2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
136 #include <openssl/x509.h>
137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
138 #include <openssl/dh.h>
140 #include <openssl/bn.h>
141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
142 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
144 #include <openssl/md5.h>
146 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
151 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
170 int new_state,state,skip=0;
172 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
176 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
178 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
179 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
181 /* init things to blank */
183 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
197 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
199 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
203 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
204 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
207 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
209 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
214 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
216 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
218 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
223 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
231 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
238 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
251 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
252 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
254 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
255 * client that doesn't support secure
258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
259 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
265 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
266 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
267 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
268 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
272 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
276 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
277 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
278 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
282 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
285 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
289 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
290 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
291 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
294 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
295 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
301 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
302 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
303 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
304 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
308 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
311 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
315 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
318 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
322 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
323 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
324 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
325 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
326 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
328 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
329 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
331 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
332 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
346 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
351 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
353 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
355 /* clear this, it may get reset by
356 * send_server_key_exchange */
357 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
360 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
362 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
363 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
364 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
365 * be able to handle this) */
366 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
368 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
371 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
372 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
374 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
375 * message only if the cipher suite is either
376 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
377 * server certificate contains the server's
378 * public key for key exchange.
380 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
382 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
384 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
385 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
386 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
392 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
393 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
403 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
404 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
405 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
406 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
407 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
408 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
409 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
410 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
411 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
412 * and in RFC 2246): */
413 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
414 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
415 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
416 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
417 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
418 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
420 /* no cert request */
422 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
423 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
427 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
428 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
429 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
430 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
431 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
434 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
441 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
442 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
443 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
444 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
445 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
449 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
451 /* This code originally checked to see if
452 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
453 * and then flushed. This caused problems
454 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
455 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
456 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
457 * still exist. So instead we just flush
461 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
462 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
467 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
469 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
472 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
473 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
474 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
475 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
479 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
481 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
483 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
484 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
491 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
492 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
493 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
498 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
499 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
500 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
501 * message is not sent.
503 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
508 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
511 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
512 * a client cert, it can be verified
514 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
515 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
516 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
517 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
518 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
519 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
523 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
524 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
526 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
527 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
528 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
530 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
534 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
535 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
536 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
537 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
538 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
542 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
543 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
546 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
551 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
552 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
553 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
554 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
555 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
559 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
561 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
562 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
563 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
572 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
573 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
574 { ret= -1; goto end; }
576 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
577 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
579 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
580 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
583 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
584 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
592 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
593 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
594 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
595 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
596 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
597 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
598 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
599 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
601 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
603 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
608 /* clean a few things up */
609 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
611 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
614 /* remove buffering on output */
615 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
619 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
621 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
622 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
626 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
628 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
630 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
632 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
646 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
650 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
655 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
659 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
666 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
670 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
674 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
678 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
680 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
681 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
686 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
687 /* number of bytes to write */
692 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
693 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
696 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
701 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
703 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
709 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
710 * so permit appropriate message length */
711 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
717 if (!ok) return((int)n);
718 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
719 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
721 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
722 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
723 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
724 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
726 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
728 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
729 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
732 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
738 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
740 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
741 unsigned int cookie_len;
744 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
749 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
751 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
752 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
753 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
754 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
757 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
759 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
762 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
763 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
764 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
765 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
766 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
769 if (!ok) return((int)n);
771 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
773 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
774 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
775 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
778 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
779 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
782 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
784 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
785 s->version = s->client_version;
787 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
791 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
792 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
793 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
795 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
797 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
799 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
800 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
802 if (cookie_length == 0)
806 /* load the client random */
807 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
810 /* get the session-id */
814 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
815 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
816 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
817 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
818 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
819 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
820 * an earlier library version)
822 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
824 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
829 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
831 { /* previous session */
838 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
845 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
851 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
852 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
853 * does not cause an overflow.
