2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
136 #include <openssl/x509.h>
137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
138 #include <openssl/dh.h>
140 #include <openssl/bn.h>
141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
142 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
144 #include <openssl/md5.h>
146 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
151 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
170 int new_state,state,skip=0;
172 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
176 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
178 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
179 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
181 /* init things to blank */
183 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
197 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
199 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
203 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
204 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
207 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
209 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
214 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
216 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
218 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
223 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
231 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
238 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
251 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
252 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
254 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
255 * client that doesn't support secure
258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
259 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
265 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
266 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
267 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
268 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
272 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
276 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
277 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
278 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
282 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
285 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
289 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
290 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
291 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
294 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
295 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
301 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
302 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
303 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
304 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
308 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
311 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
315 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
318 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
322 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
323 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
324 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
325 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
326 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
328 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
329 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
331 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
332 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
346 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
351 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
353 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
355 /* clear this, it may get reset by
356 * send_server_key_exchange */
357 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
360 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
362 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
363 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
364 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
365 * be able to handle this) */
366 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
368 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
371 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
372 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
374 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
375 * message only if the cipher suite is either
376 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
377 * server certificate contains the server's
378 * public key for key exchange.
380 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
382 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
384 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
385 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
386 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
392 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
393 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
403 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
404 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
405 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
406 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
407 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
408 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
409 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
410 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
411 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
412 * and in RFC 2246): */
413 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
414 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
415 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
416 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
417 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
418 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
420 /* no cert request */
422 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
423 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
427 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
428 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
429 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
430 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
431 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
434 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
441 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
442 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
443 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
444 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
445 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
449 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
451 /* This code originally checked to see if
452 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
453 * and then flushed. This caused problems
454 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
455 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
456 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
457 * still exist. So instead we just flush
461 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
462 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
467 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
469 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
472 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
473 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
474 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
475 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
479 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
481 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
483 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
484 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
491 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
492 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
493 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
498 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
499 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
500 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
501 * message is not sent.
503 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
508 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
511 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
512 * a client cert, it can be verified
514 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
515 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
516 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
517 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
518 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
519 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
523 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
524 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
526 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
527 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
528 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
530 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
534 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
535 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
536 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
537 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
538 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
542 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
543 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
546 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
551 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
552 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
553 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
554 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
555 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
559 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
561 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
562 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
563 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
572 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
573 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
574 { ret= -1; goto end; }
576 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
577 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
579 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
580 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
583 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
584 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
592 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
593 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
594 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
595 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
596 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
597 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
598 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
599 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
601 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
603 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
608 /* clean a few things up */
609 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
611 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
614 /* remove buffering on output */
615 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
619 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
621 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
622 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
626 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
628 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
630 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
632 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
646 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
650 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
655 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
659 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
666 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
670 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
674 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
678 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
680 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
681 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
686 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
687 /* number of bytes to write */
692 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
693 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
696 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
701 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
702 * so permit appropriate message length */
703 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
709 if (!ok) return((int)n);
710 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
711 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
713 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
715 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
720 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
721 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
722 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
723 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
725 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
727 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
728 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
731 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
737 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
739 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
740 unsigned int cookie_len;
743 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
748 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
750 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
751 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
752 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
753 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
756 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
758 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
761 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
762 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
763 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
764 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
765 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
768 if (!ok) return((int)n);
770 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
772 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
773 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
774 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
777 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
778 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
781 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
783 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
784 s->version = s->client_version;
786 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
790 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
791 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
792 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
794 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
796 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
798 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
799 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
801 if (cookie_length == 0)
805 /* load the client random */
806 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
809 /* get the session-id */
813 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
814 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
815 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
816 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
817 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
818 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
819 * an earlier library version)
821 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
823 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
828 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
830 { /* previous session */
837 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
844 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
850 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
851 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
852 * does not cause an overflow.
