,
1120                 env->scratch_buffer, *env->now, 0, topname);
1121         return msg;
1122 }