]> CyberLeo.Net >> Repos - FreeBSD/FreeBSD.git/blob - contrib/wpa/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
Update hostapd/wpa_supplicant to 2.8 to fix multiple vulnerabilities.
[FreeBSD/FreeBSD.git] / contrib / wpa / src / eap_common / eap_pwd_common.c
1 /*
2  * EAP server/peer: EAP-pwd shared routines
3  * Copyright (c) 2010, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
4  *
5  * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6  * See README for more details.
7  */
8
9 #include "includes.h"
10 #include "common.h"
11 #include "utils/const_time.h"
12 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
13 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
14 #include "eap_defs.h"
15 #include "eap_pwd_common.h"
16
17 #define MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN 66
18
19
20 /* The random function H(x) = HMAC-SHA256(0^32, x) */
21 struct crypto_hash * eap_pwd_h_init(void)
22 {
23         u8 allzero[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
24         os_memset(allzero, 0, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
25         return crypto_hash_init(CRYPTO_HASH_ALG_HMAC_SHA256, allzero,
26                                 SHA256_MAC_LEN);
27 }
28
29
30 void eap_pwd_h_update(struct crypto_hash *hash, const u8 *data, size_t len)
31 {
32         crypto_hash_update(hash, data, len);
33 }
34
35
36 void eap_pwd_h_final(struct crypto_hash *hash, u8 *digest)
37 {
38         size_t len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
39         crypto_hash_finish(hash, digest, &len);
40 }
41
42
43 /* a counter-based KDF based on NIST SP800-108 */
44 static int eap_pwd_kdf(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, const u8 *label,
45                        size_t labellen, u8 *result, size_t resultbitlen)
46 {
47         struct crypto_hash *hash;
48         u8 digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
49         u16 i, ctr, L;
50         size_t resultbytelen, len = 0, mdlen;
51
52         resultbytelen = (resultbitlen + 7) / 8;
53         ctr = 0;
54         L = htons(resultbitlen);
55         while (len < resultbytelen) {
56                 ctr++;
57                 i = htons(ctr);
58                 hash = crypto_hash_init(CRYPTO_HASH_ALG_HMAC_SHA256,
59                                         key, keylen);
60                 if (hash == NULL)
61                         return -1;
62                 if (ctr > 1)
63                         crypto_hash_update(hash, digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
64                 crypto_hash_update(hash, (u8 *) &i, sizeof(u16));
65                 crypto_hash_update(hash, label, labellen);
66                 crypto_hash_update(hash, (u8 *) &L, sizeof(u16));
67                 mdlen = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
68                 if (crypto_hash_finish(hash, digest, &mdlen) < 0)
69                         return -1;
70                 if ((len + mdlen) > resultbytelen)
71                         os_memcpy(result + len, digest, resultbytelen - len);
72                 else
73                         os_memcpy(result + len, digest, mdlen);
74                 len += mdlen;
75         }
76
77         /* since we're expanding to a bit length, mask off the excess */
78         if (resultbitlen % 8) {
79                 u8 mask = 0xff;
80                 mask <<= (8 - (resultbitlen % 8));
81                 result[resultbytelen - 1] &= mask;
82         }
83
84         return 0;
85 }
86
87
88 static int eap_pwd_suitable_group(u16 num)
89 {
90         /* Do not allow ECC groups with prime under 256 bits based on guidance
91          * for the similar design in SAE. */
92         return num == 19 || num == 20 || num == 21 ||
93                 num == 28 || num == 29 || num == 30;
94 }
95
96
97 EAP_PWD_group * get_eap_pwd_group(u16 num)
98 {
99         EAP_PWD_group *grp;
100
101         if (!eap_pwd_suitable_group(num)) {
102                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unsuitable group %u", num);
103                 return NULL;
104         }
105         grp = os_zalloc(sizeof(EAP_PWD_group));
106         if (!grp)
107                 return NULL;
108         grp->group = crypto_ec_init(num);
109         if (!grp->group) {
110                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create EC group");
111                 os_free(grp);
112                 return NULL;
113         }
114
115         grp->group_num = num;
116         wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: provisioned group %d", num);
117
118         return grp;
119 }
120
121
122 static void buf_shift_right(u8 *buf, size_t len, size_t bits)
123 {
124         size_t i;
125         for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--)
126                 buf[i] = (buf[i - 1] << (8 - bits)) | (buf[i] >> bits);
127         buf[0] >>= bits;
128 }
129
130
131 /*
132  * compute a "random" secret point on an elliptic curve based
133  * on the password and identities.
