1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
296 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
322 * support secure renegotiation.
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
363 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
364 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
373 * callback indicates firther work to be done
375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
386 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
388 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
395 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
400 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
401 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
407 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
413 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
416 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
421 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
422 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
423 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
426 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
428 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
429 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
433 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
434 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
436 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
439 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
445 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
451 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
452 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
455 * clear this, it may get reset by
456 * send_server_key_exchange
458 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
461 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
462 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
463 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
464 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
465 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
470 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
474 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
477 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
478 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
480 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH))
481 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
482 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
483 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
484 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
486 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
487 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
492 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
498 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
504 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
507 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
508 * during re-negotiation:
510 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
511 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
513 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
514 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
517 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
519 * ... except when the application insists on
520 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
523 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
525 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
527 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
528 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
529 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
531 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
534 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
535 /* no cert request */
537 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
538 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
539 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
540 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
541 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
546 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
547 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
550 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
551 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
553 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
554 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
562 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
565 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
566 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
573 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
574 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
575 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
576 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
577 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
581 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
582 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
586 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
588 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
593 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
594 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
598 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
600 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
601 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
606 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
610 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
611 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
612 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
617 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
618 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
619 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
620 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
622 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
623 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
625 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
626 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
628 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
631 } else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
632 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
634 if (!s->session->peer)
637 * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
638 * digest cached records.
640 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
642 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
645 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
646 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
647 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
654 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
658 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
659 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
660 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
663 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
664 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
665 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
669 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
670 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
673 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
682 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
684 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
695 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
699 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
700 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
702 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
703 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
705 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
710 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
711 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
712 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
714 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
715 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
716 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
718 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
719 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
720 * the client's Finished message is read.
722 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
723 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
725 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
729 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
733 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
734 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
736 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
737 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
738 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
739 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
740 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
741 * the client's Finished message is read.
743 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
744 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
745 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
746 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
750 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
752 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
753 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
756 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
762 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
763 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
766 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
770 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
771 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
772 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
775 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
782 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
784 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
785 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
787 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
791 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
793 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
797 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
800 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
801 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
804 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
810 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
811 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
812 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
813 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
814 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
816 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
818 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
821 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
823 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
824 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
826 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
827 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
829 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
832 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
837 /* clean a few things up */
838 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
840 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
843 /* remove buffering on output */
844 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
848 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
853 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
855 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
857 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
860 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
875 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
877 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
881 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
882 new_state = s->state;
884 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
885 s->state = new_state;
891 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
895 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
899 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
903 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
904 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
905 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
910 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
911 /* number of bytes to write */
916 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
917 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
920 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
926 * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
927 * so permit appropriate message length
929 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
932 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
935 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
936 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
938 * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
941 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) {
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO,
943 SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
947 * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
948 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
951 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
952 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
953 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
957 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
958 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
959 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
962 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
968 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
970 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1;
971 unsigned int cookie_len;
974 unsigned char *p, *d, *q;
976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
977 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
979 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
982 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
983 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
984 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
985 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
987 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
988 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
991 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
992 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
993 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
994 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
995 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
1000 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1003 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
1004 * for session id length
1006 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
1007 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1013 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1014 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1016 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
1019 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
1020 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) {
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1022 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
1023 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
1025 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1028 s->version = s->client_version;
1030 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1035 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
1036 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
1039 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1040 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1042 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1044 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
1045 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1049 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1051 if (cookie_length == 0)
1055 /* load the client random */
1056 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1057 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1059 /* get the session-id */
1062 if (p + j > d + n) {
1063 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1070 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1071 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1072 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1073 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1074 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1075 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1076 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1077 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1078 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1079 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1082 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1083 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1086 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1088 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1090 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1091 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1092 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1093 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1094 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1096 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1103 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1110 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1112 if (p + 1 > d + n) {
1113 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1117 cookie_len = *(p++);
1119 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
1120 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1126 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1127 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1128 * does not cause an overflow.
