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Fix patch(1) shell injection vulnerability via ed(1). [SA-15:18]
[FreeBSD/releng/10.1.git] / sbin / routed / input.c
1 /*
2  * Copyright (c) 1983, 1988, 1993
3  *      The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7  * are met:
8  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13  * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
14  *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
15  *    without specific prior written permission.
16  *
17  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
18  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
19  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
20  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
21  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
22  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
23  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
24  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
25  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
26  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
27  * SUCH DAMAGE.
28  *
29  * $FreeBSD$
30  */
31
32 #include "defs.h"
33
34 #ifdef __NetBSD__
35 __RCSID("$NetBSD$");
36 #elif defined(__FreeBSD__)
37 __RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
38 #else
39 __RCSID("$Revision: 2.26 $");
40 #ident "$Revision: 2.26 $"
41 #endif
42
43 static void input(struct sockaddr_in *, struct interface *, struct interface *,
44                   struct rip *, int);
45 static void input_route(naddr, naddr, struct rt_spare *, struct netinfo *);
46 static int ck_passwd(struct interface *, struct rip *, void *,
47                      naddr, struct msg_limit *);
48
49
50 /* process RIP input
51  */
52 void
53 read_rip(int sock,
54          struct interface *sifp)
55 {
56         struct sockaddr_in from;
57         struct interface *aifp;
58         socklen_t fromlen;
59         int cc;
60 #ifdef USE_PASSIFNAME
61         static struct msg_limit  bad_name;
62         struct {
63                 char    ifname[IFNAMSIZ];
64                 union pkt_buf pbuf;
65         } inbuf;
66 #else
67         struct {
68                 union pkt_buf pbuf;
69         } inbuf;
70 #endif
71
72
73         for (;;) {
74                 fromlen = sizeof(from);
75                 cc = recvfrom(sock, &inbuf, sizeof(inbuf), 0,
76                               (struct sockaddr*)&from, &fromlen);
77                 if (cc <= 0) {
78                         if (cc < 0 && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
79                                 LOGERR("recvfrom(rip)");
80                         break;
81                 }
82                 if (fromlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
83                         logbad(1,"impossible recvfrom(rip) fromlen=%d",
84                                (int)fromlen);
85
86                 /* aifp is the "authenticated" interface via which the packet
87                  *      arrived.  In fact, it is only the interface on which
88                  *      the packet should have arrived based on is source
89                  *      address.
90                  * sifp is interface associated with the socket through which
91                  *      the packet was received.
92                  */
93 #ifdef USE_PASSIFNAME
94                 if ((cc -= sizeof(inbuf.ifname)) < 0)
95                         logbad(0,"missing USE_PASSIFNAME; only %d bytes",
96                                cc+sizeof(inbuf.ifname));
97
98                 /* check the remote interfaces first */
99                 LIST_FOREACH(aifp, &remote_if, remote_list) {
100                         if (aifp->int_addr == from.sin_addr.s_addr)
101                                 break;
102                 }
103                 if (aifp == 0) {
104                         aifp = ifwithname(inbuf.ifname, 0);
105                         if (aifp == 0) {
106                                 msglim(&bad_name, from.sin_addr.s_addr,
107                                        "impossible interface name %.*s",
108                                        IFNAMSIZ, inbuf.ifname);
109                         } else if (((aifp->int_if_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT)
110                                     && aifp->int_dstaddr!=from.sin_addr.s_addr)
111                                    || (!(aifp->int_if_flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT)
112                                        && !on_net(from.sin_addr.s_addr,
113                                                   aifp->int_net,
114                                                   aifp->int_mask))) {
115                                 /* If it came via the wrong interface, do not
116                                  * trust it.
