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1 /*
2  * validator/val_utils.c - validator utility functions.
3  *
4  * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
5  *
6  * This software is open source.
7  * 
8  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10  * are met:
11  * 
12  * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
13  * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14  * 
15  * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
16  * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
17  * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
18  * 
19  * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may
20  * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
21  * specific prior written permission.
22  * 
23  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
24  * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
25  * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
26  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
27  * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
28  * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
29  * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
30  * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
31  * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
32  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
33  * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
34  */
35
36 /**
37  * \file
38  *
39  * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
40  */
41 #include "config.h"
42 #include "validator/val_utils.h"
43 #include "validator/validator.h"
44 #include "validator/val_kentry.h"
45 #include "validator/val_sigcrypt.h"
46 #include "validator/val_anchor.h"
47 #include "validator/val_nsec.h"
48 #include "validator/val_neg.h"
49 #include "services/cache/rrset.h"
50 #include "services/cache/dns.h"
51 #include "util/data/msgreply.h"
52 #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h"
53 #include "util/data/dname.h"
54 #include "util/net_help.h"
55 #include "util/module.h"
56 #include "util/regional.h"
57
58 enum val_classification 
59 val_classify_response(uint16_t query_flags, struct query_info* origqinf,
60         struct query_info* qinf, struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip)
61 {
62         int rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(rep->flags);
63         size_t i;
64
65         /* Normal Name Error's are easy to detect -- but don't mistake a CNAME
66          * chain ending in NXDOMAIN. */
67         if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN && rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
68                 return VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR;
69
70         /* check for referral: nonRD query and it looks like a nodata */
71         if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->an_numrrsets == 0 &&
72                 rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
73                 /* SOA record in auth indicates it is NODATA instead.
74                  * All validation requiring NODATA messages have SOA in 
75                  * authority section. */
76                 /* uses fact that answer section is empty */
77                 int saw_ns = 0;
78                 for(i=0; i<rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
79                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)
80                                 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
81                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS)
82                                 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL;
83                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS)
84                                 saw_ns = 1;
85                 }
86                 return saw_ns?VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
87         }
88         /* root referral where NS set is in the answer section */
89         if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->ns_numrrsets == 0 &&
90                 rep->an_numrrsets == 1 && rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
91                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS &&
92                 query_dname_compare(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.dname, 
93                         origqinf->qname) != 0)
94                 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL;
95
96         /* dump bad messages */
97         if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN)
98                 return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN;
99         /* next check if the skip into the answer section shows no answer */
100         if(skip>0 && rep->an_numrrsets <= skip)
101                 return VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER;
102
103         /* Next is NODATA */
104         if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
105                 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA;
106         
107         /* We distinguish between CNAME response and other positive/negative
108          * responses because CNAME answers require extra processing. */
109
110         /* We distinguish between ANY and CNAME or POSITIVE because 
111          * ANY responses are validated differently. */
112         if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && qinf->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY)
113                 return VAL_CLASS_ANY;
114         
115         /* Note that DNAMEs will be ignored here, unless qtype=DNAME. Unless
116          * qtype=CNAME, this will yield a CNAME response. */
117         for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
118                 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR &&
119                         ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == qinf->qtype)
120                         return VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE;
121                 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)
122                         return VAL_CLASS_CNAME;
123         }
124         log_dns_msg("validator: error. failed to classify response message: ",
125                 qinf, rep);
126         return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN;
127 }
128
129 /** Get signer name from RRSIG */
130 static void
131 rrsig_get_signer(uint8_t* data, size_t len, uint8_t** sname, size_t* slen)
132 {
133         /* RRSIG rdata is not allowed to be compressed, it is stored
134          * uncompressed in memory as well, so return a ptr to the name */
135         if(len < 21) {
136                 /* too short RRSig:
137                  * short, byte, byte, long, long, long, short, "." is
138                  * 2    1       1       4       4  4    2       1 = 19
139                  *                      and a skip of 18 bytes to the name.