1130 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1132 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1137 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1138 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1139 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1141 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1142 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1144 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1146 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1149 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1151 /* default verification */
1152 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1153 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1154 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1165 if (p + 2 > d + n) {
1166 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1173 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1178 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1179 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
1180 /* not enough data */
1181 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1185 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1190 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1193 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1196 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1197 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1199 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1200 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1202 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1203 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1211 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1215 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1216 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1218 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1219 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1220 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1221 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1222 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1224 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1225 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1226 s->session->cipher = c;
1233 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1236 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1238 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1245 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1246 /* not enough data */
1247 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1252 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1260 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1265 /* TLS extensions */
1266 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1267 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
1268 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1273 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1279 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1280 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1281 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1282 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1286 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1287 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1288 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1293 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1294 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1296 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1297 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1298 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1300 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1302 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1303 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1307 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1309 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1314 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1315 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1320 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1323 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1325 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1326 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1328 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1329 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1335 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1336 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1337 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1339 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1341 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1342 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1343 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1344 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1345 /* Can't disable compression */
1346 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1347 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1349 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1352 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1353 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1354 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1355 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1356 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1360 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1361 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1363 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1366 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1367 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1368 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1372 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1374 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1379 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1380 /* See if we have a match */
1381 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1383 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1384 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1385 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1387 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1397 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1403 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1404 * using compression.
1406 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1407 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1414 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1418 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1419 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1421 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1423 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1424 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1425 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1426 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1427 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1432 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1435 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1439 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1441 /* Session-id reuse */
1442 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1443 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1444 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1445 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1447 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1448 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1449 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1450 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1451 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1453 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1457 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1458 else if (ec != NULL)
1459 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1461 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1464 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1467 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
1468 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1469 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
1470 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1476 * we now have the following setup.
1478 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1479 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1480 * compression - basically ignored right now
1481 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1482 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1483 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1484 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1487 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1488 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1489 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1499 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1501 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1504 if (ciphers != NULL)
1505 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1509 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1512 unsigned char *p, *d;
1516 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1517 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1518 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1519 p = s->s3->server_random;
1520 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1521 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1525 /* Do the message type and length last */
1528 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1529 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1532 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1533 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1536 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1537 * back in the server hello:
1538 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1539 * we send back the old session ID.
1540 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1541 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1542 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1543 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1545 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1546 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1547 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1548 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1551 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1553 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1555 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1556 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1558 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1562 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1565 /* put the cipher */
1566 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1569 /* put the compression method */
1570 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1573 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1576 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1579 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1581 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1585 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p,
1586 buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
1588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1589 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1596 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1599 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1600 /* number of bytes to write */
1601 s->init_num = p - buf;
1605 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1606 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1609 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1613 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1614 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1617 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1622 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1623 /* number of bytes to write */
1628 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1629 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1632 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1638 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1642 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1645 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1646 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1649 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1652 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1653 unsigned char *p, *d;
1663 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1664 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1665 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1670 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1673 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1674 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1675 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1676 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1677 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1679 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1682 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1684 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1688 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1691 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1693 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1698 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1702 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1704 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1705 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1706 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1708 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1711 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1713 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1717 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1719 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1723 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1729 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1730 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1731 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1732 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1737 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1738 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1739 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1750 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1751 const EC_GROUP *group;
1753 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1754 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1755 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1756 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1758 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1759 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1761 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1762 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1764 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1768 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1770 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1774 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1775 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1779 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1784 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1785 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1786 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1787 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1788 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1795 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1796 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1797 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1802 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1803 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1805 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1810 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1811 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1815 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1818 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1823 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1824 * allocate memory accordingly.
1826 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1827 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1828 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1831 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1832 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1833 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1834 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1836 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1840 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1841 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1842 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1843 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1845 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1850 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1854 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1855 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1856 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1862 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1863 * can set these to NULLs
1870 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1872 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1874 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1876 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1878 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1880 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1881 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1882 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1883 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1885 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1888 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1889 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1890 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1891 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1895 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1897 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1900 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1901 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1903 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1910 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1911 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1912 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1914 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1917 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1923 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) {
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1927 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1930 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1932 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1943 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1945 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1946 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1947 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1948 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1950 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1958 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1959 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1960 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1961 encodedPoint = NULL;
1966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1967 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1968 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1969 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1970 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1971 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1972 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1979 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1980 * points to the space at the end.