117                                  */
118                                 aifp = 0;
119                         }
120                 }
121 #else
122                 aifp = iflookup(from.sin_addr.s_addr);
123 #endif
124                 if (sifp == 0)
125                         sifp = aifp;
126
127                 input(&from, sifp, aifp, &inbuf.pbuf.rip, cc);
128         }
129 }
130
131
132 /* Process a RIP packet
133  */
134 static void
135 input(struct sockaddr_in *from,         /* received from this IP address */
136       struct interface *sifp,           /* interface of incoming socket */
137       struct interface *aifp,           /* "authenticated" interface */
138       struct rip *rip,
139       int cc)
140 {
141 #       define FROM_NADDR from->sin_addr.s_addr
142         static struct msg_limit use_auth, bad_len, bad_mask;
143         static struct msg_limit unk_router, bad_router, bad_nhop;
144
145         struct rt_entry *rt;
146         struct rt_spare new;
147         struct netinfo *n, *lim;
148         struct interface *ifp1;
149         naddr gate, mask, v1_mask, dst, ddst_h = 0;
150         struct auth *ap;
151         struct tgate *tg = 0;
152         struct tgate_net *tn;
153         int i, j;
154
155         /* Notice when we hear from a remote gateway
156          */
157         if (aifp != 0
158             && (aifp->int_state & IS_REMOTE))
159                 aifp->int_act_time = now.tv_sec;
160
161         trace_rip("Recv", "from", from, sifp, rip, cc);
162
163         if (sifp == 0) {
164                 trace_pkt("    discard a request from an indirect router"
165                     " (possibly an attack)");
166                 return;
167         }
168
169         if (rip->rip_vers == 0) {
170                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
171                        "RIP version 0, cmd %d, packet received from %s",
172                        rip->rip_cmd, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
173                 return;
174         } else if (rip->rip_vers > RIPv2) {
175                 rip->rip_vers = RIPv2;
176         }
177         if (cc > (int)OVER_MAXPACKETSIZE) {
178                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
179                        "packet at least %d bytes too long received from %s",
180                        cc-MAXPACKETSIZE, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
181                 return;
182         }
183
184         n = rip->rip_nets;
185         lim = (struct netinfo *)((char*)rip + cc);
186
187         /* Notice authentication.
188          * As required by section 4.2 in RFC 1723, discard authenticated
189          * RIPv2 messages, but only if configured for that silliness.
190          *
191          * RIPv2 authentication is lame.  Why authenticate queries?
192          * Why should a RIPv2 implementation with authentication disabled
193          * not be able to listen to RIPv2 packets with authentication, while
194          * RIPv1 systems will listen?  Crazy!
195          */
196         if (!auth_ok
197             && rip->rip_vers == RIPv2
198             && n < lim && n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH) {
199                 msglim(&use_auth, FROM_NADDR,
200                        "RIPv2 message with authentication from %s discarded",
201                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
202                 return;
203         }
204
205         switch (rip->rip_cmd) {
206         case RIPCMD_REQUEST:
207                 /* For mere requests, be a little sloppy about the source
208                  */
209                 if (aifp == 0)
210                         aifp = sifp;
211
212                 /* Are we talking to ourself or a remote gateway?
213                  */
214                 ifp1 = ifwithaddr(FROM_NADDR, 0, 1);
215                 if (ifp1) {
216                         if (ifp1->int_state & IS_REMOTE) {
217                                 /* remote gateway */
218                                 aifp = ifp1;
219                                 if (check_remote(aifp)) {
220                                         aifp->int_act_time = now.tv_sec;
221                                         (void)if_ok(aifp, "remote ");
222                                 }
223                         } else if (from->sin_port == htons(RIP_PORT)) {
224                                 trace_pkt("    discard our own RIP request");
225                                 return;
226                         }
227                 }
228
229                 /* did the request come from a router?
230                  */
231                 if (from->sin_port == htons(RIP_PORT)) {
232                         /* yes, ignore the request if RIP is off so that
233                          * the router does not depend on us.
234                          */
235                         if (rip_sock < 0
236                             || (aifp != 0
237                                 && IS_RIP_OUT_OFF(aifp->int_state))) {
238                                 trace_pkt("    discard request while RIP off");
239                                 return;
240                         }
241                 }
242
243                 /* According to RFC 1723, we should ignore unauthenticated
244                  * queries.  That is too silly to bother with.  Sheesh!
245                  * Are forwarding tables supposed to be secret, when
246                  * a bad guy can infer them with test traffic?  When RIP
247                  * is still the most common router-discovery protocol
248                  * and so hosts need to send queries that will be answered?
249                  * What about `rtquery`?
250                  * Maybe on firewalls you'd care, but not enough to
251                  * give up the diagnostic facilities of remote probing.
252                  */
253
254                 if (n >= lim) {
255                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR, "empty request from %s",
256                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
257                         return;
258                 }
259                 if (cc%sizeof(*n) != sizeof(struct rip)%sizeof(*n)) {
260                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR,
261                                "request of bad length (%d) from %s",
262                                cc, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
263                 }
264
265                 if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv2
266                     && (aifp == 0 || (aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_OUT))) {
267                         v12buf.buf->rip_vers = RIPv2;
268                         /* If we have a secret but it is a cleartext secret,
269                          * do not disclose our secret unless the other guy
270                          * already knows it.