140                  * +2 for the rdatalen is 21 bytes len for root label */
141                 *sname = NULL;
142                 *slen = 0;
143                 return;
144         }
145         data += 20; /* skip the fixed size bits */
146         len -= 20;
147         *slen = dname_valid(data, len);
148         if(!*slen) {
149                 /* bad dname in this rrsig. */
150                 *sname = NULL;
151                 return;
152         }
153         *sname = data;
154 }
155
156 void 
157 val_find_rrset_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** sname,
158         size_t* slen)
159 {
160         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
161                 rrset->entry.data;
162         /* return signer for first signature, or NULL */
163         if(d->rrsig_count == 0) {
164                 *sname = NULL;
165                 *slen = 0;
166                 return;
167         }
168         /* get rrsig signer name out of the signature */
169         rrsig_get_signer(d->rr_data[d->count], d->rr_len[d->count], 
170                 sname, slen);
171 }
172
173 /**
174  * Find best signer name in this set of rrsigs.
175  * @param rrset: which rrsigs to look through.
176  * @param qinf: the query name that needs validation.
177  * @param signer_name: the best signer_name. Updated if a better one is found.
178  * @param signer_len: length of signer name.
179  * @param matchcount: count of current best name (starts at 0 for no match).
180  *      Updated if match is improved.
181  */
182 static void
183 val_find_best_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, 
184         struct query_info* qinf, uint8_t** signer_name, size_t* signer_len, 
185         int* matchcount)
186 {
187         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
188                 rrset->entry.data;
189         uint8_t* sign;
190         size_t i;
191         int m;
192         for(i=d->count; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) {
193                 sign = d->rr_data[i]+2+18;
194                 /* look at signatures that are valid (long enough),
195                  * and have a signer name that is a superdomain of qname,
196                  * and then check the number of labels in the shared topdomain
197                  * improve the match if possible */
198                 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+19 && /* rdata, sig + root label*/
199                         dname_subdomain_c(qinf->qname, sign)) {
200                         (void)dname_lab_cmp(qinf->qname, 
201                                 dname_count_labels(qinf->qname), 
202                                 sign, dname_count_labels(sign), &m);
203                         if(m > *matchcount) {
204                                 *matchcount = m;
205                                 *signer_name = sign;
206                                 (void)dname_count_size_labels(*signer_name,
207                                         signer_len);
208                         }
209                 }
210         }
211 }
212
213 void 
214 val_find_signer(enum val_classification subtype, struct query_info* qinf, 
215         struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip, uint8_t** signer_name, 
216         size_t* signer_len)
217 {
218         size_t i;
219         
220         if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE || subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY) {
221                 /* check for the answer rrset */
222                 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
223                         if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname, 
224                                 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) {
225                                 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 
226                                         signer_name, signer_len);
227                                 return;
228                         }
229                 }
230                 *signer_name = NULL;
231                 *signer_len = 0;
232         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) {
233                 /* check for the first signed cname/dname rrset */
234                 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
235                         val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 
236                                 signer_name, signer_len);
237                         if(*signer_name)
238                                 return;
239                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME)
240                                 break; /* only check CNAME after a DNAME */
241                 }
242                 *signer_name = NULL;
243                 *signer_len = 0;
244         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR 
245                 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA) {
246                 /*Check to see if the AUTH section NSEC record(s) have rrsigs*/
247                 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<
248                         rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
249                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC
250                                 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) ==
251                                 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
252                                 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 
253                                         signer_name, signer_len);
254                                 return;
255                         }
256                 }
257         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER) {
258                 /* find closest superdomain signer name in authority section
259                  * NSEC and NSEC3s */
260                 int matchcount = 0;
261                 *signer_name = NULL;
262                 *signer_len = 0;
263                 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->
264                         ns_numrrsets; i++) { 
265                         if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC
266                                 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 
267                                 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
268                                 val_find_best_signer(rep->rrsets[i], qinf,
269                                         signer_name, signer_len, &matchcount);
270                         }
271                 }
272         } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) {
273                 /* find keys for the item at skip */
274                 if(skip < rep->rrset_count) {
275                         val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip], 
276                                 signer_name, signer_len);
277                         return;
278                 }
279                 *signer_name = NULL;
280                 *signer_len = 0;
281         } else {
282                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "find_signer: could not find signer name"
283                         " for unknown type response");
284                 *signer_name = NULL;
285                 *signer_len = 0;
286         }
287 }
288
289 /** return number of rrs in an rrset */
290 static size_t
291 rrset_get_count(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
292 {
293         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
294                 rrset->entry.data;