1982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1983 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1984 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1987 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1988 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1989 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1990 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1991 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1992 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1994 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1996 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n);
1997 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
2001 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2002 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
2012 * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm
2014 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2015 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2016 /* Should never happen */
2017 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2019 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2025 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2027 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2028 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2030 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2032 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n);
2033 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2034 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2040 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2043 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2044 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2046 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2051 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2055 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2057 s->init_num = n + 4;
2061 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2062 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2063 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2065 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2068 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2069 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2070 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2072 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2073 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2077 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2079 unsigned char *p, *d;
2080 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2081 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2085 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2088 d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2090 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2092 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2097 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2098 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2108 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2111 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2112 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2113 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2114 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) {
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2119 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]);
2120 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2122 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2127 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2136 /* else no CA names */
2137 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]);
2140 d = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
2141 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2145 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2148 s->init_num = n + 4;
2150 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2151 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2155 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2158 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2165 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2168 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2169 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2171 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2175 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2179 unsigned long alg_k;
2181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2183 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2191 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2194 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2195 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2196 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2197 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2200 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2201 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2202 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2203 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2207 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2209 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2212 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2213 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2215 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2218 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2219 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2220 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2221 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2223 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2226 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2228 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2233 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2234 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2235 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2236 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2238 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2241 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2244 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2245 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2248 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2249 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2251 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2260 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2261 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2262 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2263 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2264 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2266 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2267 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2269 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2274 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2275 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2276 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2277 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2278 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2282 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2284 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2285 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2288 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2292 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2293 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2296 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2299 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2300 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2301 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2302 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2303 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2304 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2307 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2309 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2312 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2313 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2314 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2315 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2316 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2317 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2320 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2321 unsigned char workaround_good;
2323 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2325 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2326 version_good |= workaround_good;
2330 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2331 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2333 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2336 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2337 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2338 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2339 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2341 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2342 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2343 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2346 s->session->master_key_length =
2347 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2349 session->master_key,
2352 (rand_premaster_secret));
2353 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2357 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2360 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2362 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2370 if (n == 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */
2371 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2373 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2376 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2377 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2379 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2382 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2385 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2391 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2399 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2400 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2404 s->session->master_key_length =
2405 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2407 session->master_key,
2409 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2413 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2414 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2415 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2416 krb5_data authenticator;
2418 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2419 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2420 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2421 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2422 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2424 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2425 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2428 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2431 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2434 enc_ticket.length = i;
2436 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2442 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2443 p += enc_ticket.length;
2446 authenticator.length = i;
2448 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2450 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2454 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2455 p += authenticator.length;
2459 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2460 p += enc_pms.length;
2463 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2465 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2467 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2471 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2472 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2474 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2478 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2481 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2482 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2484 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2485 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2491 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2492 * return authtime == 0.
2494 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2495 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2497 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2498 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2500 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2501 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2506 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2511 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2512 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2514 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2518 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2520 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2522 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2525 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2526 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2529 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2533 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2535 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2539 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2541 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2546 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2548 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2552 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2553 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2555 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2556 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2557 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2558 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2559 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2560 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2561 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2564 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2566 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2572 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2574 s->session->master_key_length =
2575 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2577 session->master_key,
2580 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2581 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2582 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2583 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2584 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2589 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2590 * but it caused problems for apache.
2591 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2592 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2596 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
2600 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2603 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2607 const EC_GROUP *group;
2608 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2610 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2611 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2616 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2617 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2618 /* use the certificate */
2619 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2622 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2623 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2625 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2628 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2629 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2631 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2632 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2637 /* Let's get client's public key */
2638 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2644 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2646 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2647 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2649 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2652 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2653 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2655 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2656 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2657 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2658 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2659 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2660 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2662 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2664 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2668 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2669 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2674 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2677 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2678 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2680 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2682 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2686 /* Get encoded point length */
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2693 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2698 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2701 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2704 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2705 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2706 if (field_size <= 0) {
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2710 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2717 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2718 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2719 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2720 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2721 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2722 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2724 /* Compute the master secret */
2725 s->session->master_key_length =
2726 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2728 session->master_key,
2731 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2736 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2737 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2738 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2739 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2741 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2743 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2750 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2752 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2755 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2757 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2762 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2764 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2765 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2766 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2768 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2769 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2771 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2774 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2776 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2779 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2780 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2784 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2785 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2787 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2789 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2793 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2794 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2795 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
2796 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2801 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2802 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2803 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2804 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2805 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2810 s->session->master_key_length =
2811 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2813 session->master_key,
2818 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2824 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2829 if (param_len > n) {
2830 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2832 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2835 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2839 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2840 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2841 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2843 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2846 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2847 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2848 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2849 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2854 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2855 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2856 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2863 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2864 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2866 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2867 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2868 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2869 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2870 unsigned long alg_a;
2874 /* Get our certificate private key */
2875 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2876 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2877 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2878 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2879 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2881 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2882 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2884 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2885 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2886 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2887 * client certificate for authorization only.