134  */
135 int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
136                              const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
137                              const u8 *id_server, size_t id_server_len,
138                              const u8 *id_peer, size_t id_peer_len,
139                              const u8 *token)
140 {
141         struct crypto_bignum *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL, *one = NULL;
142         struct crypto_bignum *qr_or_qnr = NULL;
143         u8 qr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
144         u8 qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
145         u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
146         u8 x_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN];
147         struct crypto_bignum *tmp1 = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *pm1 = NULL;
148         struct crypto_hash *hash;
149         unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
150         int ret = 0, check, res;
151         u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_*
152                        * mask */
153         size_t primebytelen = 0, primebitlen;
154         struct crypto_bignum *x_candidate = NULL;
155         const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
156         u8 mask, found_ctr = 0, is_odd = 0;
157
158         if (grp->pwe)
159                 return -1;
160
161         os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin));
162
163         prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(grp->group);
164         grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(grp->group);
165         tmp1 = crypto_bignum_init();
166         pm1 = crypto_bignum_init();
167         one = crypto_bignum_init_set((const u8 *) "\x01", 1);
168         if (!grp->pwe || !tmp1 || !pm1 || !one) {
169                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create bignums");
170                 goto fail;
171         }
172
173         primebitlen = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(grp->group);
174         primebytelen = crypto_ec_prime_len(grp->group);
175         if ((prfbuf = os_malloc(primebytelen)) == NULL) {
176                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to malloc space for prf "
177                            "buffer");
178                 goto fail;
179         }
180         if (crypto_bignum_sub(prime, one, pm1) < 0)
181                 goto fail;
182
183         /* get a random quadratic residue and nonresidue */
184         while (!qr || !qnr) {
185                 if (crypto_bignum_rand(tmp1, prime) < 0)
186                         goto fail;
187                 res = crypto_bignum_legendre(tmp1, prime);
188                 if (!qr && res == 1) {
189                         qr = tmp1;
190                         tmp1 = crypto_bignum_init();
191                 } else if (!qnr && res == -1) {
192                         qnr = tmp1;
193                         tmp1 = crypto_bignum_init();
194                 }
195                 if (!tmp1)
196                         goto fail;
197         }
198         if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(qr, qr_bin, sizeof(qr_bin),
199                                  primebytelen) < 0 ||
200             crypto_bignum_to_bin(qnr, qnr_bin, sizeof(qnr_bin),
201                                  primebytelen) < 0)
202                 goto fail;
203
204         os_memset(prfbuf, 0, primebytelen);
205         ctr = 0;
206
207         /*
208          * Run through the hunting-and-pecking loop 40 times to mask the time
209          * necessary to find PWE. The odds of PWE not being found in 40 loops is
210          * roughly 1 in 1 trillion.
211          */
212         while (ctr < 40) {
213                 ctr++;
214
215                 /*
216                  * compute counter-mode password value and stretch to prime
217                  *    pwd-seed = H(token | peer-id | server-id | password |
218                  *                 counter)
219                  */
220                 hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
221                 if (hash == NULL)
222                         goto fail;
223                 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, token, sizeof(u32));
224                 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_peer, id_peer_len);
225                 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_server, id_server_len);
226                 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, password, password_len);
227                 eap_pwd_h_update(hash, &ctr, sizeof(ctr));
228                 eap_pwd_h_final(hash, pwe_digest);
229
230                 is_odd = const_time_select_u8(
231                         found, is_odd, pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01);
232                 if (eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
233                                 (u8 *) "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
234                                 os_strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"),
235                                 prfbuf, primebitlen) < 0)
236                         goto fail;
237                 if (primebitlen % 8)
238                         buf_shift_right(prfbuf, primebytelen,
239                                         8 - primebitlen % 8);
240
241                 crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
242                 x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(prfbuf, primebytelen);
243                 if (!x_candidate) {
244                         wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
245                                    "EAP-pwd: unable to create x_candidate");
246                         goto fail;
247                 }
248
249                 if (crypto_bignum_cmp(x_candidate, prime) >= 0)
250                         continue;
251
252                 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
253                                 prfbuf, primebytelen);
254                 const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, prfbuf, primebytelen,
255                                       x_bin);
256
257                 /*
258                  * compute y^2 using the equation of the curve
259                  *
260                  *      y^2 = x^3 + ax + b
261                  */
262                 crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp2, 1);
263                 tmp2 = crypto_ec_point_compute_y_sqr(grp->group, x_candidate);
264                 if (!tmp2)
265                         goto fail;
266
267                 /*
268                  * mask tmp2 so doing legendre won't leak timing info
269                  *
270                  * tmp1 is a random number between 1 and p-1
271                  */
272                 if (crypto_bignum_rand(tmp1, pm1) < 0 ||
273                     crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, tmp1, prime, tmp2) < 0 ||
274                     crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, tmp1, prime, tmp2) < 0)
275                         goto fail;
276
277                 /*
278                  * Now tmp2 (y^2) is masked, all values between 1 and p-1
279                  * are equally probable. Multiplying by r^2 does not change
280                  * whether or not tmp2 is a quadratic residue, just masks it.