295         if(!d) return 0;
296         return d->count;
297 }
298
299 /** return TTL of rrset */
300 static uint32_t
301 rrset_get_ttl(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
302 {
303         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
304                 rrset->entry.data;
305         if(!d) return 0;
306         return d->ttl;
307 }
308
309 enum sec_status 
310 val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
311         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* keys,
312         uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
313 {
314         enum sec_status sec;
315         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
316                 entry.data;
317         if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
318                 /* re-verify all other statuses, because keyset may change*/
319                 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset cached", 
320                         rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type), 
321                         ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
322                 return d->security;
323         }
324         /* check in the cache if verification has already been done */
325         rrset_check_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now);
326         if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
327                 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset from cache", 
328                         rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type), 
329                         ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
330                 return d->security;
331         }
332         log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset", rrset->rk.dname,
333                 ntohs(rrset->rk.type), ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
334         sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, keys, sigalg, reason);
335         verbose(VERB_ALGO, "verify result: %s", sec_status_to_string(sec));
336         regional_free_all(env->scratch);
337
338         /* update rrset security status 
339          * only improves security status 
340          * and bogus is set only once, even if we rechecked the status */
341         if(sec > d->security) {
342                 d->security = sec;
343                 if(sec == sec_status_secure)
344                         d->trust = rrset_trust_validated;
345                 else if(sec == sec_status_bogus) {
346                         size_t i;
347                         /* update ttl for rrset to fixed value. */
348                         d->ttl = ve->bogus_ttl;
349                         for(i=0; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++)
350                                 d->rr_ttl[i] = ve->bogus_ttl;
351                         /* leave RR specific TTL: not used for determine
352                          * if RRset timed out and clients see proper value. */
353                         lock_basic_lock(&ve->bogus_lock);
354                         ve->num_rrset_bogus++;
355                         lock_basic_unlock(&ve->bogus_lock);
356                 }
357                 /* if status updated - store in cache for reuse */
358                 rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now);
359         }
360
361         return sec;
362 }
363
364 enum sec_status 
365 val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
366         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct key_entry_key* kkey,
367         char** reason)
368 {
369         /* temporary dnskey rrset-key */
370         struct ub_packed_rrset_key dnskey;
371         struct key_entry_data* kd = (struct key_entry_data*)kkey->entry.data;
372         enum sec_status sec;
373         dnskey.rk.type = htons(kd->rrset_type);
374         dnskey.rk.rrset_class = htons(kkey->key_class);
375         dnskey.rk.flags = 0;
376         dnskey.rk.dname = kkey->name;
377         dnskey.rk.dname_len = kkey->namelen;
378         dnskey.entry.key = &dnskey;
379         dnskey.entry.data = kd->rrset_data;
380         sec = val_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, &dnskey, kd->algo, reason);
381         return sec;
382 }
383
384 /** verify that a DS RR hashes to a key and that key signs the set */
385 static enum sec_status
386 verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 
387         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
388         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, size_t ds_idx, char** reason)
389 {
390         enum sec_status sec = sec_status_bogus;
391         size_t i, num, numchecked = 0, numhashok = 0;
392         num = rrset_get_count(dnskey_rrset);
393         for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
394                 /* Skip DNSKEYs that don't match the basic criteria. */
395                 if(ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx) 
396                    != dnskey_get_algo(dnskey_rrset, i)
397                    || dnskey_calc_keytag(dnskey_rrset, i)
398                    != ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx)) {
399                         continue;
400                 }
401                 numchecked++;
402                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "attempt DS match algo %d keytag %d",
403                         ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx),
404                         ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx));
405
406                 /* Convert the candidate DNSKEY into a hash using the 
407                  * same DS hash algorithm. */
408                 if(!ds_digest_match_dnskey(env, dnskey_rrset, i, ds_rrset, 
409                         ds_idx)) {
410                         verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match attempt failed");
411                         continue;
412                 }
413                 numhashok++;
414                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match digest ok, trying signature");
415
416                 /* Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY 
417                  * verifies *with this key*  */
418                 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 
419                         dnskey_rrset, i, reason);
420                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
421                         return sec;
422                 }
423                 /* If it didn't validate with the DNSKEY, try the next one! */
424         }
425         if(numchecked == 0)
426                 algo_needs_reason(env, ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx),
427                         reason, "no keys have a DS");
428         else if(numhashok == 0)
429                 *reason = "DS hash mismatches key";
430         else if(!*reason)
431                 *reason = "keyset not secured by DNSKEY that matches DS";
432         return sec_status_bogus;
433 }
434
435 int val_favorite_ds_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset)
436 {
437         size_t i, num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset);
438         int d, digest_algo = 0; /* DS digest algo 0 is not used. */
439         /* find favorite algo, for now, highest number supported */
440         for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
441                 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
442                         !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i)) {