271                          */
272                         ap = find_auth(aifp);
273                         if (ap != 0 && ap->type == RIP_AUTH_PW
274                             && n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH
275                             && !ck_passwd(aifp,rip,lim,FROM_NADDR,&use_auth))
276                                 ap = 0;
277                 } else {
278                         v12buf.buf->rip_vers = RIPv1;
279                         ap = 0;
280                 }
281                 clr_ws_buf(&v12buf, ap);
282
283                 do {
284                         n->n_metric = ntohl(n->n_metric);
285
286                         /* A single entry with family RIP_AF_UNSPEC and
287                          * metric HOPCNT_INFINITY means "all routes".
288                          * We respond to routers only if we are acting
289                          * as a supplier, or to anyone other than a router
290                          * (i.e. a query).
291                          */
292                         if (n->n_family == RIP_AF_UNSPEC
293                             && n->n_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY) {
294                                 /* Answer a query from a utility program
295                                  * with all we know.
296                                  */
297                                 if (aifp == NULL) {
298                                         trace_pkt("ignore remote query");
299                                         return;
300                                 }
301                                 if (from->sin_port != htons(RIP_PORT)) {
302                                         supply(from, aifp, OUT_QUERY, 0,
303                                                rip->rip_vers, ap != 0);
304                                         return;
305                                 }
306
307                                 /* A router trying to prime its tables.
308                                  * Filter the answer in the about same way
309                                  * broadcasts are filtered.
310                                  *
311                                  * Only answer a router if we are a supplier
312                                  * to keep an unwary host that is just starting
313                                  * from picking us as a router.
314                                  */
315                                 if (aifp == 0) {
316                                         trace_pkt("ignore distant router");
317                                         return;
318                                 }
319                                 if (!supplier
320                                     || IS_RIP_OFF(aifp->int_state)) {
321                                         trace_pkt("ignore; not supplying");
322                                         return;
323                                 }
324
325                                 /* Do not answer a RIPv1 router if
326                                  * we are sending RIPv2.  But do offer
327                                  * poor man's router discovery.
328                                  */
329                                 if ((aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_OUT)
330                                     && rip->rip_vers == RIPv1) {
331                                         if (!(aifp->int_state & IS_PM_RDISC)) {
332                                             trace_pkt("ignore; sending RIPv2");
333                                             return;
334                                         }
335
336                                         v12buf.n->n_family = RIP_AF_INET;
337                                         v12buf.n->n_dst = RIP_DEFAULT;
338                                         i = aifp->int_d_metric;
339                                         if (0 != (rt = rtget(RIP_DEFAULT, 0))) {
340                                             j = (rt->rt_metric
341                                                  +aifp->int_metric
342                                                  +aifp->int_adj_outmetric
343                                                  +1);
344                                             if (i > j)
345                                                 i = j;
346                                         }
347                                         v12buf.n->n_metric = htonl(i);
348                                         v12buf.n++;
349                                         break;
350                                 }
351
352                                 /* Respond with RIPv1 instead of RIPv2 if
353                                  * that is what we are broadcasting on the
354                                  * interface to keep the remote router from
355                                  * getting the wrong initial idea of the
356                                  * routes we send.
357                                  */
358                                 supply(from, aifp, OUT_UNICAST, 0,
359                                        (aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_OUT)
360                                        ? RIPv2 : RIPv1,
361                                        ap != 0);
362                                 return;
363                         }
364
365                         /* Ignore authentication */
366                         if (n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH)
367                                 continue;
368
369                         if (n->n_family != RIP_AF_INET) {
370                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
371                                        "request from %s for unsupported"
372                                        " (af %d) %s",
373                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
374                                        ntohs(n->n_family),
375                                        naddr_ntoa(n->n_dst));
376                                 return;
377                         }
378
379                         /* We are being asked about a specific destination.
380                          */
381                         dst = n->n_dst;
382                         if (!check_dst(dst)) {
383                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
384                                        "bad queried destination %s from %s",
385                                        naddr_ntoa(dst),
386                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
387                                 return;
388                         }
389
390                         /* decide what mask was intended */
391                         if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1
392                             || 0 == (mask = ntohl(n->n_mask))
393                             || 0 != (ntohl(dst) & ~mask))
394                                 mask = ripv1_mask_host(dst, aifp);
395
396                         /* try to find the answer */
397                         rt = rtget(dst, mask);
398                         if (!rt && dst != RIP_DEFAULT)
399                                 rt = rtfind(n->n_dst);
400
401                         if (v12buf.buf->rip_vers != RIPv1)
402                                 v12buf.n->n_mask = mask;
403                         if (rt == 0) {
404                                 /* we do not have the answer */
405                                 v12buf.n->n_metric = HOPCNT_INFINITY;
406                         } else {
407                                 /* we have the answer, so compute the
408                                  * right metric and next hop.