854 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
857 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
862 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
863 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
866 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
868 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
870 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
873 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
875 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
878 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
880 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
881 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
883 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
885 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
896 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
898 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
899 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
905 /* not enough data */
906 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
910 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
917 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
918 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
921 id=s->session->cipher->id;
924 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
926 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
928 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
930 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
931 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
939 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
940 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
943 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
945 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
946 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
947 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
948 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
949 * enabled, though. */
950 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
951 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
953 s->session->cipher = c;
960 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
961 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
962 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
972 /* not enough data */
973 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
980 if (p[j] == 0) break;
987 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
994 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
996 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
998 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1003 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1008 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1009 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1010 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1011 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1013 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
1014 { /* See if we have a match */
1015 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1017 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1018 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1020 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1033 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1039 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
1040 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
1041 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
1042 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
1043 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1047 /* wrong number of bytes,
1048 * there could be more to follow */
1049 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1056 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1061 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1062 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1064 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1066 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1067 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1068 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1069 if (ciphers == NULL)
1071 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1076 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1077 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1081 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1085 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1089 /* Session-id reuse */
1090 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1091 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1092 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1093 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1095 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1097 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1098 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1100 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1101 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1103 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1107 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1108 else if (ec != NULL)
1109 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1111 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1115 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1118 /* we now have the following setup.
1120 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1121 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1122 * compression - basically ignored right now
1123 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1124 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1125 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1126 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1133 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1136 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1140 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1143 unsigned char *p,*d;
1145 unsigned long l,Time;
1147 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1149 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1150 p=s->s3->server_random;
1151 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1153 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1155 /* Do the message type and length last */
1158 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1159 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1162 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1163 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1165 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1166 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1167 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1168 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1169 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1170 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1171 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1173 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1174 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1175 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1176 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1177 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1180 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1182 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1184 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1185 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1191 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1194 /* put the cipher */
1195 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1198 /* put the compression method */
1199 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1202 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1205 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1208 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1217 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1220 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1221 /* number of bytes to write */
1226 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1227 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1230 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1234 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1236 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1239 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1244 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1245 /* number of bytes to write */
1250 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1251 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1254 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1260 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1267 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1268 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1271 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1274 unsigned char *p,*d;
1284 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1285 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1287 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1292 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1295 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1298 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1300 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1301 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1302 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1305 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1314 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1320 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1325 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1328 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1329 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1330 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1331 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1334 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1339 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1346 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1353 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1354 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1355 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1357 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1366 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1367 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1368 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1369 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1382 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1384 const EC_GROUP *group;
1386 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1387 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1389 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1390 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1391 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1395 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1400 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1402 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1407 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1413 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1420 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1421 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1422 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1423 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1425 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1432 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1433 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1434 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1440 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1441 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1447 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1448 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1449 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1452 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1459 /* Encode the public key.
1460 * First check the size of encoding and
1461 * allocate memory accordingly.
1463 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1464 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1465 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1468 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1469 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1470 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1471 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1478 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1479 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1480 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1481 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1483 if (encodedlen == 0)
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1489 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1491 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1492 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1493 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1494 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1499 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1500 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1508 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1510 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1514 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1516 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1520 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1522 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1525 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1528 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1536 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1541 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1544 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1552 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1554 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1555 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1556 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1557 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1558 * the actual encoded point itself
1560 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1568 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1569 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1571 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1579 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1580 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1582 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1586 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1588 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1589 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1590 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1591 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1592 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1593 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1594 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1595 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1596 (unsigned int *)&i);
1600 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1601 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1611 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1612 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1615 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1616 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1617 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1618 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1619 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1620 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1630 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1631 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1633 /* let's do ECDSA */
1634 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1635 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1636 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1637 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1638 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1639 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1650 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1651 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1657 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1660 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1666 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1667 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1668 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1670 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1673 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1674 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1676 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1680 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1682 unsigned char *p,*d;
1684 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1688 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1692 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1694 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1696 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1705 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1709 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1711 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1712 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1713 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1718 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1719 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1722 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1729 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1730 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1736 /* else no CA names */
1737 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1740 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1741 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1744 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1749 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1750 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1753 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1760 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1763 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1764 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1769 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1777 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1785 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1787 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1788 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1789 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1790 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1791 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1794 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1795 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1796 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1797 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1801 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1802 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1804 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1809 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1810 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1812 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1813 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1814 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1815 * be sent already */
1818 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1826 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1827 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1828 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1829 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1831 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1838 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
1839 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
1840 s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1845 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1857 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1861 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1863 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1864 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1867 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1869 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1870 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1871 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1872 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1873 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1875 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1876 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1877 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1879 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1880 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1882 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1883 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1884 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1885 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1886 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1887 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1888 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1894 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1895 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1896 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1898 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1899 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1900 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1901 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1905 s->session->master_key_length=
1906 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1907 s->session->master_key,
1909 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1914 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1919 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1931 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1933 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1939 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1941 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1946 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1949 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1956 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1964 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1969 s->session->master_key_length=
1970 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1971 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1972 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1979 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1980 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1981 krb5_data authenticator;
1983 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1984 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1985 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1986 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1987 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1988 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1990 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1991 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1993 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1995 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1998 enc_ticket.length = i;
2000 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2003 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2007 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2008 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2011 authenticator.length = i;
2013 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
2015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2016 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2020 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2021 p+=authenticator.length;
2025 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2028 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2031 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2034 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2038 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2039 enc_pms.length + 6))
2041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2042 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2046 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2050 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2051 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2053 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2054 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2060 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2061 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2063 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2064 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2067 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2068 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2070 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2071 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2077 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2084 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2085 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2087 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2091 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2093 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2096 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2099 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2100 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2103 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2106 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2109 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2112 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2115 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2119 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2122 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2125 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2127 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2128 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2129 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2130 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2131 * the protocol version.