443                         continue;
444                 }
445                 d = ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i);
446                 if(d > digest_algo)
447                         digest_algo = d;
448         }
449         return digest_algo;
450 }
451
452 enum sec_status 
453 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
454         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
455         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
456 {
457         /* as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be
458          * equivalent to no DS rrset. */
459         int has_useful_ds = 0, digest_algo, alg;
460         struct algo_needs needs;
461         size_t i, num;
462         enum sec_status sec;
463
464         if(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ds_rrset->rk.dname_len ||
465                 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname)
466                 != 0) {
467                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset "
468                         "by name");
469                 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name";
470                 return sec_status_bogus;
471         }
472
473         digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ds_rrset);
474         if(sigalg)
475                 algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ds_rrset, digest_algo, sigalg);
476         num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset);
477         for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
478                 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS. 
479                  * And check it is the strongest digest */
480                 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
481                         !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) ||
482                         ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i) != digest_algo) {
483                         continue;
484                 }
485
486                 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and 
487                  * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a 
488                  * "null" KeyEntry). */
489                 has_useful_ds = true;
490
491                 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 
492                         ds_rrset, i, reason);
493                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
494                         if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
495                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i))) {
496                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY.");
497                                 return sec_status_secure;
498                         }
499                 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
500                         algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
501                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i));
502                 }
503         }
504
505         /* None of the DS's worked out. */
506
507         /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */
508         if(!has_useful_ds) {
509                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable DS records were found -- "
510                         "treating as insecure.");
511                 return sec_status_insecure;
512         }
513         /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */
514         verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable DS to a DNSKEY.");
515         if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) {
516                 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of "
517                         "DNSKEY signature");
518         }
519         return sec_status_bogus;
520 }
521
522 struct key_entry_key* 
523 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env, 
524         struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
525         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason)
526 {
527         uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
528         enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(env, ve, 
529                 dnskey_rrset, ds_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason);
530
531         if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
532                 return key_entry_create_rrset(region, 
533                         ds_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname_len,
534                         ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset,
535                         downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now);
536         } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
537                 return key_entry_create_null(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname,
538                         ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, 
539                         ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
540                         rrset_get_ttl(ds_rrset), *env->now);
541         }
542         return key_entry_create_bad(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname,
543                 ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
544                 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now);
545 }
546
547 enum sec_status 
548 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
549         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
550         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds,
551         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
552 {
553         /* as long as this is false, we can consider this anchor to be
554          * equivalent to no anchor. */
555         int has_useful_ta = 0, digest_algo = 0, alg;
556         struct algo_needs needs;
557         size_t i, num;
558         enum sec_status sec;
559
560         if(ta_ds && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_ds->rk.dname_len ||
561                 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_ds->rk.dname)
562                 != 0)) {
563                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset "
564                         "by name");
565                 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name";
566                 return sec_status_bogus;
567         }
568         if(ta_dnskey && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_dnskey->rk.dname_len
569              || query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_dnskey->rk.dname)
570                 != 0)) {
571                 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset "
572                         "by name");
573                 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset by name";
574                 return sec_status_bogus;
575         }
576
577         if(ta_ds)
578                 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ta_ds);
579         if(sigalg) {
580                 if(ta_ds)
581                         algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ta_ds, digest_algo, sigalg);
582                 else    memset(&needs, 0, sizeof(needs));
583                 if(ta_dnskey)
584                         algo_needs_init_dnskey_add(&needs, ta_dnskey, sigalg);
585         }
586         if(ta_ds) {
587             num = rrset_get_count(ta_ds);
588             for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
589                 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS. 