409                                  */
410                                 v12buf.n->n_family = RIP_AF_INET;
411                                 v12buf.n->n_dst = dst;
412                                 j = rt->rt_metric+1;
413                                 if (!aifp)
414                                         ++j;
415                                 else
416                                         j += (aifp->int_metric
417                                               + aifp->int_adj_outmetric);
418                                 if (j < HOPCNT_INFINITY)
419                                         v12buf.n->n_metric = j;
420                                 else
421                                         v12buf.n->n_metric = HOPCNT_INFINITY;
422                                 if (v12buf.buf->rip_vers != RIPv1) {
423                                         v12buf.n->n_tag = rt->rt_tag;
424                                         v12buf.n->n_mask = mask;
425                                         if (aifp != 0
426                                             && on_net(rt->rt_gate,
427                                                       aifp->int_net,
428                                                       aifp->int_mask)
429                                             && rt->rt_gate != aifp->int_addr)
430                                             v12buf.n->n_nhop = rt->rt_gate;
431                                 }
432                         }
433                         v12buf.n->n_metric = htonl(v12buf.n->n_metric);
434
435                         /* Stop paying attention if we fill the output buffer.
436                          */
437                         if (++v12buf.n >= v12buf.lim)
438                                 break;
439                 } while (++n < lim);
440
441                 /* Send the answer about specific routes.
442                  */
443                 if (ap != 0 && ap->type == RIP_AUTH_MD5)
444                         end_md5_auth(&v12buf, ap);
445
446                 if (from->sin_port != htons(RIP_PORT)) {
447                         /* query */
448                         (void)output(OUT_QUERY, from, aifp,
449                                      v12buf.buf,
450                                      ((char *)v12buf.n - (char*)v12buf.buf));
451                 } else if (supplier) {
452                         (void)output(OUT_UNICAST, from, aifp,
453                                      v12buf.buf,
454                                      ((char *)v12buf.n - (char*)v12buf.buf));
455                 } else {
456                         /* Only answer a router if we are a supplier
457                          * to keep an unwary host that is just starting
458                          * from picking us an a router.
459                          */
460                         ;
461                 }
462                 return;
463
464         case RIPCMD_TRACEON:
465         case RIPCMD_TRACEOFF:
466                 /* Notice that trace messages are turned off for all possible
467                  * abuse if _PATH_TRACE is undefined in pathnames.h.
468                  * Notice also that because of the way the trace file is
469                  * handled in trace.c, no abuse is plausible even if
470                  * _PATH_TRACE_ is defined.
471                  *
472                  * First verify message came from a privileged port. */
473                 if (ntohs(from->sin_port) > IPPORT_RESERVED) {
474                         msglog("trace command from untrusted port on %s",
475                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
476                         return;
477                 }
478                 if (aifp == 0) {
479                         msglog("trace command from unknown router %s",
480                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
481                         return;
482                 }
483                 if (rip->rip_cmd == RIPCMD_TRACEON) {
484                         rip->rip_tracefile[cc-4] = '\0';
485                         set_tracefile((char*)rip->rip_tracefile,
486                                       "trace command: %s\n", 0);
487                 } else {
488                         trace_off("tracing turned off by %s",
489                                   naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
490                 }
491                 return;
492
493         case RIPCMD_RESPONSE:
494                 if (cc%sizeof(*n) != sizeof(struct rip)%sizeof(*n)) {
495                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR,
496                                "response of bad length (%d) from %s",
497                                cc, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
498                 }
499
500                 /* verify message came from a router */
501                 if (from->sin_port != ntohs(RIP_PORT)) {
502                         msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
503                                "    discard RIP response from unknown port"
504                                " %d on %s",
505                                ntohs(from->sin_port), naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
506                         return;
507                 }
508
509                 if (rip_sock < 0) {
510                         trace_pkt("    discard response while RIP off");
511                         return;
512                 }
513
514                 /* Are we talking to ourself or a remote gateway?