281                  *
282                  * Flip a coin, multiply by the random quadratic residue or the
283                  * random quadratic nonresidue and record heads or tails.
284                  */
285                 mask = const_time_eq_u8(crypto_bignum_is_odd(tmp1), 1);
286                 check = const_time_select_s8(mask, 1, -1);
287                 const_time_select_bin(mask, qr_bin, qnr_bin, primebytelen,
288                                       qr_or_qnr_bin);
289                 crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1);
290                 qr_or_qnr = crypto_bignum_init_set(qr_or_qnr_bin, primebytelen);
291                 if (!qr_or_qnr ||
292                     crypto_bignum_mulmod(tmp2, qr_or_qnr, prime, tmp2) < 0)
293                         goto fail;
294
295                 /*
296                  * Now it's safe to do legendre, if check is 1 then it's
297                  * a straightforward test (multiplying by qr does not
298                  * change result), if check is -1 then it's the opposite test
299                  * (multiplying a qr by qnr would make a qnr).
300                  */
301                 res = crypto_bignum_legendre(tmp2, prime);
302                 if (res == -2)
303                         goto fail;
304                 mask = const_time_eq(res, check);
305                 found_ctr = const_time_select_u8(found, found_ctr, ctr);
306                 found |= mask;
307         }
308         if (found == 0) {
309                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
310                            "EAP-pwd: unable to find random point on curve for group %d, something's fishy",
311                            num);
312                 goto fail;
313         }
314
315         /*
316          * We know x_candidate is a quadratic residue so set it here.
317          */
318         crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
319         x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(x_bin, primebytelen);
320         if (!x_candidate ||
321             crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(grp->group, grp->pwe, x_candidate,
322                                           is_odd) != 0) {
323                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Could not solve for y");
324                 goto fail;
325         }
326
327         /*
328          * If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be on the
329          * curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code says this is
330          * required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't hurt just to be sure.
331          */
332         if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {
333                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");
334                 goto fail;
335         }
336
337         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %02d tries", found_ctr);
338
339         if (0) {
340  fail:
341                 crypto_ec_point_deinit(grp->pwe, 1);
342                 grp->pwe = NULL;
343                 ret = 1;
344         }
345         /* cleanliness and order.... */
346         crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1);
347         crypto_bignum_deinit(pm1, 0);
348         crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp1, 1);
349         crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp2, 1);
350         crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 1);
351         crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 1);
352         crypto_bignum_deinit(qr_or_qnr, 1);
353         crypto_bignum_deinit(one, 0);
354         bin_clear_free(prfbuf, primebytelen);
355         os_memset(qr_bin, 0, sizeof(qr_bin));
356         os_memset(qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qnr_bin));
357         os_memset(qr_or_qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qr_or_qnr_bin));
358         os_memset(pwe_digest, 0, sizeof(pwe_digest));
359
360         return ret;
361 }
362
363
364 int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *grp, const struct crypto_bignum *k,
365                  const struct crypto_bignum *peer_scalar,
366                  const struct crypto_bignum *server_scalar,
367                  const u8 *confirm_peer, const u8 *confirm_server,
368                  const u32 *ciphersuite, u8 *msk, u8 *emsk, u8 *session_id)
369 {
370         struct crypto_hash *hash;
371         u8 mk[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft;
372         u8 msk_emsk[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
373         size_t prime_len, order_len;
374
375         prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(grp->group);
376         order_len = crypto_ec_order_len(grp->group);
377
378         cruft = os_malloc(prime_len);
379         if (!cruft)
380                 return -1;
381
382         /*
383          * first compute the session-id = TypeCode | H(ciphersuite | scal_p |
384          *      scal_s)
385          */
386         session_id[0] = EAP_TYPE_PWD;
387         hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
388         if (hash == NULL) {
389                 os_free(cruft);
390                 return -1;
391         }
392         eap_pwd_h_update(hash, (const u8 *) ciphersuite, sizeof(u32));
393         crypto_bignum_to_bin(peer_scalar, cruft, order_len, order_len);
394         eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, order_len);
395         crypto_bignum_to_bin(server_scalar, cruft, order_len, order_len);
396         eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, order_len);