590                  * And check it is the strongest digest */
591                 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) ||
592                         !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) ||
593                         ds_get_digest_algo(ta_ds, i) != digest_algo)
594                         continue;
595
596                 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and 
597                  * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a 
598                  * "null" KeyEntry). */
599                 has_useful_ta = true;
600
601                 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 
602                         ta_ds, i, reason);
603                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
604                         if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
605                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i))) {
606                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY.");
607                                 return sec_status_secure;
608                         }
609                 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
610                         algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
611                                 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i));
612                 }
613             }
614         }
615
616         /* None of the DS's worked out: check the DNSKEYs. */
617         if(ta_dnskey) {
618             num = rrset_get_count(ta_dnskey);
619             for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
620                 /* Check to see if we can understand this DNSKEY */
621                 if(!dnskey_algo_is_supported(ta_dnskey, i))
622                         continue;
623
624                 /* we saw a useful TA */
625                 has_useful_ta = true;
626
627                 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
628                         ta_dnskey, i, reason);
629                 if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
630                         if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
631                                 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i))) {
632                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "anchor matched DNSKEY.");
633                                 return sec_status_secure;
634                         }
635                 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) {
636                         algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs,
637                                 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i));
638                 }
639             }
640         }
641
642         /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */
643         if(!has_useful_ta) {
644                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable trust anchors were found -- "
645                         "treating as insecure.");
646                 return sec_status_insecure;
647         }
648         /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */
649         verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable anchor to a DNSKEY.");
650         if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) {
651                 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of "
652                         "DNSKEY signature");
653         }
654         return sec_status_bogus;
655 }
656
657 struct key_entry_key* 
658 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env,
659         struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
660         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds_rrset,
661         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey_rrset, int downprot,
662         char** reason)
663 {
664         uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
665         enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(env, ve, 
666                 dnskey_rrset, ta_ds_rrset, ta_dnskey_rrset,
667                 downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason);
668
669         if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
670                 return key_entry_create_rrset(region, 
671                         dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len,
672                         ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset,
673                         downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now);
674         } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
675                 return key_entry_create_null(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname,
676                         dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, 
677                         ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
678                         rrset_get_ttl(dnskey_rrset), *env->now);
679         }
680         return key_entry_create_bad(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname,
681                 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class),
682                 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now);
683 }
684
685 int 
686 val_dsset_isusable(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset)
687 {
688         size_t i;
689         for(i=0; i<rrset_get_count(ds_rrset); i++) {
690                 if(ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) &&
691                         ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i))
692                         return 1;
693         }
694         return 0;
695 }
696
697 /** get label count for a signature */
698 static uint8_t
699 rrsig_get_labcount(struct packed_rrset_data* d, size_t sig)
700 {
701         if(d->rr_len[sig] < 2+4)
702                 return 0; /* bad sig length */
703         return d->rr_data[sig][2+3];
704 }
705
706 int 
707 val_rrset_wildcard(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** wc)
708 {
709         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
710                 entry.data;
711         uint8_t labcount;
712         int labdiff;
713         uint8_t* wn;
714         size_t i, wl;
715         if(d->rrsig_count == 0) {
716                 return 1;
717         }
718         labcount = rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + 0);
719         /* check rest of signatures identical */
720         for(i=1; i<d->rrsig_count; i++) {
721                 if(labcount != rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + i)) {
722                         return 0;
723                 }
724         }
725         /* OK the rrsigs check out */
726         /* if the RRSIG label count is shorter than the number of actual 
727          * labels, then this rrset was synthesized from a wildcard.