855 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
858 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
863 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
864 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
867 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
869 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
871 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
874 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
876 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
879 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
881 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
882 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
884 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
886 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
897 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
899 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
900 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
906 /* not enough data */
907 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
911 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
918 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
919 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
922 id=s->session->cipher->id;
925 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
927 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
929 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
931 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
932 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
940 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
941 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
944 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
946 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
947 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
948 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
949 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
950 * enabled, though. */
951 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
952 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
954 s->session->cipher = c;
961 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
962 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
963 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
973 /* not enough data */
974 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
981 if (p[j] == 0) break;
988 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
995 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
997 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
999 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1004 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1009 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1010 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1011 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1012 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1014 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
1015 { /* See if we have a match */
1016 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1018 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1019 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1021 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1034 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1040 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
1041 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
1042 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
1043 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
1044 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1048 /* wrong number of bytes,
1049 * there could be more to follow */
1050 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1057 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1062 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1063 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1065 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1067 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1068 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1069 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1070 if (ciphers == NULL)
1072 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1077 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1078 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1082 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1086 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1090 /* Session-id reuse */
1091 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1092 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1093 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1094 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1096 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1098 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1099 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1101 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1102 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1104 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1108 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1109 else if (ec != NULL)
1110 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1112 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1116 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1119 /* we now have the following setup.
1121 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1122 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1123 * compression - basically ignored right now
1124 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1125 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1126 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1127 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1134 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1137 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1141 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1144 unsigned char *p,*d;
1146 unsigned long l,Time;
1148 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1150 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1151 p=s->s3->server_random;
1152 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1154 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1156 /* Do the message type and length last */
1159 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1160 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1163 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1164 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1166 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1167 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1168 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1169 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1170 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1171 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1172 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1174 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1175 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1176 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1177 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1178 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1181 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1183 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1185 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1186 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1192 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1195 /* put the cipher */
1196 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1199 /* put the compression method */
1200 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1203 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1206 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1209 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1218 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1221 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1222 /* number of bytes to write */
1227 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1228 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1231 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1235 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1237 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1240 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1245 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1246 /* number of bytes to write */
1251 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1252 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1255 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1261 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1268 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1269 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1272 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1275 unsigned char *p,*d;
1285 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1286 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1288 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1293 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1296 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1299 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1301 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1302 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1303 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1306 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1315 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1321 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1326 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1329 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1330 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1331 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1332 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1335 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1340 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1347 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1354 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1355 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1356 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1358 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1367 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1368 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1369 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1370 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1383 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1385 const EC_GROUP *group;
1387 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1388 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1390 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1391 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1392 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1396 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1401 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1403 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1408 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1414 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1421 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1422 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1423 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1424 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1426 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1433 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1434 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1435 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1441 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1442 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1448 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1449 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1450 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1453 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1460 /* Encode the public key.
1461 * First check the size of encoding and
1462 * allocate memory accordingly.
1464 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1465 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1466 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1469 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1470 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1471 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1472 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1479 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1480 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1481 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1482 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1484 if (encodedlen == 0)
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1490 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1492 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1493 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1494 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1495 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1500 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1501 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1509 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1511 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1515 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1517 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1521 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1523 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1526 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1529 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1537 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1542 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1545 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1553 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1555 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1556 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1557 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1558 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1559 * the actual encoded point itself
1561 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1569 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1570 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1572 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1580 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1581 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1583 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1587 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1589 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1590 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1591 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1592 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1593 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1594 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1595 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1596 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1597 (unsigned int *)&i);
1601 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1602 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1612 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1613 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1616 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1617 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1618 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1619 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1620 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1621 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1631 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1632 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1634 /* let's do ECDSA */
1635 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1636 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1637 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1638 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1639 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1640 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1651 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1652 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1658 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1661 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1667 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1668 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1669 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1671 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1674 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1675 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1677 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1681 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1683 unsigned char *p,*d;
1685 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1689 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1693 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1695 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1697 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1706 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1710 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1712 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1713 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1714 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1719 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1720 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1723 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1730 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1731 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1737 /* else no CA names */
1738 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1741 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1742 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1745 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1750 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1751 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1754 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1761 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1764 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1765 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1770 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1778 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1786 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1789 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1790 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1791 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1792 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1795 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1796 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1797 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1798 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1802 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1803 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1805 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1810 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1811 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1813 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1814 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1815 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1816 * be sent already */
1819 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1827 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1828 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1829 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1830 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1832 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1839 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
1840 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
1841 s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1846 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1858 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1862 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1864 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1865 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1868 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1870 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1871 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1872 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1873 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1874 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1876 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1877 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1878 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1880 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1881 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1883 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1884 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1885 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1886 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1887 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1888 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1889 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1895 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1896 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1897 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1899 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1900 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1901 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1902 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1906 s->session->master_key_length=
1907 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1908 s->session->master_key,
1910 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1915 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1920 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1932 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1934 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1940 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1942 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1947 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1950 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1957 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1965 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1970 s->session->master_key_length=
1971 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1972 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1973 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1980 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1981 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1982 krb5_data authenticator;
1984 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1985 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1986 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1987 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1988 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1989 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1991 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1992 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1994 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1996 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1999 enc_ticket.length = i;
2001 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2004 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2008 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2009 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2012 authenticator.length = i;
2014 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2017 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2021 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2022 p+=authenticator.length;
2026 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2029 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2032 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2035 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2039 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2040 enc_pms.length + 6))
2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2043 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2047 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2051 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2052 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2054 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2055 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2061 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2062 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2064 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2065 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2068 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2069 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2071 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2072 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2078 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2085 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2086 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2088 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2092 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2094 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2097 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2100 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2101 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2104 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2107 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2110 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2113 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2116 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2120 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2123 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2126 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2128 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2129 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2130 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2131 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2132 * the protocol version.
