3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
121 #include <openssl/rand.h>
122 #include <openssl/objects.h>
123 #include <openssl/evp.h>
124 #include <openssl/x509.h>
126 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8)
128 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \
129 if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
131 for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
134 bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
135 for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
136 bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
139 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
141 OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
143 if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
144 if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
145 if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
148 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \
150 printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \
151 printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \
155 static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = {0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80};
156 static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f};
158 /* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
159 static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500, 512, 256};
161 static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
162 unsigned long frag_len);
163 static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s,
165 static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
166 unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
167 unsigned long frag_len);
168 static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn,
172 dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
174 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
175 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
176 unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
178 frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
184 buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
192 /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
193 frag->fragment = buf;
195 /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
198 bitmask = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
201 if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf);
205 memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
208 frag->reassembly = bitmask;
213 void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
216 if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
218 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
219 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
221 if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
222 if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
226 static int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
230 s->d1->mtu = s->d1->link_mtu-BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
234 /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
235 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s))
237 if(!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
240 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
242 /* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
243 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
244 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s))
247 s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
248 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
258 /* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
259 int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
262 unsigned int curr_mtu;
264 unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len;
266 if(!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
269 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu(s)); /* should have something reasonable now */
271 if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
272 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
273 (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
276 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
280 if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
281 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
282 blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
287 /* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */
288 while(s->init_num > 0)
290 used_len = BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
291 + mac_size + blocksize;
292 if(s->d1->mtu > used_len)
293 curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
297 if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
299 /* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */
300 ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
303 used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize;
304 if(s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
306 curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
310 /* Shouldn't happen */
315 /* We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe */
316 if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
321 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
325 /* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */
326 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
328 if ( s->init_off != 0)
330 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
331 s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
332 s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
334 /* We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe */
335 if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
341 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
345 if ( len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH )
348 * len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
353 dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
354 len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
356 dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
359 ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
363 /* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know
364 * which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't
365 * really retransmit anything. continue as if everything
366 * is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
369 if ( retry && BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
370 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
372 if(!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
374 if(!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
376 /* Have one more go */
390 /* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
391 * message got sent. but why would this happen? */
392 OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
394 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
396 /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
397 * we'll ignore the result anyway */
398 unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
399 const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
402 if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
404 /* reconstruct message header is if it
405 * is being sent in single fragment */
406 *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
407 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
408 s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
410 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
411 p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
416 p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
417 xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
420 ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
423 if (ret == s->init_num)
426 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
427 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
428 s->msg_callback_arg);
430 s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
437 frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
444 /* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
445 * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
446 * Read an entire handshake message. Handshake messages arrive in
449 long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
452 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
454 unsigned long msg_len;
456 /* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
457 * by the absence of an optional handshake message */
458 if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
460 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
461 if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
463 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
464 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
468 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
469 s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
473 msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
474 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
477 i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
478 if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT ||
479 i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) /* bad fragment received */
481 else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
484 if (mt >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt) {
485 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
486 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
490 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
491 msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
493 /* reconstruct message header */
494 *(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
496 s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
499 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
500 p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
501 msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
504 ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
506 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
508 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
510 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
512 /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
514 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
516 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
520 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
526 static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max)
528 size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len;
530 msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
531 frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
532 frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
534 /* sanity checking */
535 if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len)
537 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
538 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
541 if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max)
543 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
544 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
547 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
549 /* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
550 * against max above */
551 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
553 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
554 return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
557 s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
558 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
559 s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
560 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
561 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
563 else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len)
565 /* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce
566 * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */
567 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
568 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
571 return 0; /* no error */
576 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
578 /* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
580 * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
581 * (2) update s->init_num
588 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
592 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
594 /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
595 if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
598 if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
600 unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
601 pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
603 al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);
605 if (al==0) /* no alert */
607 unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
608 memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
609 frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
612 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
621 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
630 /* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
631 * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
632 * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
633 static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
635 unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
636 if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
637 return s->max_cert_list;
642 dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
644 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
646 int i = -1, is_complete;
647 unsigned char seq64be[8];
648 unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
650 if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
651 msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
655 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
657 /* Try to find item in queue */
658 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
659 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
660 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
661 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
665 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
668 memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
669 frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
670 frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
674 frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
675 if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
684 /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
685 * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
686 * does not need to be freed.