2889 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2890 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2891 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2894 /* Decrypt session key */
2896 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2897 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2898 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2900 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2905 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2906 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2908 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2911 /* Generate master secret */
2912 s->session->master_key_length =
2913 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2915 session->master_key,
2916 premaster_secret, 32);
2917 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
2918 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2919 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2920 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2925 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2926 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2932 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2939 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2940 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2944 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2945 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2946 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2947 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2948 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2950 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2954 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2956 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2958 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2962 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2964 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2967 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2968 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2969 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2970 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2971 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2972 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2974 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2979 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2980 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2981 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2982 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
2983 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2988 peer = s->session->peer;
2989 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2990 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2992 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2994 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2995 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2999 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3000 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3001 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3003 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3006 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3007 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
3010 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3011 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
3012 /* Should never happen */
3014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3015 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3018 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3019 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3021 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3022 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3025 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3028 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3032 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3041 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3045 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3046 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3048 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3052 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3055 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3056 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3058 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3062 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3065 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3066 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3068 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3072 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3073 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3079 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3080 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3081 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3084 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3089 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3096 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3097 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3098 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3099 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3102 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3108 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3109 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3110 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3111 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3112 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3115 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3121 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3122 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3123 unsigned char signature[64];
3125 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3126 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3128 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3130 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3131 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3133 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3135 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3137 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3143 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3150 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3151 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3154 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3155 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3156 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3157 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3159 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3160 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3164 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3166 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3168 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3169 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3171 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3173 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3176 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3181 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3182 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3183 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3185 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3186 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3190 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3192 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3194 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3195 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3198 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3202 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3203 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3207 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3209 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3215 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3216 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3220 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3222 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3223 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3225 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3230 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3236 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3238 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3241 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3249 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3250 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3251 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3252 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3254 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3257 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3258 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3259 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3261 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3262 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3265 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3266 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3267 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3271 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3273 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3275 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3280 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3281 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3282 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3283 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3286 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3289 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3290 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3291 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3296 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3297 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3298 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3300 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3301 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3309 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3311 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3317 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3321 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3326 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3327 x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3329 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3330 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3331 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3333 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3334 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3339 l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x);
3341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3342 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3345 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3346 s->init_num = (int)l;
3350 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3351 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3355 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3356 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3358 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3362 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3363 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3364 const unsigned char *const_p;
3365 int len, slen_full, slen;
3368 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3369 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3370 unsigned char key_name[16];
3372 /* get session encoding length */
3373 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3375 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3378 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3379 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3382 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3384 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3388 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3389 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3392 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3396 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3399 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3402 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3404 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3405 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3406 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3410 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3411 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3414 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3417 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3418 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3419 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3420 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3421 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3422 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3424 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3425 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3426 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3429 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3431 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3432 /* Skip message length for now */
3435 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3436 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3438 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3439 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3443 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3445 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3446 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3448 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3449 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3451 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3455 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3456 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3457 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3459 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3461 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3463 /* Output key name */
3465 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3468 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3469 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3470 /* Encrypt session data */
3471 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3474 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3478 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3480 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3483 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3484 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3487 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3489 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3490 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3491 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3493 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3495 /* number of bytes to write */
3497 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3502 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3503 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3507 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3508 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3509 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3513 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3515 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3518 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3519 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3520 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3523 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3524 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3528 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3531 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3532 /* message length */
3533 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3535 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3536 /* length of OCSP response */
3537 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3538 /* actual response */
3539 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3540 /* number of bytes to write */
3541 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3542 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3546 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3547 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3550 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3552 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3553 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3555 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3558 int proto_len, padding_len;
3560 const unsigned char *p;
3563 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3564 * extension in their ClientHello
3566 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3568 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3569 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3573 /* See the payload format below */
3574 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3575 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3576 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3577 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3583 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3584 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3585 * ssl3_get_finished).
3587 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3589 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3594 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3595 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3598 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3601 * The payload looks like:
3603 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3604 * uint8 padding_len;
3605 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3608 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3609 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3612 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3613 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3614 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3618 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3619 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3621 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3624 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3625 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;