728          * Note that the RRSIG label count doesn't count the root label. */
729         wn = rrset->rk.dname;
730         wl = rrset->rk.dname_len;
731         /* skip a leading wildcard label in the dname (RFC4035 2.2) */
732         if(dname_is_wild(wn)) {
733                 wn += 2;
734                 wl -= 2;
735         }
736         labdiff = (dname_count_labels(wn) - 1) - (int)labcount;
737         if(labdiff > 0) {
738                 *wc = wn;
739                 dname_remove_labels(wc, &wl, labdiff);
740                 return 1;
741         }
742         return 1;
743 }
744
745 int
746 val_chase_cname(struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* rep,
747         size_t* cname_skip) {
748         size_t i;
749         /* skip any DNAMEs, go to the CNAME for next part */
750         for(i = *cname_skip; i < rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
751                 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME &&
752                         query_dname_compare(qchase->qname, rep->rrsets[i]->
753                                 rk.dname) == 0) {
754                         qchase->qname = NULL;
755                         get_cname_target(rep->rrsets[i], &qchase->qname,
756                                 &qchase->qname_len);
757                         if(!qchase->qname)
758                                 return 0; /* bad CNAME rdata */
759                         (*cname_skip) = i+1;
760                         return 1;
761                 }
762         }
763         return 0; /* CNAME classified but no matching CNAME ?! */
764 }
765
766 /** see if rrset has signer name as one of the rrsig signers */
767 static int
768 rrset_has_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t* name, size_t len)
769 {
770         struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
771                 entry.data;
772         size_t i;
773         for(i = d->count; i< d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) {
774                 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+18+len) {
775                         /* at least rdatalen + signature + signame (+1 sig)*/
776                         if(query_dname_compare(name, d->rr_data[i]+2+18) == 0)
777                         {
778                                 return 1;
779                         }
780                 }
781         }
782         return 0;
783 }
784
785 void 
786 val_fill_reply(struct reply_info* chase, struct reply_info* orig, 
787         size_t skip, uint8_t* name, size_t len, uint8_t* signer)
788 {
789         size_t i;
790         int seen_dname = 0;
791         chase->rrset_count = 0;
792         chase->an_numrrsets = 0;
793         chase->ns_numrrsets = 0;
794         chase->ar_numrrsets = 0;
795         /* ANSWER section */
796         for(i=skip; i<orig->an_numrrsets; i++) {
797                 if(!signer) {
798                         if(query_dname_compare(name, 
799                                 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
800                                 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = 
801                                         orig->rrsets[i];
802                 } else if(seen_dname && ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 
803                         LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) {
804                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
805                         seen_dname = 0;
806                 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
807                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
808                         if(ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 
809                                 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
810                                         seen_dname = 1;
811                         }
812                 }
813         }       
814         /* AUTHORITY section */
815         for(i = (skip > orig->an_numrrsets)?skip:orig->an_numrrsets;
816                 i<orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets; 
817                 i++) {
818                 if(!signer) {
819                         if(query_dname_compare(name, 
820                                 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
821                                 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+
822                                     chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
823                 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
824                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+
825                                 chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
826                 }
827         }
828         /* ADDITIONAL section */
829         for(i= (skip>orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets)?