688 if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
690 unsigned char devnull [256];
694 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
696 frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
700 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
703 /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
704 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
705 frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
706 if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
711 RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
712 (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
714 RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
719 OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
720 frag->reassembly = NULL;
725 item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
732 item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
733 /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
734 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
735 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
736 * would never have reached this branch. */
737 OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
740 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
743 if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
750 dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
753 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
755 unsigned char seq64be[8];
756 unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
758 if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
761 /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
762 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
763 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
764 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
765 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
767 /* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
768 * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
770 if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
773 /* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
774 * too far in the future, already in the queue or if we received
775 * a FINISHED before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale
778 if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
779 msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
780 (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
782 unsigned char devnull [256];
786 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
788 frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
795 if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
796 return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
798 if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
801 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
805 memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
809 /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
810 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
811 frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
812 if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
818 item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
822 item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
823 /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
824 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
825 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
826 * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
827 * to NULL and it will have been processed with
828 * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
830 OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
833 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
836 if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
843 dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
845 unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
846 unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len;
848 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
851 /* see if we have the required fragment already */
852 if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
854 if (*ok) s->init_num = frag_len;
858 /* read handshake message header */
859 i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire,
860 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
861 if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */
863 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
867 /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
868 if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
870 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
875 /* parse the message fragment header */
876 dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
878 len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
879 frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
880 frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
883 * We must have at least frag_len bytes left in the record to be read.
884 * Fragments must not span records.
886 if (frag_len > s->s3->rrec.length) {
887 al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
888 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
893 * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
894 * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
895 * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie)
896 * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello)
898 if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1))
899 return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
901 if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
902 return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
904 if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
905 wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
907 /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
908 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
909 * if their format is correct. Does not count for
911 if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0)
914 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
915 wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
916 s->msg_callback_arg);
921 else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
923 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
929 if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max)))
934 unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
936 i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
937 &p[frag_off],frag_len,0);
939 * This shouldn't ever fail due to NBIO because we already checked
940 * that we have enough data in the record
944 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
952 /* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the
953 * handshake to fail */
954 if (i != (int)frag_len)
956 al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
964 /* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
965 * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments'
966 * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet
967 * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */
968 s->init_num = frag_len;
972 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
979 int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
987 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
988 p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
990 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
991 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
992 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
993 memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
997 /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
998 * renegotiation checks
1000 if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1002 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
1003 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1004 s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
1005 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
1009 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
1010 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished,
1011 s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
1012 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
1015 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
1016 /* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
1022 d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l, 0, l);
1023 s->init_num=(int)l+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1026 /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
1027 dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
1032 /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
1033 return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1036 /* for these 2 messages, we need to
1037 * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
1038 * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
1039 * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
1040 * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
1041 * ssl->session->read_compression assign
1042 * ssl->session->read_hash assign
1044 int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
1050 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1052 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
1053 s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1055 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1056 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
1057 s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p);
1063 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
1064 s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
1066 /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
1067 dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
1072 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
1073 return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
1076 static int dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
1082 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1087 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
1094 unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
1098 unsigned long l= 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1101 /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
1103 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1110 X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
1112 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL))
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
1118 X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
1119 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
1121 for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
1123 x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
1125 if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
1127 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
1131 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
1133 /* Thawte special :-) */
1134 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++)
1136 x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
1137 if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
1141 l-= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
1143 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
1146 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
1147 p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l, 0, l);
1149 l+=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1153 int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
1157 fprintf( stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
1161 if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
1163 /* not a timeout, none of our business,
1164 let higher layers handle this. in fact it's probably an error */
1168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1169 if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
1171 if (!SSL_in_init(s)) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
1174 BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
1178 #if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one record number */
1179 item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records);
1182 /* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */
1187 #if 0 /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the last set of messages */
1188 if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
1189 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1190 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1193 return dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
1197 dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs)
1199 /* The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence number,
1200 * since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake. However, the
1201 * ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so using only the sequence
1202 * will result in the CCS and Finished having the same index. To prevent this,
1203 * the sequence number is multiplied by 2. In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted.
1204 * This does not only differ CSS and Finished, it also maintains the order of the
1205 * index (important for priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable.