515                  */
516                 ifp1 = ifwithaddr(FROM_NADDR, 0, 1);
517                 if (ifp1) {
518                         if (ifp1->int_state & IS_REMOTE) {
519                                 /* remote gateway */
520                                 aifp = ifp1;
521                                 if (check_remote(aifp)) {
522                                         aifp->int_act_time = now.tv_sec;
523                                         (void)if_ok(aifp, "remote ");
524                                 }
525                         } else {
526                                 trace_pkt("    discard our own RIP response");
527                                 return;
528                         }
529                 }
530
531                 /* Accept routing packets from routers directly connected
532                  * via broadcast or point-to-point networks, and from
533                  * those listed in /etc/gateways.
534                  */
535                 if (aifp == 0) {
536                         msglim(&unk_router, FROM_NADDR,
537                                "   discard response from %s"
538                                " via unexpected interface",
539                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
540                         return;
541                 }
542                 if (IS_RIP_IN_OFF(aifp->int_state)) {
543                         trace_pkt("    discard RIPv%d response"
544                                   " via disabled interface %s",
545                                   rip->rip_vers, aifp->int_name);
546                         return;
547                 }
548
549                 if (n >= lim) {
550                         msglim(&bad_len, FROM_NADDR, "empty response from %s",
551                                naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
552                         return;
553                 }
554
555                 if (((aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_IN)
556                      && rip->rip_vers == RIPv1)
557                     || ((aifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV2_IN)
558                         && rip->rip_vers != RIPv1)) {
559                         trace_pkt("    discard RIPv%d response",
560                                   rip->rip_vers);
561                         return;
562                 }
563
564                 /* Ignore routes via dead interface.
565                  */
566                 if (aifp->int_state & IS_BROKE) {
567                         trace_pkt("discard response via broken interface %s",
568                                   aifp->int_name);
569                         return;
570                 }
571
572                 /* If the interface cares, ignore bad routers.
573                  * Trace but do not log this problem, because where it
574                  * happens, it happens frequently.
575                  */
576                 if (aifp->int_state & IS_DISTRUST) {
577                         tg = tgates;
578                         while (tg->tgate_addr != FROM_NADDR) {
579                                 tg = tg->tgate_next;
580                                 if (tg == 0) {
581                                         trace_pkt("    discard RIP response"
582                                                   " from untrusted router %s",
583                                                   naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
584                                         return;
585                                 }
586                         }
587                 }
588
589                 /* Authenticate the packet if we have a secret.
590                  * If we do not have any secrets, ignore the error in
591                  * RFC 1723 and accept it regardless.
592                  */
593                 if (aifp->int_auth[0].type != RIP_AUTH_NONE
594                     && rip->rip_vers != RIPv1
595                     && !ck_passwd(aifp,rip,lim,FROM_NADDR,&use_auth))
596                         return;
597
598                 do {
599                         if (n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH)
600                                 continue;
601
602                         n->n_metric = ntohl(n->n_metric);
603                         dst = n->n_dst;
604                         if (n->n_family != RIP_AF_INET
605                             && (n->n_family != RIP_AF_UNSPEC
606                                 || dst != RIP_DEFAULT)) {
607                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
608                                        "route from %s to unsupported"
609                                        " address family=%d destination=%s",
610                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
611                                        n->n_family,
612                                        naddr_ntoa(dst));
613                                 continue;
614                         }
615                         if (!check_dst(dst)) {
616                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
617                                        "bad destination %s from %s",
618                                        naddr_ntoa(dst),
619                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR));
620                                 return;
621                         }
622                         if (n->n_metric == 0
623                             || n->n_metric > HOPCNT_INFINITY) {
624                                 msglim(&bad_router, FROM_NADDR,
625                                        "bad metric %d from %s"
626                                        " for destination %s",
627                                        n->n_metric,
628                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
629                                        naddr_ntoa(dst));
630                                 return;
631                         }
632
633                         /* Notice the next-hop.
634                          */
635                         gate = FROM_NADDR;
636                         if (n->n_nhop != 0) {
637                                 if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1) {
638                                         n->n_nhop = 0;
639                                 } else {
640                                     /* Use it only if it is valid. */
641                                     if (on_net(n->n_nhop,
642                                                aifp->int_net, aifp->int_mask)
643                                         && check_dst(n->n_nhop)) {
644                                             gate = n->n_nhop;
645                                     } else {
646                                             msglim(&bad_nhop, FROM_NADDR,
647                                                    "router %s to %s"
648                                                    " has bad next hop %s",
649                                                    naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
650                                                    naddr_ntoa(dst),
651                                                    naddr_ntoa(n->n_nhop));
652                                             n->n_nhop = 0;
653                                     }
654                                 }
655                         }
656
657                         if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1
658                             || 0 == (mask = ntohl(n->n_mask))) {
659                                 mask = ripv1_mask_host(dst,aifp);
660                         } else if ((ntohl(dst) & ~mask) != 0) {
661                                 msglim(&bad_mask, FROM_NADDR,
662                                        "router %s sent bad netmask"
663                                        " %#lx with %s",
664                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
665                                        (u_long)mask,
666                                        naddr_ntoa(dst));
667                                 continue;
668                         }
669                         if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1)
670                                 n->n_tag = 0;
671
672                         /* Adjust metric according to incoming interface..