2132 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2133 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2135 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2138 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2143 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2145 s->session->master_key_length=
2146 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2147 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2149 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2151 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2152 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2154 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2155 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2160 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2161 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2162 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2163 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2167 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2170 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2175 const EC_GROUP *group;
2176 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2178 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2179 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2182 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2186 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2189 /* use the certificate */
2190 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2194 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2195 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2197 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2200 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2201 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2203 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2204 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2211 /* Let's get client's public key */
2212 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2215 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2221 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2225 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2229 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2231 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2233 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2234 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2235 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2236 * never executed. When that support is
2237 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2238 * received in the certificate is
2239 * authorized for key agreement.
2240 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2241 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2244 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2246 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2250 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2251 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2257 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2261 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2262 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2264 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2267 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2271 /* Get encoded point length */
2274 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2275 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2281 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2282 * currently, so set it to the start
2284 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2287 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2288 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2289 if (field_size <= 0)
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2295 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2303 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2304 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2305 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2306 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2307 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2309 /* Compute the master secret */
2310 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2311 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2313 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2319 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2321 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2327 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2328 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2332 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2333 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2334 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2335 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2336 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2341 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2343 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2350 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2351 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2352 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2357 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2359 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2361 peer=s->session->peer;
2362 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2363 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2371 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2373 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2374 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2376 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2387 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2391 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2394 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2398 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2401 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2405 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2406 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2412 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2416 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2417 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2420 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2425 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2427 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2428 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2432 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2438 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2446 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2448 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2449 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2450 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2454 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2462 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2464 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2465 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2466 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2470 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2472 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2480 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2489 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2492 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2496 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2498 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2500 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2501 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2503 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2505 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2512 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2514 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2516 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2517 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2520 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2523 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2524 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2527 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2530 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2534 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2536 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2540 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2542 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2551 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2555 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2558 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2560 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2566 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2574 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2578 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2587 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2589 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2590 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2592 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2596 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2597 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2598 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2601 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2607 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2610 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2616 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2617 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2618 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2619 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2621 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2622 * when we arrive here. */
2623 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2625 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2626 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2632 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2633 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2634 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2635 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2636 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2644 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2647 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2648 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2652 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2657 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2659 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2661 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2662 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2663 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2664 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2670 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2671 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2676 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2677 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2682 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2683 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2685 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2686 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2688 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2690 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2692 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2694 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2696 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2698 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2700 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2702 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2704 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2706 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2708 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2710 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2712 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2714 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2716 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2718 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2720 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2722 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2724 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2726 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2728 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2730 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2732 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2734 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2736 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2744 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2746 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2748 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2753 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2754 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2755 unsigned char key_name[16];
2757 /* get session encoding length */
2758 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2759 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2764 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2765 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2766 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2767 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2768 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2769 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2771 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2772 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2773 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2775 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2779 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2781 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2783 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2784 /* Skip message length for now */
2786 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2787 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2788 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2789 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2792 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2794 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
2803 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
2804 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2805 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2806 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2807 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2808 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2810 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2811 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2813 /* Output key name */
2815 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2818 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2819 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2820 /* Encrypt session data */
2821 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2823 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2825 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2827 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2828 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2829 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2832 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2834 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2835 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
2836 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
2838 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
2840 /* number of bytes to write */
2842 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2847 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2848 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2851 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2853 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
2856 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2857 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2858 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2861 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2864 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2867 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
2868 /* message length */
2869 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
2871 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
2872 /* length of OCSP response */
2873 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2874 /* actual response */
2875 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2876 /* number of bytes to write */
2877 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
2878 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2882 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2883 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));