2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
171 s->version = s->method->version;
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
176 static int nid_list[] =
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 static int pref_list[] =
207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
234 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
240 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
243 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
306 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
311 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
313 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
316 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
317 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
319 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
323 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
325 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
328 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
333 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
346 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
350 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
352 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
354 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
359 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
363 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
366 unsigned char *ret = p;
368 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
369 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
370 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
375 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
377 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
379 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
380 unsigned long size_str;
383 /* check for enough space.
384 4 for the servername type and entension length
385 2 for servernamelist length
386 1 for the hostname type
387 2 for hostname length
391 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
392 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
395 /* extension type and length */
396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
399 /* length of servername list */
402 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
403 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
405 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
409 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
414 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
420 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
425 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
435 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
436 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
437 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
439 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
440 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
446 /* check for enough space.
447 4 for the srp type type and entension length
448 1 for the srp user identity
449 + srp user identity length
451 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
453 /* fill in the extension */
454 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
455 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
456 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
457 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
464 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
466 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
469 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
470 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
471 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
478 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
479 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
480 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
481 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
483 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
484 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
486 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
489 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
490 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
491 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
498 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
500 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
501 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
502 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
503 * resolves this to two bytes.
505 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
506 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
507 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
509 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
511 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
514 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
515 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
516 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
517 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
519 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
520 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
521 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
523 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
524 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
526 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
530 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
531 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
533 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
541 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
547 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
549 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
552 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
553 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
554 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
555 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
558 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
559 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
560 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
562 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
564 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
566 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
569 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
572 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
577 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
578 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
581 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
585 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
587 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
588 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
594 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
596 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
603 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
605 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
607 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
608 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
610 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
612 /* save position of id len */
613 unsigned char *q = ret;
614 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
615 /* skip over id len */
617 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
623 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
627 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
628 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
631 * 1: peer may send requests
632 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
634 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
635 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
637 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
641 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
643 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
644 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
645 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
653 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
657 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
659 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
661 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
664 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
673 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
680 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
683 unsigned char *ret = p;
684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
685 int next_proto_neg_seen;
688 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
689 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
693 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
695 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
697 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
699 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
703 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
707 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
713 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
715 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
718 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
728 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
729 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
731 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
734 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
735 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
736 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
742 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
743 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
744 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
745 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
746 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
749 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
750 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
752 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
753 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
755 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
756 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
760 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
762 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
763 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
767 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
768 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
769 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
771 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
773 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
775 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
778 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
781 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
787 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
791 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
793 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
795 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
798 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
807 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
808 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
809 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
810 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
811 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
812 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
813 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
814 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
815 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
816 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
817 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
823 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
824 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
826 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
829 * 1: peer may send requests
830 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
832 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
833 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
835 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
841 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
842 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
843 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
845 const unsigned char *npa;
849 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
850 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
852 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
853 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
855 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
857 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
862 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
869 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
874 unsigned char *data = *p;
875 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
878 s->servername_done = 0;
879 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
881 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
884 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
885 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
886 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
893 if (data > (d+n-len))
896 while (data <= (d+n-4))
901 if (data+size > (d+n))
904 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
906 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
907 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
908 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
909 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
911 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
912 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
913 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
914 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
915 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
916 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
917 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
918 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
919 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
920 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
921 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
922 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
923 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
924 the value of the Host: field.
925 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
926 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
927 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
928 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
932 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
934 unsigned char *sdata;
940 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
947 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
954 servname_type = *(sdata++);
960 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
963 if (s->servername_done == 0)
964 switch (servname_type)
966 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
969 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
971 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
974 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
976 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
979 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
981 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
984 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
985 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
986 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
987 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
988 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
989 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
992 s->servername_done = 1;
996 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
997 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
998 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1010 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1016 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1018 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1020 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1023 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1025 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1028 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1030 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1031 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1033 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1042 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1043 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1045 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1046 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1048 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1050 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1055 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1057 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1058 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1060 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1061 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1063 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1066 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1067 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1070 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1071 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1072 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1073 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1074 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1077 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1078 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1080 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1081 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1082 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1084 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1085 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1087 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1092 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1094 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1097 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1098 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1100 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1103 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1104 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1107 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1108 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1109 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1110 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1111 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1114 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1115 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1116 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1117 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1119 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1123 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1126 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1127 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1129 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1133 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1134 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1135 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1136 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1138 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1139 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1141 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1146 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1148 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1149 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1151 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1155 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1157 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1159 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1161 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1164 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1166 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1172 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1174 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1177 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1179 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1183 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1184 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1189 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1193 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1195 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1197 const unsigned char *sdata;
1199 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1204 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1213 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1217 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1221 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1226 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1230 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1235 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1236 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1239 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1240 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1241 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1243 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1244 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1247 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1248 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1250 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1251 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1256 /* Read in request_extensions */
1259 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1266 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1272 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1274 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1275 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1278 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1279 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1281 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1282 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1289 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1293 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1296 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1300 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1301 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1303 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1304 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1305 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1307 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1313 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1314 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1316 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1319 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1320 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1321 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1322 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1323 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1324 * anything like that, but this might change).