673                          */
674                         n->n_metric += (aifp->int_metric
675                                         + aifp->int_adj_inmetric);
676                         if (n->n_metric > HOPCNT_INFINITY)
677                                 n->n_metric = HOPCNT_INFINITY;
678
679                         /* Should we trust this route from this router? */
680                         if (tg && (tn = tg->tgate_nets)->mask != 0) {
681                                 for (i = 0; i < MAX_TGATE_NETS; i++, tn++) {
682                                         if (on_net(dst, tn->net, tn->mask)
683                                             && tn->mask <= mask)
684                                             break;
685                                 }
686                                 if (i >= MAX_TGATE_NETS || tn->mask == 0) {
687                                         trace_pkt("   ignored unauthorized %s",
688                                                   addrname(dst,mask,0));
689                                         continue;
690                                 }
691                         }
692
693                         /* Recognize and ignore a default route we faked
694                          * which is being sent back to us by a machine with
695                          * broken split-horizon.
696                          * Be a little more paranoid than that, and reject
697                          * default routes with the same metric we advertised.
698                          */
699                         if (aifp->int_d_metric != 0
700                             && dst == RIP_DEFAULT
701                             && (int)n->n_metric >= aifp->int_d_metric)
702                                 continue;
703
704                         /* We can receive aggregated RIPv2 routes that must
705                          * be broken down before they are transmitted by
706                          * RIPv1 via an interface on a subnet.
707                          * We might also receive the same routes aggregated
708                          * via other RIPv2 interfaces.
709                          * This could cause duplicate routes to be sent on
710                          * the RIPv1 interfaces.  "Longest matching variable
711                          * length netmasks" lets RIPv2 listeners understand,
712                          * but breaking down the aggregated routes for RIPv1
713                          * listeners can produce duplicate routes.
714                          *
715                          * Breaking down aggregated routes here bloats
716                          * the daemon table, but does not hurt the kernel
717                          * table, since routes are always aggregated for
718                          * the kernel.
719                          *
720                          * Notice that this does not break down network
721                          * routes corresponding to subnets.  This is part
722                          * of the defense against RS_NET_SYN.
723                          */
724                         if (have_ripv1_out
725                             && (((rt = rtget(dst,mask)) == 0
726                                  || !(rt->rt_state & RS_NET_SYN)))
727                             && (v1_mask = ripv1_mask_net(dst,0)) > mask) {
728                                 ddst_h = v1_mask & -v1_mask;
729                                 i = (v1_mask & ~mask)/ddst_h;
730                                 if (i >= 511) {
731                                         /* Punt if we would have to generate
732                                          * an unreasonable number of routes.
733                                          */
734                                         if (TRACECONTENTS)
735                                             trace_misc("accept %s-->%s as 1"
736                                                        " instead of %d routes",
737                                                        addrname(dst,mask,0),
738                                                        naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR),
739                                                        i+1);
740                                         i = 0;
741                                 } else {
742                                         mask = v1_mask;
743                                 }
744                         } else {
745                                 i = 0;
746                         }
747
748                         new.rts_gate = gate;
749                         new.rts_router = FROM_NADDR;
750                         new.rts_metric = n->n_metric;
751                         new.rts_tag = n->n_tag;
752                         new.rts_time = now.tv_sec;
753                         new.rts_ifp = aifp;
754                         new.rts_de_ag = i;
755                         j = 0;
756                         for (;;) {
757                                 input_route(dst, mask, &new, n);
758                                 if (++j > i)
759                                         break;
760                                 dst = htonl(ntohl(dst) + ddst_h);
761                         }
762                 } while (++n < lim);
763                 break;
764         }
765 #undef FROM_NADDR
766 }
767
768
769 /* Process a single input route.