397         eap_pwd_h_final(hash, &session_id[1]);
398
399         /* then compute MK = H(k | confirm-peer | confirm-server) */
400         hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
401         if (hash == NULL) {
402                 os_free(cruft);
403                 return -1;
404         }
405         crypto_bignum_to_bin(k, cruft, prime_len, prime_len);
406         eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, prime_len);
407         os_free(cruft);
408         eap_pwd_h_update(hash, confirm_peer, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
409         eap_pwd_h_update(hash, confirm_server, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
410         eap_pwd_h_final(hash, mk);
411
412         /* stretch the mk with the session-id to get MSK | EMSK */
413         if (eap_pwd_kdf(mk, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
414                         session_id, SHA256_MAC_LEN + 1,
415                         msk_emsk, (EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) * 8) < 0) {
416                 return -1;
417         }
418
419         os_memcpy(msk, msk_emsk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
420         os_memcpy(emsk, msk_emsk + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
421
422         return 1;
423 }
424
425
426 static int eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(const struct crypto_bignum *prime,
427                                     const u8 *buf, size_t len)
428 {
429         struct crypto_bignum *val;
430         int ok = 1;
431
432         val = crypto_bignum_init_set(buf, len);
433         if (!val || crypto_bignum_is_zero(val) ||
434             crypto_bignum_cmp(val, prime) >= 0)
435                 ok = 0;
436         crypto_bignum_deinit(val, 0);
437         return ok;
438 }
439
440
441 struct crypto_ec_point * eap_pwd_get_element(EAP_PWD_group *group,
442                                              const u8 *buf)
443 {
444         struct crypto_ec_point *element;
445         const struct crypto_bignum *prime;
446         size_t prime_len;
447
448         prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(group->group);
449         prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(group->group);
450
451         /* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2.2: 0 < x,y < p */
452         if (!eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(prime, buf, prime_len) ||
453             !eap_pwd_element_coord_ok(prime, buf + prime_len, prime_len)) {
454                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Invalid coordinate in element");
455                 return NULL;
456         }
457
458         element = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(group->group, buf);
459         if (!element) {
460                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: EC point from element failed");
461                 return NULL;
462         }
463
464         /* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2.2: on curve and not the point at infinity */
465         if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(group->group, element) ||
466             crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(group->group, element)) {
467                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Invalid element");
468                 goto fail;
469         }
470
471 out:
472         return element;
473 fail:
474         crypto_ec_point_deinit(element, 0);
475         element = NULL;
476         goto out;
477 }
478
479
480 struct crypto_bignum * eap_pwd_get_scalar(EAP_PWD_group *group, const u8 *buf)
481 {
482         struct crypto_bignum *scalar;
483         const struct crypto_bignum *order;
484         size_t order_len;
485
486         order = crypto_ec_get_order(group->group);
487         order_len = crypto_ec_order_len(group->group);
488
489         /* RFC 5931, 2.8.5.2: 1 < scalar < r */
490         scalar = crypto_bignum_init_set(buf, order_len);
491         if (!scalar || crypto_bignum_is_zero(scalar) ||
492             crypto_bignum_is_one(scalar) ||
493             crypto_bignum_cmp(scalar, order) >= 0) {
494                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: received scalar is invalid");
495                 crypto_bignum_deinit(scalar, 0);
496                 scalar = NULL;
497         }
498
499         return scalar;
500 }
501
502
503 int eap_pwd_get_rand_mask(EAP_PWD_group *group, struct crypto_bignum *_rand,
504                           struct crypto_bignum *_mask,
505                           struct crypto_bignum *scalar)
506 {
507         const struct crypto_bignum *order;
508         int count;
509
510         order = crypto_ec_get_order(group->group);
511
512         /* Select two random values rand,mask such that 1 < rand,mask < r and
513          * rand + mask mod r > 1. */
514         for (count = 0; count < 100; count++) {
515                 if (crypto_bignum_rand(_rand, order) == 0 &&
516                     !crypto_bignum_is_zero(_rand) &&
517                     crypto_bignum_rand(_mask, order) == 0 &&
518                     !crypto_bignum_is_zero(_mask) &&
519                     crypto_bignum_add(_rand, _mask, scalar) == 0 &&
520                     crypto_bignum_mod(scalar, order, scalar) == 0 &&
521                     !crypto_bignum_is_zero(scalar) &&
522                     !crypto_bignum_is_one(scalar))
523                         return 0;
524         }
525
526         wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get randomness");
527         return -1;
528 }