1326 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1327 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1328 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1329 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1330 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1331 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1335 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1337 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
1338 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1340 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1353 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1355 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1356 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1358 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1360 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1368 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1369 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1370 * the length of the block. */
1371 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1373 unsigned int off = 0;
1387 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1389 unsigned short length;
1390 unsigned short type;
1391 unsigned short size;
1392 unsigned char *data = *p;
1393 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1394 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1397 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1401 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1402 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1405 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1409 if (data+length != d+n)
1411 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1415 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1420 if (data+size > (d+n))
1423 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1424 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1425 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1427 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1429 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1431 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1434 tlsext_servername = 1;
1437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1438 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1439 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1441 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1442 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1444 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1445 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1447 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1452 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1453 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1454 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1456 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1459 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1460 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1463 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1464 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1465 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1466 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1467 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1470 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1472 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1474 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1475 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1477 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1480 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1483 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1486 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1488 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1489 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1490 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1492 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1496 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1499 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1500 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1502 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1506 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1507 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1508 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1509 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1511 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1513 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1515 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1520 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1521 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1523 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1524 * a status request message.
1526 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1528 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1531 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1532 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1535 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1536 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1538 unsigned char *selected;
1539 unsigned char selected_len;
1541 /* We must have requested it. */
1542 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
1544 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1547 /* The data must be valid */
1548 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1550 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1553 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1555 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1558 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1559 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1561 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1564 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1565 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1566 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1569 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1571 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1573 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1576 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1580 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1581 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1583 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1584 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1585 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1587 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1593 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1595 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1606 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1610 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1612 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1614 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1616 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1617 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1619 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1625 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1635 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1636 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1637 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1638 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1639 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1640 * absence on initial connect only.
1642 if (!renegotiate_seen
1643 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1644 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1646 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1648 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1656 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1659 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1660 * and elliptic curves we support.
1665 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1666 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1668 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1670 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1672 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1673 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1674 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1680 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1683 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1684 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1689 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1690 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1691 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1692 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1694 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1695 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1696 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1697 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1699 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1703 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1704 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1706 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1710 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1712 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1716 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1718 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1723 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1725 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1726 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1728 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1729 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1731 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1732 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1737 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1741 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1742 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1749 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1752 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1753 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1754 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1757 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1758 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1759 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1760 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1764 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1765 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1770 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1771 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1772 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1773 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1775 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1780 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1782 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1783 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1786 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1787 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1789 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1790 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1794 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1795 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1796 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1797 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1799 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1801 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1802 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1803 * so this has to happen here in
1804 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
1808 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1810 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1813 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1814 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1819 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1820 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1821 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1823 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1825 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1826 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1828 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1829 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1831 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1832 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1834 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1835 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1837 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1838 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1841 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1845 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1847 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1848 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1849 * abort the handshake.
1851 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1852 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1860 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1861 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1864 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1865 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1868 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1869 s->servername_done=0;
1875 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1877 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1880 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1881 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1882 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
1883 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
1885 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1888 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
1889 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1890 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1891 if (certpkey == NULL)
1893 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1896 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
1897 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
1899 s->cert->key = certpkey;
1900 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1903 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1904 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1905 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1907 /* status request response should be sent */
1908 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1909 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1910 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1912 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1914 /* something bad happened */
1915 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1916 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1917 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1922 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1927 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1928 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1931 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1932 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1940 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1942 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1943 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1946 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1947 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
1948 * it must contain uncompressed.