1207 return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
1211 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
1213 pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
1219 iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
1221 for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter))
1223 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
1224 if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1225 (unsigned short)dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs),
1226 0, &found) <= 0 && found)
1228 fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
1237 dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
1241 unsigned char seq64be[8];
1243 /* this function is called immediately after a message has
1244 * been serialized */
1245 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
1247 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
1251 memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
1255 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
1256 ((s->version==DTLS1_VERSION)?DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH:3) == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
1260 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
1261 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
1264 frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
1265 frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
1266 frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
1267 frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
1268 frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
1269 frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
1271 /* save current state*/
1272 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
1273 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
1274 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
1275 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
1276 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1278 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
1279 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
1280 frag->msg_header.is_ccs)>>8);
1281 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
1282 frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
1284 item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
1287 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
1292 fprintf( stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type);
1293 fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len);
1294 fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num);
1297 pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
1302 dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
1306 /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
1309 unsigned long header_length;
1310 unsigned char seq64be[8];
1311 struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
1312 unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
1315 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
1316 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
1319 /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
1320 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
1321 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq>>8);
1322 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq;
1324 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be);
1327 fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq);
1333 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
1335 if ( frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
1336 header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1338 header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1340 memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment,
1341 frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length);
1342 s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length;
1344 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type,
1345 frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0,
1346 frag->msg_header.frag_len);
1348 /* save current state */
1349 saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
1350 saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
1351 saved_state.compress = s->compress;
1352 saved_state.session = s->session;
1353 saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1354 saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1356 s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
1358 /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
1359 s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
1360 s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
1361 s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
1362 s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
1363 s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch;
1365 if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
1367 memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1368 memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1371 ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ?
1372 SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
1374 /* restore current state */
1375 s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
1376 s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
1377 s->compress = saved_state.compress;
1378 s->session = saved_state.session;
1379 s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch;
1381 if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
1383 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1384 memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1387 s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
1389 (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1393 /* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
1395 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
1399 for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
1400 item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages))
1402 dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
1409 dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt,
1410 unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
1412 /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
1413 if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen)
1415 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
1416 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
1419 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
1420 frag_off, frag_len);
1422 return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1426 /* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
1428 dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
1429 unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
1430 unsigned long frag_len)
1432 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1435 msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
1436 msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
1437 msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
1438 msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
1442 dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
1443 unsigned long frag_len)
1445 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1447 msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
1448 msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
1451 static unsigned char *
1452 dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
1454 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1456 *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
1457 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
1459 s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
1460 l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
1461 l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
1467 dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
1469 return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
1470 sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
1474 dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
1476 return dtls1_link_min_mtu()-BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1481 dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
1483 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
1484 msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
1485 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
1487 n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
1488 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
1489 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
1493 dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr)
1495 memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st));
1497 ccs_hdr->type = *(data++);
1500 int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
1503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1504 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
1505 !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN))
1507 ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1508 if (ret < 0) return -1;
1511 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1, NULL);
1514 ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
1515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1516 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
1521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1523 dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
1525 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
1526 unsigned short hbtype;
1527 unsigned int payload;
1528 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
1530 if (s->msg_callback)
1531 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1532 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
1533 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1535 /* Read type and payload length first */
1536 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
1537 return 0; /* silently discard */
1538 if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1539 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
1543 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
1544 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
1547 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
1549 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
1550 unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
1551 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
1555 if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1558 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
1559 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
1560 * payload, plus padding
1562 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
1565 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
1566 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
1568 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
1570 /* Random padding */
1571 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
1573 r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
1575 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
1576 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1577 buffer, write_length,
1578 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1580 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
1585 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
1589 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
1590 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
1591 * sequence number */
1594 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
1596 dtls1_stop_timer(s);
1598 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
1606 dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
1608 unsigned char *buf, *p;
1610 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
1611 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
1613 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
1614 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
1615 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
1621 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
1622 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
1628 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
1629 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1635 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
1636 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
1638 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
1640 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
1641 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
1642 * some random stuff.
1643 * - Message Type, 1 byte
1644 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
1645 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
1646 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
1649 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
1652 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
1653 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
1655 /* Sequence number */
1656 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
1657 /* 16 random bytes */
1658 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
1660 /* Random padding */
1661 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
1663 ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
1666 if (s->msg_callback)
1667 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1668 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
1669 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1671 dtls1_start_timer(s);
1672 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;