770  */
771 static void
772 input_route(naddr dst,                  /* network order */
773             naddr mask,
774             struct rt_spare *new,
775             struct netinfo *n)
776 {
777         int i;
778         struct rt_entry *rt;
779         struct rt_spare *rts, *rts0;
780         struct interface *ifp1;
781
782
783         /* See if the other guy is telling us to send our packets to him.
784          * Sometimes network routes arrive over a point-to-point link for
785          * the network containing the address(es) of the link.
786          *
787          * If our interface is broken, switch to using the other guy.
788          */
789         ifp1 = ifwithaddr(dst, 1, 1);
790         if (ifp1 != 0
791             && (!(ifp1->int_state & IS_BROKE)
792                 || (ifp1->int_state & IS_PASSIVE)))
793                 return;
794
795         /* Look for the route in our table.
796          */
797         rt = rtget(dst, mask);
798
799         /* Consider adding the route if we do not already have it.
800          */
801         if (rt == 0) {
802                 /* Ignore unknown routes being poisoned.
803                  */
804                 if (new->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY)
805                         return;
806
807                 /* Ignore the route if it points to us */
808                 if (n->n_nhop != 0
809                     && 0 != ifwithaddr(n->n_nhop, 1, 0))
810                         return;
811
812                 /* If something has not gone crazy and tried to fill
813                  * our memory, accept the new route.
814                  */
815                 if (total_routes < MAX_ROUTES)
816                         rtadd(dst, mask, 0, new);
817                 return;
818         }
819
820         /* We already know about the route.  Consider this update.
821          *
822          * If (rt->rt_state & RS_NET_SYN), then this route
823          * is the same as a network route we have inferred
824          * for subnets we know, in order to tell RIPv1 routers
825          * about the subnets.
826          *
827          * It is impossible to tell if the route is coming
828          * from a distant RIPv2 router with the standard
829          * netmask because that router knows about the entire
830          * network, or if it is a round-about echo of a
831          * synthetic, RIPv1 network route of our own.
832          * The worst is that both kinds of routes might be
833          * received, and the bad one might have the smaller
834          * metric.  Partly solve this problem by never
835          * aggregating into such a route.  Also keep it
836          * around as long as the interface exists.
837          */
838
839         rts0 = rt->rt_spares;
840         for (rts = rts0, i = NUM_SPARES; i != 0; i--, rts++) {
841                 if (rts->rts_router == new->rts_router)
842                         break;
843                 /* Note the worst slot to reuse,
844                  * other than the current slot.
845                  */
846                 if (rts0 == rt->rt_spares
847                     || BETTER_LINK(rt, rts0, rts))
848                         rts0 = rts;
849         }
850         if (i != 0) {
851                 /* Found a route from the router already in the table.
852                  */
853
854                 /* If the new route is a route broken down from an
855                  * aggregated route, and if the previous route is either
856                  * not a broken down route or was broken down from a finer
857                  * netmask, and if the previous route is current,
858                  * then forget this one.
859                  */
860                 if (new->rts_de_ag > rts->rts_de_ag
861                     && now_stale <= rts->rts_time)
862                         return;
863
864                 /* Keep poisoned routes around only long enough to pass
865                  * the poison on.  Use a new timestamp for good routes.
866                  */
867                 if (rts->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY
868                     && new->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY)
869                         new->rts_time = rts->rts_time;
870
871                 /* If this is an update for the router we currently prefer,
872                  * then note it.
873                  */
874                 if (i == NUM_SPARES) {
875                         rtchange(rt, rt->rt_state, new, 0);
876                         /* If the route got worse, check for something better.
877                          */
878                         if (new->rts_metric > rts->rts_metric)
879                                 rtswitch(rt, 0);
880                         return;
881                 }
882
883                 /* This is an update for a spare route.
884                  * Finished if the route is unchanged.
885                  */
886                 if (rts->rts_gate == new->rts_gate
887                     && rts->rts_metric == new->rts_metric
888                     && rts->rts_tag == new->rts_tag) {
889                         trace_upslot(rt, rts, new);
890                         *rts = *new;
891                         return;
892                 }
893                 /* Forget it if it has gone bad.
894                  */
895                 if (new->rts_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY) {
896                         rts_delete(rt, rts);
897                         return;
898                 }
899
900         } else {
901                 /* The update is for a route we know about,
902                  * but not from a familiar router.
903                  *
904                  * Ignore the route if it points to us.
905                  */
906                 if (n->n_nhop != 0
907                     && 0 != ifwithaddr(n->n_nhop, 1, 0))
908                         return;
909
910                 /* the loop above set rts0=worst spare */
911                 rts = rts0;
912
913                 /* Save the route as a spare only if it has
914                  * a better metric than our worst spare.