2133 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2134 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2136 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2139 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2144 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2146 s->session->master_key_length=
2147 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2148 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2150 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2152 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2153 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2155 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2156 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2161 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2162 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2163 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2164 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2168 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2171 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2176 const EC_GROUP *group;
2177 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2179 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2180 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2183 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2187 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2190 /* use the certificate */
2191 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2195 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2196 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2198 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2201 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2202 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2204 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2205 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2212 /* Let's get client's public key */
2213 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2216 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2222 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2226 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2230 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2232 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2234 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2235 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2236 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2237 * never executed. When that support is
2238 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2239 * received in the certificate is
2240 * authorized for key agreement.
2241 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2242 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2245 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2247 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2251 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2252 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2258 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2262 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2263 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2265 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2268 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2272 /* Get encoded point length */
2275 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2276 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2282 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2283 * currently, so set it to the start
2285 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2288 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2289 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2290 if (field_size <= 0)
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2296 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2304 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2305 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2306 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2307 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2308 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2310 /* Compute the master secret */
2311 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2312 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2314 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2320 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2322 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2328 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2329 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2333 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2334 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2335 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2336 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2337 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2342 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2344 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2351 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2352 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2353 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2358 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2360 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2362 peer=s->session->peer;
2363 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2364 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2372 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2374 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2375 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2377 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2388 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2392 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2395 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2399 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2402 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2406 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2407 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2413 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2417 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2418 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2421 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2426 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2428 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2429 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2433 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2439 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2447 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2449 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2450 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2451 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2455 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2463 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2465 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2466 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2467 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2471 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2473 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2481 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2490 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2493 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2497 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2499 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2501 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2502 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2504 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2506 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2513 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2515 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2517 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2518 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2521 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2524 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2525 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2528 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2531 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2535 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2537 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2541 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2543 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2552 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2556 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2559 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2561 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2567 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2575 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2579 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2588 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2590 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2591 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2593 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2597 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2598 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2599 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2602 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2608 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2611 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2617 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2618 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2619 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2620 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2622 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2623 * when we arrive here. */
2624 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2626 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2627 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2633 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2634 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2635 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2636 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2637 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2645 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2648 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2649 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2653 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2658 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2660 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2662 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2663 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2664 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2665 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2671 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2672 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2677 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2678 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2683 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2684 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2686 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2687 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2689 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2691 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2693 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2695 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2697 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2699 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2701 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2703 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2705 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2707 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2709 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2711 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2713 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2715 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2717 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2719 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2721 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2723 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2725 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2727 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2729 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2731 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2733 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2735 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2737 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2745 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2747 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2749 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2754 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2755 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2756 unsigned char key_name[16];
2758 /* get session encoding length */
2759 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2760 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2765 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2766 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2767 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2768 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2769 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2770 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2772 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2773 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2774 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2776 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2780 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2782 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2784 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2785 /* Skip message length for now */
2787 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2788 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2789 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2790 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2793 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2795 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
2804 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
2805 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2806 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2807 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2808 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2809 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2811 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2812 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2814 /* Output key name */
2816 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2819 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2820 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2821 /* Encrypt session data */
2822 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2824 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2826 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2828 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2829 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2830 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2833 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2835 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2836 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
2837 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
2839 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
2841 /* number of bytes to write */
2843 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2848 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2849 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2852 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2854 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
2857 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2858 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2859 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2862 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2865 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2868 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
2869 /* message length */
2870 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
2872 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
2873 /* length of OCSP response */
2874 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2875 /* actual response */
2876 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2877 /* number of bytes to write */
2878 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
2879 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2883 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2884 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));