830                 skip:orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets; 
831                 i<orig->rrset_count; i++) {
832                 if(!signer) {
833                         if(query_dname_compare(name, 
834                                 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0)
835                             chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets
836                                 +orig->ns_numrrsets+chase->ar_numrrsets++] 
837                                 = orig->rrsets[i];
838                 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) {
839                         chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets+
840                                 chase->ar_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i];
841                 }
842         }
843         chase->rrset_count = chase->an_numrrsets + chase->ns_numrrsets + 
844                 chase->ar_numrrsets;
845 }
846
847 void
848 val_check_nonsecure(struct val_env* ve, struct reply_info* rep) 
849 {
850         size_t i;
851         /* authority */
852         for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
853                 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data)
854                         ->security != sec_status_secure) {
855                         /* because we want to return the authentic original
856                          * message when presented with CD-flagged queries,
857                          * we need to preserve AUTHORITY section data.
858                          * However, this rrset is not signed or signed
859                          * with the wrong keys. Validation has tried to
860                          * verify this rrset with the keysets of import.
861                          * But this rrset did not verify.
862                          * Therefore the message is bogus.
863                          */
864
865                         /* check if authority consists of only an NS record
866                          * which is bad, and there is an answer section with
867                          * data.  In that case, delete NS and additional to 
868                          * be lenient and make a minimal response */
869                         if(rep->an_numrrsets != 0 && rep->ns_numrrsets == 1 &&
870                                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) 
871                                 == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) {
872                                 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "truncate to minimal");
873                                 rep->ns_numrrsets = 0;
874                                 rep->ar_numrrsets = 0;
875                                 rep->rrset_count = rep->an_numrrsets;
876                                 return;
877                         }
878
879                         log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "message is bogus, "
880                                 "non secure rrset",
881                                 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, 
882                                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type),
883                                 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class));
884                         rep->security = sec_status_bogus;
885                         return;
886                 }
887         }
888         /* additional */
889         if(!ve->clean_additional)
890                 return;
891         for(i=rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
892                 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data)
893                         ->security != sec_status_secure) {
894                         /* This does not cause message invalidation. It was
895                          * simply unsigned data in the additional. The
896                          * RRSIG must have been truncated off the message.
897                          *
898                          * However, we do not want to return possible bogus
899                          * data to clients that rely on this service for
900                          * their authentication.
901                          */
902                         /* remove this unneeded additional rrset */
903                         memmove(rep->rrsets+i, rep->rrsets+i+1, 
904                                 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)*
905                                 (rep->rrset_count - i - 1));
906                         rep->ar_numrrsets--;
907                         rep->rrset_count--;
908                         i--;
909                 }
910         }
911 }
912
913 /** check no anchor and unlock */
914 static int
915 check_no_anchor(struct val_anchors* anchors, uint8_t* nm, size_t l, uint16_t c)
916 {
917         struct trust_anchor* ta;
918         if((ta=anchors_lookup(anchors, nm, l, c))) {
919                 lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock);
920         }
921         return !ta;
922 }
923
924 void 
925 val_mark_indeterminate(struct reply_info* rep, struct val_anchors* anchors, 
926         struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env)
927 {
928         size_t i;
929         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
930         for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
931                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
932                 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked &&
933                    check_no_anchor(anchors, rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname,
934                         rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname_len, 
935                         ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class))) 
936                 {       
937                         /* mark as indeterminate */
938                         d->security = sec_status_indeterminate;
939                         rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now);
940                 }
941         }
942 }
943
944 void 
945 val_mark_insecure(struct reply_info* rep, uint8_t* kname,
946         struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env)
947 {
948         size_t i;
949         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