915                  * This also ignores poisoned routes (those
916                  * received with metric HOPCNT_INFINITY).
917                  */
918                 if (new->rts_metric >= rts->rts_metric)
919                         return;
920         }
921
922         trace_upslot(rt, rts, new);
923         *rts = *new;
924
925         /* try to switch to a better route */
926         rtswitch(rt, rts);
927 }
928
929
930 static int                              /* 0 if bad */
931 ck_passwd(struct interface *aifp,
932           struct rip *rip,
933           void *lim,
934           naddr from,
935           struct msg_limit *use_authp)
936 {
937 #       define NA (rip->rip_auths)
938         struct netauth *na2;
939         struct auth *ap;
940         MD5_CTX md5_ctx;
941         u_char hash[RIP_AUTH_PW_LEN];
942         int i, len;
943
944         assert(aifp != NULL);
945         if ((void *)NA >= lim || NA->a_family != RIP_AF_AUTH) {
946                 msglim(use_authp, from, "missing password from %s",
947                        naddr_ntoa(from));
948                 return 0;
949         }
950
951         /* accept any current (+/- 24 hours) password
952          */
953         for (ap = aifp->int_auth, i = 0; i < MAX_AUTH_KEYS; i++, ap++) {
954                 if (ap->type != NA->a_type
955                     || (u_long)ap->start > (u_long)clk.tv_sec+DAY
956                     || (u_long)ap->end+DAY < (u_long)clk.tv_sec)
957                         continue;
958
959                 if (NA->a_type == RIP_AUTH_PW) {
960                         if (!memcmp(NA->au.au_pw, ap->key, RIP_AUTH_PW_LEN))
961                                 return 1;
962
963                 } else {
964                         /* accept MD5 secret with the right key ID
965                          */
966                         if (NA->au.a_md5.md5_keyid != ap->keyid)
967                                 continue;
968
969                         len = ntohs(NA->au.a_md5.md5_pkt_len);
970                         if ((len-sizeof(*rip)) % sizeof(*NA) != 0
971                             || len != (char *)lim-(char*)rip-(int)sizeof(*NA)) {
972                                 msglim(use_authp, from,
973                                        "wrong MD5 RIPv2 packet length of %d"
974                                        " instead of %d from %s",
975                                        len, (int)((char *)lim-(char *)rip
976                                                   -sizeof(*NA)),
977                                        naddr_ntoa(from));
978                                 return 0;
979                         }
980                         na2 = (struct netauth *)((char *)rip+len);
981
982                         /* Given a good hash value, these are not security
983                          * problems so be generous and accept the routes,
984                          * after complaining.
985                          */
986                         if (TRACEPACKETS) {
987                                 if (NA->au.a_md5.md5_auth_len
988                                     != RIP_AUTH_MD5_HASH_LEN)
989                                         msglim(use_authp, from,
990                                                "unknown MD5 RIPv2 auth len %#x"
991                                                " instead of %#x from %s",
992                                                NA->au.a_md5.md5_auth_len,
993                                                (unsigned)RIP_AUTH_MD5_HASH_LEN,
994                                                naddr_ntoa(from));
995                                 if (na2->a_family != RIP_AF_AUTH)
996                                         msglim(use_authp, from,
997                                                "unknown MD5 RIPv2 family %#x"
998                                                " instead of %#x from %s",
999                                                na2->a_family, RIP_AF_AUTH,
1000                                                naddr_ntoa(from));
1001                                 if (na2->a_type != ntohs(1))
1002                                         msglim(use_authp, from,
1003                                                "MD5 RIPv2 hash has %#x"
1004                                                " instead of %#x from %s",
1005                                                na2->a_type, ntohs(1),
1006                                                naddr_ntoa(from));
1007                         }
1008
1009                         MD5Init(&md5_ctx);
1010                         MD5Update(&md5_ctx, (u_char *)rip,
1011                                   len + RIP_AUTH_MD5_HASH_XTRA);
1012                         MD5Update(&md5_ctx, ap->key, RIP_AUTH_MD5_KEY_LEN);
1013                         MD5Final(hash, &md5_ctx);
1014                         if (!memcmp(hash, na2->au.au_pw, sizeof(hash)))
1015                                 return 1;
1016                 }
1017         }
1018
1019         msglim(use_authp, from, "bad password from %s",
1020                naddr_ntoa(from));
1021         return 0;
1022 #undef NA
1023 }