1950 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1951 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1952 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1953 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1954 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1956 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1958 unsigned char *list;
1959 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1960 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1961 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1963 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1965 found_uncompressed = 1;
1969 if (!found_uncompressed)
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1975 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1976 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1978 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1979 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1980 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1981 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1983 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1984 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1986 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1987 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1989 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1991 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1992 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1995 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1996 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1997 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1998 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2000 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2001 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2006 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2009 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2010 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2013 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2014 * there is no response.
2016 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2018 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2019 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2021 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2022 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2025 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2026 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2030 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2031 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2037 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2038 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2041 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2042 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2045 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2046 s->servername_done=0;
2052 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2053 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2054 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2056 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2057 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2058 * extension, if any.
2059 * len: the length of the session ID.
2060 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2061 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2062 * point to the resulting session.
2064 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2065 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2066 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2069 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2070 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2071 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2072 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2073 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2074 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2075 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2078 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2079 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2080 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2081 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2082 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2083 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2085 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2086 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2088 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2089 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2093 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2095 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2096 * to permit stateful resumption.
2098 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2100 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2104 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2105 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2112 /* Skip past cipher list */
2117 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2122 /* Now at start of extensions */
2123 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2126 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2128 unsigned short type, size;
2131 if (p + size > limit)
2133 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2138 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2139 * currently have one. */
2140 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2143 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2145 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2146 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2147 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2148 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2149 * calculate the master secret later. */
2152 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2155 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2156 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2158 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2160 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2161 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2163 default: /* fatal error */
2172 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2174 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2175 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2176 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2177 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2178 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2179 * point to the resulting session.
2182 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2183 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2184 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2185 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2187 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2188 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2189 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2192 unsigned char *sdec;
2193 const unsigned char *p;
2194 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2195 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2198 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2199 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2202 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2203 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2204 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2205 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2207 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2208 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2219 /* Check key name matches */
2220 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2222 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2223 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2224 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2225 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2227 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2228 * integrity checks on ticket.
2230 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2233 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2237 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2238 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2239 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2240 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2241 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2243 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2246 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2247 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2248 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2249 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2250 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2253 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2256 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2257 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2260 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2263 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2267 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2268 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2269 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2270 * as required by standard.
2273 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2274 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2282 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2287 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2295 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2296 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2297 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2300 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2303 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2304 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2307 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2308 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2312 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2314 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2317 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2320 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2324 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2327 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2329 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2335 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2338 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2340 if (table[i].id == id)
2341 return table[i].nid;
2347 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2352 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2353 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2356 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2359 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2360 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2364 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2366 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2367 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2370 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2375 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2383 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2387 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2388 return EVP_sha224();
2390 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2391 return EVP_sha256();
2393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2394 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2395 return EVP_sha384();
2397 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2398 return EVP_sha512();
2406 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2408 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2413 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2414 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2416 /* Should never happen */
2420 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2421 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2422 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2423 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2425 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2427 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2432 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2433 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2437 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2438 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2442 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2450 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2452 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2455 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2456 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2457 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2464 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2465 * supported it stays as NULL.
2467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2468 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2469 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2472 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2474 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2475 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2479 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2480 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2489 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2491 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2492 unsigned short hbtype;
2493 unsigned int payload;
2494 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2496 if (s->msg_callback)
2497 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2498 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2499 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2501 /* Read type and payload length first */
2502 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2503 return 0; /* silently discard */
2506 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2507 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
2510 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2512 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2515 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2516 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2517 * payload, plus padding
2519 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2522 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2523 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2525 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2527 /* Random padding */
2528 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2530 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2532 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2533 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2534 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2535 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2537 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2542 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2546 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2547 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2548 * sequence number */
2551 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2554 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2562 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2564 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2566 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2567 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2569 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2570 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2571 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2577 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2578 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2584 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2585 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2591 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2592 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2594 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2596 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2597 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2598 * some random stuff.
2599 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2600 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2601 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2602 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2605 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2608 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2609 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2611 /* Sequence number */
2612 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2613 /* 16 random bytes */
2614 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2616 /* Random padding */
2617 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2619 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2622 if (s->msg_callback)
2623 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2624 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2625 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2627 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;