950         for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
951                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
952                 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked &&
953                    dname_subdomain_c(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, kname)) {
954                         /* mark as insecure */
955                         d->security = sec_status_insecure;
956                         rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now);
957                 }
958         }
959 }
960
961 size_t 
962 val_next_unchecked(struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip)
963 {
964         size_t i;
965         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
966         for(i=skip+1; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) {
967                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
968                 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked) {
969                         return i;
970                 }
971         }
972         return rep->rrset_count;
973 }
974
975 const char*
976 val_classification_to_string(enum val_classification subtype)
977 {
978         switch(subtype) {
979                 case VAL_CLASS_UNTYPED:         return "untyped";
980                 case VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN:         return "unknown";
981                 case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE:        return "positive";
982                 case VAL_CLASS_CNAME:           return "cname";
983                 case VAL_CLASS_NODATA:          return "nodata";
984                 case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR:       return "nameerror";
985                 case VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER:   return "cnamenoanswer";
986                 case VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:        return "referral";
987                 case VAL_CLASS_ANY:             return "qtype_any";
988                 default:
989                         return "bad_val_classification";
990         }
991 }
992
993 /** log a sock_list entry */
994 static void
995 sock_list_logentry(enum verbosity_value v, const char* s, struct sock_list* p)
996 {
997         if(p->len)
998                 log_addr(v, s, &p->addr, p->len);
999         else    verbose(v, "%s cache", s);
1000 }
1001
1002 void val_blacklist(struct sock_list** blacklist, struct regional* region,
1003         struct sock_list* origin, int cross)
1004 {
1005         /* debug printout */
1006         if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) {
1007                 struct sock_list* p;
1008                 for(p=*blacklist; p; p=p->next)
1009                         sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist", p);
1010                 if(!origin)
1011                         verbose(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add: cache");
1012                 for(p=origin; p; p=p->next)
1013                         sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add", p);
1014         }
1015         /* blacklist the IPs or the cache */
1016         if(!origin) {
1017                 /* only add if nothing there. anything else also stops cache*/
1018                 if(!*blacklist)
1019                         sock_list_insert(blacklist, NULL, 0, region);
1020         } else if(!cross)
1021                 sock_list_prepend(blacklist, origin);
1022         else    sock_list_merge(blacklist, region, origin);
1023 }
1024
1025 int val_has_signed_nsecs(struct reply_info* rep, char** reason)
1026 {
1027         size_t i, num_nsec = 0, num_nsec3 = 0;
1028         struct packed_rrset_data* d;
1029         for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
1030                 if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC))
1031                         num_nsec++;
1032                 else if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3))
1033                         num_nsec3++;
1034                 else continue;
1035                 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
1036                 if(d && d->rrsig_count != 0) {
1037                         return 1;
1038                 }
1039         }
1040         if(num_nsec == 0 && num_nsec3 == 0)
1041                 *reason = "no DNSSEC records";
1042         else if(num_nsec != 0)
1043                 *reason = "no signatures over NSECs";
1044         else    *reason = "no signatures over NSEC3s";
1045         return 0;
1046 }
1047
1048 struct dns_msg* 
1049 val_find_DS(struct module_env* env, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, uint16_t c, 
1050         struct regional* region, uint8_t* topname)
1051 {
1052         struct dns_msg* msg;
1053         struct query_info qinfo;
1054         struct ub_packed_rrset_key *rrset = rrset_cache_lookup(
1055                 env->rrset_cache, nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, 0, 
1056                 *env->now, 0);
1057         if(rrset) {
1058                 /* DS rrset exists. Return it to the validator immediately*/
1059                 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* copy = packed_rrset_copy_region(
1060                         rrset, region, *env->now);
1061                 lock_rw_unlock(&rrset->entry.lock);
1062                 if(!copy)
1063                         return NULL;
1064                 msg = dns_msg_create(nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, region, 1);
1065                 if(!msg)
1066                         return NULL;
1067                 msg->rep->rrsets[0] = copy;
1068                 msg->rep->rrset_count++;
1069                 msg->rep->an_numrrsets++;
1070                 return msg;
1071         }
1072         /* lookup in rrset and negative cache for NSEC/NSEC3 */
1073         qinfo.qname = nm;
1074         qinfo.qname_len = nmlen;
1075         qinfo.qtype = LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS;
1076         qinfo.qclass = c;
1077         /* do not add SOA to reply message, it is going to be used internal */
1078         msg = val_neg_getmsg(env->neg_cache, &qinfo, region, env->rrset_cache,
1079                 env->scratch_buffer, *env->now, 0, topname);
1080         return msg;
1081 }